An analytical ethnography of children's agency, power and social relations: an actor-network theory approach by Ogilvie-Whyte, Sharon Anne
i yen. (J) 
' it10 0 
An Analytical Ethnography of Children's Agency, 
Power and Social Relations 
An Actor-Network Theory Approach 
Sharon Anne Ogilvie-Whyte 
Thesis Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Stirling 
2004 
ý' 
Declaration 
I declare that none of the work contained within this thesis has been submitted for any 
other degree at any other university. The contents found herein have been composed by 
the candidate, Sharon A. Ogilvie-Whyte. 
Sharon A. Ogilvie-Whyte 
For My Father 
Thomas Henry Ogilvie 
Thank you Dad. 
Acknowledeements 
I would like to thank... 
In the Field 
There are so many people I should mention who in their various and not always obvious ways 
have helped and supported me over the last few years. First and foremost, however, I need to 
thank the children, parents, teachers and educational professionals who allowed me, for a short 
time, to invade their worlds. 
Stirling University 
For treating me as a person and not an `automated thesis producing machine', I would like to 
extend an enormous debt of gratitude to my supervisor Professor Alan Prout. Also, I would like 
to thank him for his encouragement and for not complaining about my frequent hiatus moments. 
Although his thought has informed my work, I feel that he has given me the room to develop this 
thesis as autonomously as possible. Lynn Kelly, Geraldine Gallagher and Maria Muir provided 
nights of Italian food, fine wine and an arena in which to `off-load'. This was both appreciated 
and much needed. 
At Home 
My sister Elizabeth Hartley has always been there to talk to, laugh with, cry with and give me the 
benefit of her psycho-therapeutic skills free of charge. This has always been valued. Others in 
my family I need to thank are: my brother Tommy for constant interruptions that cheered me up; 
my sister Karen and brother Robert who in their own ways kept my feet on the ground; and my 
mother for being there. A special mention has to go to my two sons. They have both had to put 
up with my prolonged periods of preoccupation with this thesis. So a massive thank you to 
`pickles' and `magic boots' for putting up with your mother. 
Colleagues 
More recently, colleagues at the Centre for Research on Families and Relationships helped to 
bring this thesis to a close by reminding me what the point of it all was. I extend my gratitude to 
them all and thank them for their understanding towards the end. 
A Special Mention 
At the end when things were at their most difficult there was one person in particular whose 
support was pivotal in getting me to the end point. I do not think I can ever adequately thank her 
for all that she did for me then and for her friendship, loyalty and support through the many years 
I have now known her. Mostly, I need to thank her for being there when I needed her friendship 
the most and for keeping me sane and motivated. I am honoured, privileged and blessed to have 
such a friend. I doubt I would have made it this far without her. Thank you Maria. 
Examiners 
I would also like to extend my sincere thanks to my examiners Professor Julie Allan (University 
of Stirling) and Dr. Nick Lee (University of Keele) for what was (despite the usual fears) a 
rewarding and enjoyable viva and for their comments, recommendations and enthusiasm for my 
work. 
Abstract 
This thesis connects with and extends inter alia the recent but as yet peripheral move 
within the sociology of childhood to open up children's agency to empirical analysis. 
Drawing heuristically upon actor-network theory and thought of this kind its aim is to 
expose the networks of heterogeneous associations upon which children's agency and 
power depends. Focusing upon children's every day play activities; the analytical lens is 
extended to consider the role of nonhumans that are embedded in children's mundane 
play interactions within their local neighbourhood and within their school playground. In 
doing so, this thesis argues that nonhumans are crucial participants in social interaction 
that are implicated in and pivotal to the heterogeneous networks of associations that 
children, as heterogeneous engineers, actively create to achieve their particular goals and 
desires. As a corollary to this, an analytical incorporation of nonhumans has drawn 
attention to the wider role that nonhumans play in the life worlds of children. In respect 
to this, the argument this thesis advances is that nonhumans, in their diverse forms, are 
functionally important in holding children's social relations in place. Drawn from 
ethnographic fieldwork with children, this thesis argues that children's agency, power 
and social relations, take their form and are an outcome of the heterogeneous associations 
that take place between humans and `things'. 
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Glossary 
Scottish Words, Phrases and Terms Used in the Text 
Ach Oh. 
An And. 
And all and everything. 
Aw All. 
Aw thing Everything. 
Aye Yes. 
Ba Ball. 
Bairns Children. 
Batter Beat; Physically assault. 
Cannae Can not. 
Cos Because. 
Crap Rubbish; Not Good. 
Dae Do. 
Dead Really. 
Doesnae Does not. 
Doon Down. 
Dose; dosser or dosses A person 
lacking intelligence. 
Dug Dog. 
Dunno I do not know. 
Fives Five-a-side football. 
Footie Football. 
Gettin Getting 
Gid Good. 
Goalie Goal keeper. 
Greeter Person who cries a lot. 
Greetin Crying. 
Hae Have. 
Hee Haw Trouble. 
Isnae Is not. 
Jannie Janitor. 
Ken You know. 
Midget A small person. 
Mink Poor Person. 
Mong A derogatory term for a person 
with either physical or mental 
impairments. 
Naebody Nobody. 
No Not. 
Roon Around. 
Roond Around or round. 
Rubbin Rubbing. 
Sap A person lacking in strength. 
Tae To. 
Titchy Small. 
Totsie Small. 
Trainees Trainers. 
Wee Small. 
Wee'er Smaller. 
Wellie To hit, strike or kick with force. 
Wi With. 
Woose A person lacking in strength. 
Yeah Yes. 
Yi You. 
In practice research needs to be messy and heterogeneous, because that 
is the way it, research, actually is. And also, more importantly, it needs 
to be messy because that is the way the largest part of the world is. 
Messy, unknowable in a regular and routinised way. Unknowable, 
therefore, in many ways that are definite or coherent... Clarity doesn't 
help. Disciplined lack of clarity. That may be what we need... We need 
to understand that our methods are more or less unruly assemblages. 
John Law, 2003. 
Chapter One 
Taking Account of the Means of Production: A Reflexive Biography of the 
Development of the Thesis 
Introduction 
Liz Stanley (1990) suggests that good research is that which takes account of the means 
of its own production. Failure to do so, she implies, results in alienated knowledge. 
Here, Stanley is of course discussing issues of reflexivity in ethnographic fieldwork and 
the notion that through invoking self-awareness researchers should creatively use their 
insights into their own personal, cultural and historical context in their ethnographic 
pursuits (Okley 1975 cited in Davis 1998). This process is considered to involve 
`personal exposures' (Davis 1998: 331) by the researcher that facilitate the recognition of 
the role of the self in the research process, so minimising, although not completely 
eliminating, subjectivity (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Ely and Anzul 1991). Commenting 
on reflexive practices, Geertz (1973) considers that the researcher's self-awareness can be 
used to develop a deeper understanding of the culture being researched. The perception 
being that the differences that exist between researcher and researched can be exploited 
through hermeneutics as way of developing and understanding data (Rabinow 1977). 
It is commonplace for ethnographic texts to contain reflexive narratives that incorporate 
these `personal exposures' in the name of reflexivity almost as a matter of complicity. 
Invariably, these personal narratives appear at the beginning of an account in 
introductions, first chapters or brief autobiographical statements as a prelude to formal 
description (Clifford and Marcus 1986). Here positionalities are confessed although 
usually reduced to the essentialised attributes of class, gender, ethnicity and race 
(Cupples 2002; Butler 2001). Once done, the researcher can rest easy in the knowledge 
that he / she has perhaps satisfied the requisite condition to acknowledge the effects of 
their positionalities upon their research and lessened audience worries over personal 
subjectivity (Bulter 2001). 
I have thought at length about what it means to acknowledge the effects of the self upon 
research in such ways and what the standard treatment of reflexivity in ethnographic 
practice and writing, particularly in the context of a PhD, excludes. For the most part, it 
appears that reflexivity is conventionally understood and considered in relation to the 
non-academic self of the researcher. Here, the researcher is urged to critically reflect 
upon and conceptualise how the sum of their life experiences outside of academia 
impacts upon the research process and the subsequent construction of the knowledge that 
is produced. What appears to be missing from this is a consideration of the academic self 
of the researcher and how this self influences the research process, the data generated and 
the explanations that are advanced. 
Davis (1998: 331) draws attention to this in a discussion of reflexivity when he argues that 
the `researcher's world has two parts'. Drawing on (Campbell 1995) he suggests that one 
part of this world incorporates the non-academic based self which contains the 
researcher's cultural prejudices and preconceptions out with academia. The other part is 
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the academic self which contains the researcher's academic prejudices and 
preconceptions. Thus, he argues that the researcher may recognise `that there are two 
voices at work in their head' (1998: 332). 
Exposure of this academic self in ethnographic practice and writing rarely seems to go 
beyond obligatory discussions of theory and methodology. One reason for this is that it is 
taken almost as a given that the influence of, for example, a particular theoretical position 
or stance will result in a different interpretation or set of explanations than that which 
would occur had another been advanced (cf. Denzin 1997). This is emphasised by those 
who engage in the reanalysis of their own existing ethnographic work (Burawoy 2003). 
Generally speaking however, the academic self with its various preconceptions and 
prejudices appears to be presented as static in research accounts, that is, as a stable, non- 
moving entity. Reflecting here on my own experience, I wish to suggest that this peculiar 
vision of the academic self is perhaps misleading. I say this because it denies what I have 
experienced as an unstable and continuously changing relationship with my own 
discipline, in so far, as I have questioned, resisted and changed my own academic 
preconceptions and prejudices many times over before reaching what could perhaps be 
considered as a stable viewpoint. In part, this could be related to what I suggest to be a 
third, albeit related, voice at work in the head of the doctoral candidate - that of the 
`student researcher'. 
This voice is silenced in the final written account of the doctoral thesis. Yet, it is, I argue, 
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as integral to the research process and its final outcome as either the voice of the non- 
academic or academic self. Its narrative is as rich a resource on the decisions and choices 
that have influenced and informed the development and execution of the work as either 
the reflexive narrative of the non-academic or the less reflexive (but nevertheless present) 
academic self. These arguments can be contextualised in relation to the accepted 
objectives of a PhD. 
PhD handbooks and guidelines inform the student researcher that the PhD has two 
primary objectives: First, and most explicitly, that the student researcher is required to 
produce a substantial and original contribution to knowledge (Nightingale 1984). 
Second, and less explicitly, the student researcher should become proficient in the 
process of doing research (Phillips and Pugh 1990). Hence, and as Hanrahan et al. 
(1999: 401) state, `doing a doctorate is an experience in learning'. Yet the traditional 
genre of writing empirical doctoral research seemingly requires that the act of learning is 
divorced from both the act of research and the communication of that act. Thus, the 
choice of question, theoretical framework, methodology, findings and so on are usually 
presented to the reader of the thesis as if they were preliminary thoughts that developed 
in isolation from the executive processes of the PhD. Little, if anything at all, is said of 
the interaction between learning and the research process. 
Contrary to this, narratives of the sort to which I refer frequently appear in post-doctoral 
publications after the PhD has been conferred, presumably because the need to bear in 
mind an audience that may be perceived as reluctant to accept deviations from the 
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standard genre of thesis writing perhaps no longer present as a issue of concern (cf. Pole 
2000). This suggests, that for some, the communication of the interaction between 
learning in the context of a PhD and the research process is worthy of serious 
consideration. 
My own view is that this interaction informs and is crucial to the eventual form that the 
thesis takes and the knowledge that is produced within it. Consequently, I wish to 
suggest that if I am the instrument of research (Guba and Lincoln 1989) then there is a 
place for the documentation of these aspects of the learning process in the written 
presentation of the PhD thesis. Here, I share affinity with Mary Hanrahan's (1999: 404) 
stance when she writes: 
`I see my own task of making `an original and substantial contribution 
to knowledge' as being a larger process than that of doing and reporting 
some linear process of empirical research, from a supposedly objective, 
or at least, stable, viewpoint. For me research is much more of a 
hermeneutic process, with its meaning being rewritten many times 
along the way, as the whole is continually being reconceptualised in the 
light of new learning. ' 
These sentiments are particularly relevant to the processes involved in the production of 
this thesis. The `new learning' that I did had an incontestable influence upon the 
development of the work, the changes made to the research problem and the adoption of a 
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radically different theoretical and methodological approach than that contained within the 
original research vision. The documentation of this process I consider essential for a 
coherent and faithful reading of how and why this thesis came into being. I consider that 
a failure to do so would seriously obscure from the reader an important facet in the 
production of the knowledge presented here. 
In this chapter, I wish to draw on and amalgamate three different reflexive narratives in 
my account of the means in which this thesis was produced: the narrative of the non- 
academic self, the narrative of the academic self; and the related narrative of the student 
researcher. Through these three subject positions I unfold the `story' of how this thesis 
became. In doing so, I attend to the motivations that influenced the original research 
vision, the changes made to this vision as a result of my engagements with the literature 
prior to and during the exploratory and main phases of fieldwork and the iterative 
process of reflection and modification of the focus of observations in accordance with 
analytical developments. 
It is difficult to adequately communicate the complexities of this story and I am mindful 
that I have edited my voices for a public stance. It is also inevitably partial, in so far, as it 
draws out only those aspects that I consider to have had a major effect upon the 
development of the thesis. For reasons of clarity and also because it seems the most 
logical approach, I have presented this story chronologically. I begin with the motives 
that informed the original topic of investigation and move through a discussion of how 
my identity as a sociologically trained student researcher influenced my engagements 
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with a research literature firmly colonised by psychology. Following this, I reveal the 
discrepancies within this literature that led to my focus on power. My discussion then 
turns to the interaction that took place between the conceptual and empirical world as I 
`entered the field' and the subsequent shaping of my thesis in light of this interaction. 
My main objective here is to communicate how this thesis metamorphisised into an 
analytical ethnography of agency, power and children's social relations. Part of this 
objective is to illustrate how actor-network theory came to both inform and shape my 
analysis. I conclude my discussion by outlining the main themes addressed in this thesis 
as result of this process and the structure of these themes in the text. 
The Original Vision 
My original intention was to conduct a study into children's perspectives on bullying. 
My choice of research topic was motivated entirely by a combination of my youngest 
son's then current difficulties as a `victim' of verbal bullying in school and the memory 
that this prompted of my own experiences as a bullied child. At the time my then six 
year old son was in contact with an educational psychologist charged with the remit of 
teaching him `coping strategies' to deal with the verbal bullying he was experiencing. 
The process had angered me. The relevant authorities within my son's school had 
informed me that they were more concerned about how my son would eventually react to 
those children who constantly chastised him, than the chastisement itself. Verbal 
chastisement, I was told, was to be expected. As a child whose physique and strength 
was relatively large compared to his peers, (which incidentally was the reason he was 
7 
chastised) and because it had been noted he was beginning to react aggressively towards 
his chastisers, I was told that my son had to learn to `manage his anger' and `to react 
appropriately'. 
Whilst I acknowledged his aggressive response had been becoming a source of concern, I 
was angered by the way in which his own narrative of how the chastisement was 
affecting him had been ignored. When he asked me why no one had listened to him, I 
realised that he also recognised that his voice had not been heard. Although I was a 
teenager when I experienced my own victim career, my son's recognition that his voice 
was not being heard resonated with my own memory of how the relevant authorities 
treated my case. Like my son, I experienced verbal chastisement founded upon my 
difference vis-ä-vis my peers. As a rural child attending a city centre school I was 
subjected daily to verbal taunts and name calling that drew on negative connotations of 
rural citizens as `interbred', as `bumpkins' (a simple rustic person), and as `teuchters' (a 
stupid person) 1. This was interwoven with taunts based upon my status as an adopted 
child which resulted in my having to endure daily renditions of the song `nobody's child'. 
In so far as these were vivid and painful enough memories for me to empathise with the 
emotional dimension of my son's experience, the failure of the school to adequately deal 
with my bullies and dismiss my views through repeatedly telling me (and my parents) 
that this was `character building' and `part of growing up' gave me some understanding 
of how it felt as a child to have my opinions silenced. My own case resulted in school 
1 The meaning of this colloquialism varies in Scotland. For example, in the west coast of Scotland it is 
used to refer to any person who lives in the north of Scotland. 
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refusal, truanting and my eventual early exit from compulsory education. Therefore, I 
recognised that bullying, if left unresolved, can have serious and lasting consequences for 
a child or young person. 
Against this background, I developed a thesis proposal with the explicit aim of putting 
the child's voice at the centre of the analysis. My concern with the voice of the child 
naturally led me towards an a priori and pragmatic adoption of the social actor paradigm. 
At the time I had no prior academic engagements with the sociology of childhood or its 
theoretical paradigms. The approach seduced me because it appeared to support my 
remit to privilege the voices of children. Additionally, some initial `dipping' into the 
psychologically dominated literature on school bullying suggested a lack of empirical 
research that took children's perspectives and understandings into account, something 
which is now becoming increasingly recognised (cf. Gumpel and Meadan 2000; Oliver 
and Candappa 2003). More recently, this is becoming increasingly linked to children's 
rights discourses (cf. Smith 2000; Smith 2004). 
Somewhat relatedly, was the issue of the choice of an appropriate method for privileging 
the voices of children and the recognition that psychological research on bullying was 
firmly monopolised by quantitative methods and experimental techniques that did not 
appear (even when claiming the contrary) to seek or listen to children's perspectives and 
understandings. This is something which Woodhead and Faulkner (2000: 11) comment 
on when discussing, in more general terms, psychological research into children and 
childhood: 
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`Much of this research expertise is all about empathising with the 
children's experience, understanding their beliefs and respecting their 
concerns. But in another sense this research is not about `listening to 
the child'. While research transcripts are often rich in this kind of 
material, they are generally analysed and interpreted in terms of more 
abstract questions which, as a rule, reflect researchers' rather than 
children's experiences, beliefs and concerns.... Most often, children's 
actions and thoughts are interpreted against models of psychological 
processes, stages of relative competence, and / or deviations from 
`normality'. 
Critiques of this sort (including Woodhead and Faulkner's) recognise, that for the most 
part, this is intimately bound up with a cultural research climate in which the orthodoxy 
of the scientific model dominates. In so far as privileging the child's voice is concerned, 
sociologists of childhood have argued that ethnographically informed techniques are 
perhaps more suitable: 
`Ethnography is a particularly useful methodology for the study of 
childhood. It allows children a more direct voice and participation in 
the production of sociological data than is usually possible through 
experimental or survey styles of research' (Prout and James 1997: 8). 
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Therefore, it seemed logical to conclude, that given the relative absence of children's 
perspectives in psychological studies of bullying, the implication that this may be 
interwoven with the dominance of quantitative methods and my own concern with 
children's voices, a more qualitative approach would be more timely and more suited to 
my objectives. However, such an approach also coincided with my own, and Strauss and 
Corbin (1998: 28) describe this as `obdurate' rejection of quantitative methods and my 
then belief that quantitative methods are unable to yield anything meaningful. I have 
since shifted my position to a consideration that both approaches have their benefits and 
drawbacks and that `also with statistics, as with qualitative data collection and analysis, 
one can never be certain whether one has captured the essence of the situation' (Gephart 
1998 cited in Strauss and Corbin 1998). Additionally, I have also considered that it is 
good advice to adopt a more pragmatic position where questions of method are concerned 
(cf. Bryman 1988), that is, to allow methods of data collection and analysis to be selected 
on the basis of their strengths for answering the research questions (Punch 1998). 
Most crucially, and lending further legitimacy to a qualitative approach, the lack of 
engagement with children's understandings of bullying had led to research that was 
dominated by adult understandings of bullying. In particular, many studies were explicit 
in their adult defined assumptions regarding understandings and also in their readiness to 
dismiss children's understandings as invalid (cf. Whitney and Smith 1993; Miller 1995; 
Mellor 1990). It appeared that research into bullying has commenced by if not telling 
children what bullying is, certainly by establishing the language and criteria through 
which children's views have since been sought. To put it more directly, instead of 
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seeking an understanding of what children perceive bullying to be in their own terms, 
research has been built upon what adults have understood and defined bullying to be. 
A particularly alarming example of this can be found in the reported findings of Whitney 
and Smith's (1993) study into bullying in Sheffield in the 1990's -a study which has 
been credited within the UK research context as paving the way for British research into 
bullying. Most explicitly, the study was conducted and analysed through an adultist 
framework. The study utilised a pre-existing questionnaire developed by the Swedish 
researcher Dan Olweus. Part of the underlying logic for the application of this 
questionnaire was posed in terms of how it was recognised and considered to circumvent 
issues of children's (mis)understandings of what the term bullying was considered to 
mean. This suggests, that not only have children's own interpretations been dismissed, 
they have also been devalued within research agendas. There is plenty of evidence to 
support this further. Smith and Leven (1995) for example, openly problematise 
children's understandings of bullying, emphasising their opinion that children mis- 
interpret and over-interpret the term bullying by including in their accounts behaviours 
and acts that do not coincide with accepted research definitions. 
Implicitly, statements such as these seemed to carry with them strong notions of children 
as incompetent, or less able to report on their own lives than adults. Recognising that 
children can communicate and participate effectively as research participants (Harden et 
al. 2000), sociologically informed understandings of children's competencies in this 
respect have emphasised a view of children's competencies as different from adults, 
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rather than comparatively lesser (James et al. 1998). Although both Harden et al. (2000) 
and James et al. (1998) both point out that the methods that researchers use reveal 
assumptions about these competencies, this stance questions the validity of implicit 
notions of incompetence within the research literature appertaining to bullying. It also 
suggests, that what is considered as knowledge about children's experiences of bullying 
may be fundamentally flawed. 
For at least the first six months of my doctoral programme, this original vision remained 
more or less unaltered. Having engaged with the literature, I considered that were good 
academic grounds for this research programme. However, during this time I failed to 
adequately acknowledge or reflect upon my reasons for developing this research agenda 
or how these reasons were affecting my approach to this area of investigation and the 
arguments and choices I was making. 
Whilst it is not unusual for research agendas to be influenced by the personal experiences 
of the researcher, retrospectively, I have recognised that this original vision was 
emotionally charged. My unresolved feelings about my own experiences, my anger about 
my son's situation and the related guilt I felt as a parent struggling to support and protect 
my child, had a direct effect upon my approach to the topic. It was, however, an effect 
that I did not fully recognise or consider problematic at the time. In fact, I considered 
that my own experiences with the problem of bullying in schools might have given me 
some insight into the issues involved - at least from the point of view of the victim. 
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My personal bias or empathy with the plight of victims did not go unnoticed in my early 
attempts to review the literature and justify my research plan. A written comment on my 
work by my then additional supervisor testifies to this when she wrote: `is this a PhD or a 
campaign'. I recall being quietly incensed by this comment and dismissive of the 
implication that I was being less than `balanced' in my views. In revisiting this early 
work I can now appreciate why the comment was made in relation to the content of the 
arguments I advanced and the emotive rhetoric of the text. It is also now obvious to me 
that I was almost in a state of self-denial about the motivations of my work which 
clouded my ability to think reflexively about the impact that my highly subjective 
thought processes had upon my research at this point, despite being acutely aware of the 
need to recognise and act to minimise these influences. This was evident in my attempts 
to conceal in all but the most superficial of terms my motivations for my choice of topic. 
I am not quite sure why I was reluctant to `confess' my motivations to others. In part, I 
believe that it was because I was subliminally aware that I would be `forced' to address 
the consequences of this upon my project. However, I would also say, that I was 
reluctant to fully (and I considered publicly) subject myself to a `personal exposure' of 
this kind to people I knew only within the confines of the student-supervisor relationship. 
Saving me from sinking entirely into a subjective void from which I may not have fully 
emerged was my background in sociology and the gradually emerging influence that this 
had upon my engagements with a research area that had been firmly colonised by 
psychology. 
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Psychology and Sociology: Contrasting Themes in the Literature 
The more intensively I engaged in the sociological literature on childhood, the more 
problematic the psychological approach to the study of bullying appeared to me. What 
became apparent in my comparisons between the sociologically orientated literature into 
children's peer culture and the psychological literature into bullying, was that in many 
circumstances, the two sets of literature were effectively discussing the same sorts of 
phenomena but reaching different sorts of explanations. 
Firstly, whilst the psychological literature focused solely on the negative effects of a 
range of behaviours defined as bullying, the sociological literature offered a contrary 
view. Verbal chastisement serves as good example of this. Here sociologically informed 
work had considered the positive benefits of verbal chastisement for children's 
relationships. Goodwin (1990) for example, has argued that this phenomenon has often 
been found to serve as an important mechanism through which friendships and 
affiliations between children are built and group boundaries are strengthened. Corsaro 
(1994) and Corsaro and Maynard (1996 cited in Corsaro 1997) draw attention to their 
observation that children who are skilled at verbal chastisement and teasing can increase 
their status within their peer group. Examples such as these, suggest that verbal 
chastisement is not only a negative feature of children's peer relationships. Opie and 
Opie (1959) have previously indicated that the everyday discursive practices of children, 
that is speech, is a part of children's culture which is often misunderstood by adults. 
Here, there is at least the suggestion that within the study of bullying the practice of 
verbal chastisement has not been fully grasped. 
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Another very good example is children's exclusionary practices. In common with verbal 
chastisement, the deliberate exclusion of a child from the peer group is defined both as a 
form of bullying and a negative practice. Corsaro (1997: 123) discusses exclusionary 
practices in relation to children's protection of interactive space which he defines as, `the 
tendency on the part of preschool children to protect their ongoing play from the intrusion 
of others'. Corsaro highlights that children often resist attempts by other children to gain 
access to the activities of established play-groups. He argues that whilst parents and 
teachers may perceive this behaviour as selfish and uncooperative, what is overlooked is 
that these children are already intensively involved in cooperative play. In their attempts 
to deny other children access, he suggests that these children are protecting the threat to 
group equilibrium that these attempted intrusions present. 
These illustrations present, if not alternative, perhaps more open ended perspectives on 
the same sorts of practices. One reason for this might be the different approaches taken 
to the study of children's peer relations. For the most part, sociological studies have 
engaged in understanding children's behaviour within the wider repertoire of peer culture 
and also within the wider social, cultural and historical context. By contrast, the 
psychological work into bullying has predominantly focused upon the individual child 
(victim or bully) without any substantive consideration of the wider context. Related to 
this, is the evident monopolisation of quantitative methods and a feverish application of 
psychometric testing within psychological studies of bullying, neither of which leave 
much room for examining bullying within the context of peer culture (this contrasts with 
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the ethnographic tendencies of sociological work). However, more latterly, there has 
been a peripheral move within psychology to extend the focus of research on bullying to 
include the social context (Naylor and Cowie 1999), although the conceptualisation of 
these behaviours as primarily negative has remained. 
There was evidence then, to suggest, that employing a sociological perspective that 
considered children's behaviours and interactions with their peers in the wider context of 
peer culture, had the potential to undermine some of the major and by then established 
strands of thought on school bullying. These observations certainly led me to begin 
asking questions about the validity of current understandings of bullying which focused 
upon bullying as a wholly negative set of behavioural practices and divorced these 
practices from wider social processes. I also began to ponder that perhaps what was 
considered as bullying was not quite the benign phenomena I (and those who have 
researched the topic) had originally considered it to be. Whilst I am not implying here 
that there is not a problem with peer victimisation in schools, what I began to realise was 
that there was little research that considered the positive functions that these behaviours 
served or an adequate appreciation of alternative understandings or explanations for the 
role of behaviours defined as bullying in children's peer cultures. In any case, I was 
beginning to consider the benefits of an approach that bracketed current thought on 
bullying and took a more open ended and flexible approach to researching the topic. 
Additionally, I was by this stage convinced that there was a need for a more 
ethnographically orientated study that would perhaps provide me with the opportunity to 
capture the peer context. 
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I am without doubt that my sociological background and training had fed into this 
critique and that my disciplinary biases and my engagements with the sociology of 
childhood were strong influences upon the conclusions that I was reaching at this stage. 
This is supported, in part, by the fact that I was subsequently informed that I was not the 
first doctoral student in my department to have reached a similar stance and set of 
conclusions on the psychologically informed research that existed on bullying. A former 
doctoral student who began with the intention of researching bullying in residential child 
care facilities had also questioned, for example, the problematic nature of research that 
had overwhelmingly stripped the analysis of the phenomena from the wider repertoire of 
peer behaviours. Here also, it had been considered that bullying as a research topic 
needed resituated (Emond 2000). Perhaps then it was not surprising that a sociologically 
trained student researcher would, after extensive engagements with psychologically 
orientated work, begin to critically question many of the arguments and explanations this 
literature advanced, given the differences that exist between the traditions. 
Workplace Bullying Vs School Bullying: Discrepancies in Research Foci 
These discrepancies in understanding between the psychological and sociological 
literature orientated my move towards considering an ethnographical approach to my 
research in order to gain a more holistic understanding of bullying that did not 
exclusively focus upon these behaviours as negative. However, in widening my ongoing 
review of the literature to examine the research into adult bullying within the workplace 
and institutional facilities such as prisons, it began to emerge that although there were 
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similarities between the areas of childhood bullying and adult bullying there was one 
principal difference. 
A major research focus within studies of adult bullying was a concern with power, 
specifically the abuse and use of power, as a dimension of bullying (cf. Rayner et al. 
1999). Often cited within the childhood literature as being intimately connected to 
bullying (cf. Craig and Pepler 1997; Pepler and Connolly 1997; Olweus, 1999), there was 
a distinct lack of either an empirical or analytical concern with power. For example, in an 
extensive volume which brings together the substantive findings of cross-national 
research, Smith and Morita (1999), in their introduction to the volume, begin almost 
immediately by describing bullying as an abuse of power and identifying relationships of 
power as an inevitable feature of human groups. Yet, nowhere in its twenty-two chapters 
does a thorough or even tacit consideration of power or power relationships appear. 
There seemed no obvious reason why the issue of power had been glossed over in 
research into school bullying. A possible explanation is that perhaps it has become a 
focus of research within workplace bullying because of the transparency of defined and 
identifiable status hierarchies within work place settings. Certainly, within the pertinent 
literature, discussions of status hierarchies sit alongside discussions of power and power 
relationships. Indeed, there is a curious situation here in so far as there exists an entirely 
different language and set of definitions for adult-adult bullying which appear to oscillate 
around organisational factors such as status hierarchies within the workplace. For 
example, it is common for the terms victim and bullying to be supplanted with the terms 
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`subordinate' and `superior' (cf. Zapf 1999). 
In relation to school bullying, it is possible that the existence of status hierarchies and so 
on in children's peer groups has perhaps been less visible to researchers or perceived to 
be of less importance. Although discussing teenage sexual harassment, Fineran and 
Bennett (1999: 628) advance a similar explanation for the neglect of power as a feature of 
teenage sexual harassment, suggesting the `apparent absence of a hierarchy in a 
community of peers'. Perhaps, it is simply the case that researchers have assumed a 
relative equality between children. However, in stark contradiction to this, within 
psychology studies of children's use of power under the auspices of the more general 
study of group processes is quite advanced. Schwarzwald and Koslowsky (1999) for 
example, examined the use of power strategies by adolescents in conflict situations. Yet, 
research of this sort has failed to filter through to the study of bullying. 
Against this context, my interest in power in children's relationships first emerged. It had 
emerged however, alongside my conclusions that any study of bullying (although as a 
result of the arguments advanced in the sociological literature I was questioning both the 
appropriateness of the term and the consequences of working within a restrictive 
definition of behaviour as bullying) should be located within the wider context of 
children's peer relations in order to reveal the wider functions of these behaviours within 
children's peer groups. However, my thinking had become chaotic and although I had 
these notions of the direction my research should take, I was not entirely sure how to 
proceed and how to `focus down' my research agenda. At the suggestion of my 
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supervisor, I `entered the field' with the remit of conducting a pilot phase based upon 
these interim ideas of the direction in which my research should develop. 
Exploratory Fieldwork: Interactions Between the Conceptual and the Empirical 
In identifying and accessing participants, as a matter of convenience, proximity and 
quickness, I chose to capitalise on my role as a parent in order to gain entry to an 
established community of children through my own children. In part, this choice arose 
because I had gradually begun to keep a `sociological eye' focused on the happenings of 
the community of children around me. As my family home of some 12 years now was 
adjacently situated next to a `green space' used daily by my own children, their friends 
and other local children as an informal play space, and as I was at the time continuously 
thinking over various aspects of children's peer relations, I had begun to pay attention to 
the daily routines of these children. As a site of interaction which I had previously given 
little thought to in my personal life, it began to emerge as rich in terms of the 
opportunities it provided for studying children's peer relations in a non-formal setting. 
Consequently, the community of children to which my own children belonged became a 
large focus in this research. 
Whilst this approach is perhaps unconventional precedents do exist. The most recent and 
most relevant of these is Patricia and Peter Adler's (2001) ethnographic study of 
preadolescent culture and identity. Referring to the approach as `parent-as-researcher' 
(PAR), the Adler's conducted an eight year study based on their own children's 
community. The Adler's consider that the approach has much in common with other 
21 
role-fused research approaches, such as teacher-as-researcher and counsellor-as- 
researcher. Whilst, I consider the practical, methodological and ethically advantages and 
problems with this approach in more detail in Chapter Three, the major benefit of this 
approach was that it allowed me to access a population of children outside institutional 
settings. Moreover, as I was already an established member of their community and a 
part of the everyday lives of these children I was able to observe their daily lives without 
them paying me much attention. As a variety of opportunistic research, Riemer 
(1977: 474) considers this a major advantage of such an approach because the researcher 
`already `fits' into the setting by having a legitimate reason to be there'. 
Working with the notion that I wanted to find something out about the role of power 
within children's relationships, I approached the pilot phase with flexibility and a good 
measure of hope that observing and asking children about the interactional dynamics of 
their peer relationships might result in the production of some analytical themes. 
As this suggests, I was at this time, without any clear theoretical framework for 
approaching the issue of power / power relations. I had begun to engage in the 
theoretical literature on power only to find that it was vast, diffuse and confusing. 
Enthusiastic about the fact that in recognising that power had been a hitherto unstudied 
area of bullying and that I had found the magical `gap in the literature' my fellow 
doctoral students informed me I must at all costs find, I had been ferocious in my attempt 
to gather as much of the sociological (and social psychological) material on power as I 
could practically gather. 
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The task of collecting this material was far easier than the task of either getting through it 
or making sense of it. Engaging in the literature on power was a bit like jumping into a 
bottomless pit. I struggled not only with the volume and diversity of thought on the 
concept of power but also with what I thought to be the inaccessible and esoteric style of 
writing that characterised the works of many of the authors I read and their respective 
texts and articles. Feeling self-defeated and anxious over the anti-intellectualism giving 
voice to these thoughts might have implied, I wondered why things could not be 
articulated in a more straightforward fashion. Ironically, later on in my doctoral studies, I 
found myself justifying this style of writing to undergraduate students on a social theory 
course who repeatedly issued the same complaint. My justification was, that sometimes, 
in grappling with complex and difficult problems and the communication of these 
problems, a complexity of language is required. In part, I had come to believe this to be 
true but empathised with the difficulties these students were experiencing. From the 
fieldworker's point of view however, I believe that part of the problem I experienced 
with the literature on power was as Scott (1999: xi) states, that it `is too distant and 
unidimensional to catch the realities of power as lived experience'. By this, I take Scott 
to mean that there are difficulties for the researcher in the field who is seeking to apply 
sociological thought on power in the context of understanding local and situated relations 
between humans. 
I had been attempting to find a way to study power that allowed me to ask and make 
sense of how children became powerful within the peer setting, that is, how children `do' 
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this thing called power and how it is they achieve it. As I thought that this should also be 
studied within the interactional context of the peer group, I was seeking a framework that 
focused upon generic social processes. However, I found little within the literature that I 
thought would provide a satisfactory framework for studying power in this way. Prus 
(1999) considers this to be related to the way that power has been studied, conceptualised 
and analysed. Prus (1999: 4) states, that the problem is that, `most analysts have failed to 
attend to the ways in which people experience (or engage) the power phenomenon on the 
`here and now' basis in which human group life takes place'. Related to this, he argues, 
is that power has generally been understood and studied as a structural element or macro- 
level force and depicted as `something out there' therefore, those theorists who have 
endeavoured to study how it (power) is actually accomplished by people in everyday 
settings and in the mundane activities that characterise every day life are proportionally 
few (Prus 1999: xv-84). 
Invoking an interactionist stance, Prus (1999) gives an impressive (although, by his own 
confession, not exhaustive) critique of the social science literature on power. Focusing 
particularly on structuralist thought within both classical and contemporary social theory 
he illustrates, quite convincingly, his point that theorists of power have failed to attend in 
any meaningful way to how power is accomplished by people in everyday settings. For 
example, whilst he acknowledges the currency of Weber's thought on power and 
authority in respect to organisational or structural positions amongst contemporary 
scholars, he also argues that Weber's thought is conceptually deficient because it pays 
little attention to the ways in which people negotiate authority in practice. This Prus 
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attributes to Weber's zeal with constructing elaborate (structural) typologies to explain 
human arrangements within society. Whilst his treatment of Weber's thought on 
`charisma' is less critical and he recognises that here Weber attends more explicitly to 
issues of process, Prus maintains his central argument by emphasising that Weber 
discusses the charismatic leader as an `ideal type' without the provision of a focus upon 
how charisma is accomplished by social actors in everyday settings. 
Whilst points of emphasis differ, Prus draws similar conclusions about the works of an 
assortment of theorists who have commented on power (e. g. Hobbes, Machiavelli, 
Nietzsche, Durkheim, Merton, Giddens, Parsons, Lukes,, Clegg, Marx and works 
associated with the Marxist tradition to name but a few)Z. The arguments Prus advances 
corresponded closely with my own frustrations at the time with statements on power and 
what I considered to be their lack of relevance to the analysis of how power between 
people at the micro level and their usefulness for unravelling how people [children] `do' 
power. However, akin to my own frustrations with the existing thought on power, 
arguments of this sort reflect the fact that a great deal of theory about power has been 
formulated at the `grand level'. Therefore, the lack of empirical connection to practices 
at the micro level to which Prus draws attention has been a frequently cited problem of 
grand theory for the practitioner sociologist `in the field' (Erickson 1997). 
2 It is not possible to give a theoretical overview of these works here. Whist Prus (1999) provides a critique 
the thrust of this is aimed at convincing the reader of the merits of his own interactionist approach to the 
study of power in social relationships at the micro level (although he makes a case for extending his 
methodology to examine power at the macro level). Consequently, his critique is rather harsh and effaces 
in all but the most fleeting terms that most, if not all, of the theorists he discusses are concerned with power 
as an element of the human condition and also that they would probably be of the opinion that the 
`structures' they consider and discuss are developed in associations between people (cf. Scott 1995). For a 
less bias overview the reader may wish to refer to Ng (1980) who gives an excellent and more detailed 
description of work on power. 
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Few (2002) argues that turning such theories of power into research practice is no easy 
task. However, he indicates that the problem lies not in the inadequacies of grand theory 
for the study of power at the micro level but rather the relative absence within social 
science of theorists and studies that have aimed to `unravel the mechanisms involved in 
the exercise of power by human actors' (2002: 27) despite the recognition that power and 
power relations operate at different levels of scale in society (e. g. societal structures or 
individual agency) (Heiskala 2001). Micro level studies of power, Few (2002) argues, are 
concerned with the coupling of power and agency and the way it is exercised through the 
`mechanics of social interaction' which is distinct from the project of grand theory and its 
concern with, for example, the analysis of deeper systems or modes of power that are 
operant within society (e. g. domination). Given this, he suggests that the analyst must 
come to rest on some working model of how power comes to be exercised in human 
relations at the micro level. However, the problem the analyst faces in this task is finding 
the conceptual tools from which a working model can be developed. 
Social Psychological Models of Power in Interpersonal Relations 
My own attempts at finding such a model eventually led me towards the compliance and 
influence literature within social psychology. Within this field of study models that 
approach the analysis of power in social interaction are relatively well developed (Bruins 
1999). The primary attraction of this work was its apparent relevance to the analysis of 
power in children's interpersonal relations and the fact that these models had already 
been used in empirical studies of children's power at this level of analysis (something 
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which was lacking within sociologically informed work3). Whilst a considerable number 
of empirically orientated models exist, the majority of these conceptualise power in terms 
of tactical enterprise by persons (agents) as they attempt to influence another person or 
persons (targets). French and Raven's (1959, Raven 1965,1983) taxonomy in 
conceptualising interpersonal influence which dominates social psychological studies of 
power serves as a representative example of this tendency in approach (Podsakoff and 
Schriescheim 1985, Yukl and Falbe 1991)4. 
Drawing on the theoretical work of Kurt Lewin (1941 cited in Bruins 1999) who 
considered power as the potential to exert force on someone else; French and Raven 
(1959) defined influence (or power) as `a force one person (the agent) exerts on someone 
else (the target) to induce a change in the target, including changes in behaviours, 
opinions, attitudes, goals, needs and values' (Bruins 1999). From this definition, French 
and Raven (1959) developed a classification of five different bases / types of power or 
sources for gaining compliance: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent and expert power 
(Schwarzwald and Koslowsky 1999) with informational power latterly being added to the 
classification as a sixth base (Raven 1965). 
3 It is worth noting however, that much of this work has been developed through the use of the theoretical 
insights of those early social theorists of power that Prus (1999) has considered to have ignored power 
relations at the interpersonal level. As Bruins (1999) notes, these insights serve as the groundwork for the 
approach taken to power relations in modem social psychology. 
4 Whilst it is not possible to discuss in detail other approaches it is worth noting that there are many other 
similar models to French and Raven's within social psychological work which examines power in social 
relationships. While points of emphasis and terminology differ between the models, the basic approach and 
the concepts used are similar. For example, Kipnis (1976) describes a `Power Act Model' and Bruins 
(1996 cited in Bruins 1999) proposes `The Power Use Model'. Both approach the study of interpersonal 
power and influence primarily from the perspective of the agent of influence although attention is also 
given to target perspectives. Akin to French and Raven, these models concentrate on identifying resources 
or bases of power and examining the rational processes of the agent's choice of resource and how agents 
27 
The first two of these bases, reward and coercive, are seen as dependent upon the 
principle that the target perceives the agent as having the ability to confer either positive 
or negative outcomes upon him or her (e. g. rewards and / or punishments). Legitimate 
power works on the principle that the agent has a legitimate right to impose behavioural 
constraints or to exert influence / power over the target. Referent power operates where 
the target identifies with the agent and may for example comply simply because they like 
or have respect for the agent or that the agent gives them feelings of personal acceptance 
or approval and so on. Expert power is based on the target assuming that the agent has 
expert knowledge / is an expert, or that the agent possesses special information. The 
sixth base of informational power is a variant of legitimate power stemming from the 
perceived ability of the agent to control the availability and accuracy of information 
(Bruins 1999, Schwarzwald and Koslowsky 1999). 
More recently, this original formulation of the taxonomy was extended by Raven (1992, 
1993) into a power / interaction model of interpersonal influence. Taking into account the 
subsequent research findings of studies that had used the original taxonomy, this 
reworked model further elaborates on and differentiates between each of the six bases of 
power extending the taxonomy to eleven sources of power (Bruins 1999). However, the 
main difference in this more detailed model is that it moves beyond simply providing a 
classification system to considering the agent's motivations in influencing the target and 
analysing agent's choices from the available sources of power (Schwarzwald and 
may modify the strategies they adopt. Attention is also paid to targets in terms of examining why they 
either yield or resist to the influence attempts of agents. 
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Kosloswsky 1999). This model also considers events from the perspective of targets, 
particularly in terms of the reasons targets have for either resisting or complying with 
influence attempts by agents. Additionally, it integrates the possibility of analysing how 
influence attempts are evaluated by both agents and targets and the implications that such 
evaluations have in respect to informing future situations. In doing so, it moves towards 
conceptualising power / influence in terms of `active processes' and focuses more 
attention to the interactive dimensions of power / influence attempts from the 
perspectives of all parties involved thus offering a more dynamic view than the original 
taxonomy. 
The work of French and Raven has informed and influenced the work of many 
researchers that have sought to unravel the ways in which people exert power /influence 
across a number of areas of study, such as health and medicine (Raven 1988), familial 
relations (MacDonald 1980, Rollins and Thomas 1975) and marketing and consumer 
psychology (Gaski 1986, Mackenzie and Zaichkowski 1980). Indeed as Bruins (1991) 
points out a vast and complex literature has developed around the work of French and 
Raven. However, the majority of the studies represented in this literature have aimed to 
understand power primarily within adult relationships. Therefore, research which has 
aimed to examine children's use of power is relatively thin on the ground. However, a 
small and increasing body of work does exist (e. g. Clark and Delia 1976, Haselett 1983 
and Jordan et al. 1995). 
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Focusing upon conflict within the peer group and the strategies that children use to 
resolve disputes, these studies have highlighted that children, like adults, actively chose 
from and employ a range of strategies to influence other children. Moreover, in 
examining children's decisions concerning which particular strategies to employ, 
research has drawn attention to how decision making in terms of why children choose the 
power strategies they adopt is influenced by situational and personal variables such as 
classroom norms, sociometric status, gender and so on (e. g. Bonn 1995 and Jordan et al. 
1995). 
Whilst these studies share some common ground with previously cited work which has 
mapped out and highlighted status and hierarchy within children's peer groups (and how 
this influences peer group dynamics), the major difference in studies that have been 
conceptually based upon French and Raven's work (and work of this kind) is that there is 
an additional focus upon process in so far as attention is given to the ways in which 
children as agents achieve influence in their interactions with each other and the 
processes which inform the strategies they employ to do so coupled with some 
consideration of the effects of context. Moreover, attention is also given to the 
perspectives of children as targets and the analysis of why they either yield or resist to the 
influence attempts of others. Therefore, the resulting analysis is less static than those 
works which explain children's power exclusively via recourse to status differentials 
within children's friendship groups and so on. Indeed some studies have shown that 
children who are perceived to have no status advantage over each and / or children who 
occupy a subordinate position via others quite consistently manage to influence higher 
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status children. However, Schwarzwald and Koslowsky (1999) highlight that the 
strategies these children use tend to be more subversive than the strategies employed by 
children who are perceived to wield higher status than the children they attempt to 
5 influences 
In the first instance, the approach taken to analysing power within social psychological 
discourse appeared useful in so far as this work contained a substantive focus on how 
power is achieved in interpersonal relations within micro settings such as the peer group. 
Therefore, in being more actor-orientated in approach social psychological models of 
power appeared to be able to penetrate the question of how children `do' power in their 
relationships with each other through recourse to the analysis of strategies that children 
employ in their influence attempts and how the perspectives of children as either agents 
or targets shapes these processes. 
However, whilst the approach does provide insight into children's power in these ways, it 
does not attend to how children (or adults) achieve this in actual practice nor has there 
been much effort to examine this in anything other than the most artificial ways. Most 
5A small number of studies have utilised the power / interaction model to examine children's power in 
child / parent relationships. These studies are novel in so far as research into child / parent dynamics has 
tended to concentrate on analysing parental power and have almost exclusively ignored children's power 
(MacDonald 1980, Peterson et al 1985 and Smith 1986). It has been suggested that this is a direct result of 
the assumption that parents have complete power over children (Hoffman 1960). However, studies of 
children' power in child / adult relationships have shown that children do have a certain degree of power 
over parents. This was first empirically demonstrated by Peterson (1986) who not only highlighted 
teenager's use of power and power strategies but parental perceptions of their children's power. 
Specifically he demonstrated that teenagers had and parents perceive them to have reward power, coercive 
power, legitimate power, expert power and referent power. Given that children are somewhat inherently 
subordinate within the child / parent relationship (or at least they are assumed to be so), what Peterson 
(1986) demonstrates and others who have examined children's power (eg. Kim et al. 1991) is that the 
notion of children's power as being interwoven with children's status or sociometric positioning within 
social relationships is much less tenable a proposition than has been assumed. 
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studies that have aimed to grasp how power operates in practice in people's daily lives 
and their relationships with significant others have relied on retrospective reports of 
influence attempts (Orina et al. 2002). The standard method applied has involved asking 
participants to recollect a particular situation where they attempt to influence someone 
and provide details of the specific strategies they used (e. g. Bui et al. 1994, Falbo and 
Peplau 1980, Raven et al. 1998 and Roskos-Ewoldson 1997). In attempting to grasp a 
sense of how children's power operates in practice Schwarzwald and Koslowsky (1999) 
participants were presented with a serious of vignettes depicting different conflict 
scenarios and asked to describe the type of power strategies that they would use in such 
situations in order to gain compliance. However, in common with the majority of other 
social psychological studies into power, Schwarzwald and Koslowsky's participants 
underwent a serious of psychometric tests used to ascertain the influence of variables 
such as gender, self-esteem and so on upon their participant's choice of power strategy. 
Whilst social psychological studies stood out as having been attentive to power in social 
relationships it is mostly characterised by a quest for factors or variables intended to 
explain the behaviours of agents and targets. Thus, these studies are suggestive of actual 
practice but they have not engaged in analysing children's power or applying theoretical 
models to, for example, the observation of children's power as it spontaneously emerges 
in naturally occurring social interaction6. 
6 There have been attempts to replicate natural occurring behaviours in order to overcome this missing 
dimension within the social psychological study of power. Orina et al's. (2002) study reports to have 
accomplished this by video taping conversations between adults in `dating relationships' in order to 
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In taking on the insights of this type of work during the pilot fieldwork phase, the 
limitations of this sort of approach to understanding power within the ethnographic 
setting became all the more apparent. Although this work was a useful reference point 
for identifying the resources children used in attempting to influence each other and 
directing analysis into why children as agents invoked particular strategies and likewise 
why other children as targets either yielded or resisted, the power / interaction model and 
work of this kind was unable to deal with the ethnographic complexity of children's 
attempts to influence each other within the peer group settings. For example, the power / 
interaction model invokes a bilateral view of power in so far as analysis concentrates 
solely upon exchanges between two parties. Yet the application of the model at this level 
of empirical research (that is, in an exchange between two people) is troublesome in most 
except the simplest of exchanges. However, most observed exchanges of influence 
between children were not simple, often involving repeated influence attempts that 
invoked a number of different, sometimes multiple strategies. Additionally, many 
influence attempts did not achieve quick results and a child's efforts to attain a desired 
goal could span quite lengthy time intervals. Moreover, influence attempts which were 
previously abandoned were prone to being restarted at a later point during the day or even 
the next day or several days later. This reflected a point made by Heiskala (2001) in her 
multi-level approach to power that even at this level of empirical research analysis of a 
single face-to-face episode between two people is complex. 
understand how they attempted to influence each other. However, far from being naturally occurring, the 
conversations were conducted in a laboratory setting. 
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The power / interaction approach became even less suitable when the scope of influence 
attempts extended to include: more than two people; the use of multiple strategies by 
sometimes multiple agents; attempts were directed towards more than one target and 
therefore involved the agent using a variety of different strategies simultaneously whilst 
trying to influence multiple targets; and when the use of resources belonging to others 
were used in influence attempts. In other words, when multiple actors in the 
ethnographic scene were implicated in the project of attaining some desired goal resulting 
in there being a complex web of power relations the power / interaction model was not 
capable of dealing either with the multidimensionality (cf. Sharp et al. 2000) or the 
complexity of these interactions without either filtering out the detail or dislocating 
particular fragments of interaction from the analysis of the whole ethnographic event. 7 
Heiskala (1999) considers that there is a need in such instances to find a controlled way 
of reducing the complexity of analysis whilst maintaining the ability to move, if 
necessary, from a more simple model of events to a more complex one and vice versa. In 
addressing similar issues in researching actor power at the micro level, Few (2002) draws 
on actor network theory because as an approach to power which can be applied to the 
analysis of the mechanisms of power in realms of social interaction it is able to capture 
the complexity of the processes involved when `multiple heterogeneous actors in an arena 
' By this I mean that the model could be applied if particular aspects of the event were examined in 
isolation from 
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create a complex web of power relations rather than a purely binary exchange of forces' 
(2002: 34). 8 
Actor network theory conceptualises a relational interplay between all the actors involved 
in complex configurations of power relations and interactions wherein power is seen as 
an effect or outcome of a process of alignment between actors (Cordella and Shaikh 
2004). The way in which actor network theory conceptualises power is then somewhat 
different from the approach discussed above. In common with many `resource' theories 
of power social psychological approaches conceptualise power as `power over' (i. e. as 
possessing the potential to influence or control others or control over resources and / or 
outcomes) (French and Raven 1959; Henley 1977; Johnson 1976; Carli 1999). Drawing 
upon Foucauldian notions of power; 9 power in actor network theory on the other hand is 
decentralised (non individual) and considered to be dispersed thoughout and among the 
actors (and resources) implicated in these configurations (see Chapter Two). 
What is novel about actor network theory, however, is that the actors which participate in 
these configurations are not perceived to be necessarily human. Actors can also be 
nonhuman (material artefacts, objects and so on). Whilst the benefits of actor network 
theory in terms of its ability to grasp complexity came to be a valued feature of the 
approach later on in the study - it was this incorporation of nonhumans into analysis that 
provided the approach entry into this thesis. 
The analytic approach to handling complexity taken by actor network theory is fully discussed in Chapter 
Two (see in particular pp. 72-78). Therefore, I will not provide a discussion of these issues in the present 
Chapter. 
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First Encounters with Actor-Network Theory 
Struggling with how to deal with the literature on power for my own comprehension and 
with finding within this literature an approach which would lend itself to ethnographic 
enquiry, actor-network theory was suggested as a possibility. I recall being told that 
actor-network theorists considered power as an effect generated in heterogeneous 
networks. However, I also vividly recall thinking to myself: (a) what is actor-network 
theory and (b) what on earth are heterogeneous networks. Actor-network theory had 
been hitherto unknown to me. It was not an approach I had encountered as an 
undergraduate, nor did I recall any reference to it within the literature I had been reading. 
Akin to the literature on power, I found the writing on actor-network theory equally 
abstruse for both similar and different reasons. In particular, I had problems with what 
actor network theory had to say about nonhumans and what sociologists should be doing 
with them. Specifically, I am referring here to the symmetry principle, that is, actor- 
network theory's insistence to abandon all a priori distinctions between humans and 
nonhumans and the related notion that nonhumans should also be considered as actors. I 
had read that this was `radical'. I had also read that this was `controversial'. However, I 
was not particularly interested at this stage in my research in how radical, controversial or 
otherwise that this stance may or may not have been, given that I thought the whole idea 
was antithetical to the sociologist's task. The study of objects and other nonhuman things 
I had understood as being peripheral to the sociological enterprise and of interest only in 
the sense that humans endowed them with meaning But then I had missed the point of 
9 The relationship between Foucault's ideas on power and actor network theory's is discussed in Chapter 
Two. 
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the `a priori' (amongst other things) and confused it with an ethical position and not the 
analytical stance that it is. 
In the first instance then, I had dismissed actor-network theory, although more latterly, I 
have thought that it would be more accurate to state that I attempted to `resist' it. 
However, because my first reading of the actor-network literature had been conducted 
with power in mind, all the talk about nonhumans had me thoroughly confused. I could 
understand the thinking behind the notion that power was an effect but the thinking on 
how this was generated seemed to escape my comprehension. On reflection this lack of 
understanding was related to my readiness to cease engaging with actor-network theory 
because it seemed such an alien line of thought. Therefore, my reading of the relevant 
literature was sparse and much less than thorough. 
Child / Object Partnerships: Resisting Symmetry, Resisting ANT 
As my early and fleeting engagements with actor-network had occurred concurrently 
with my pilot fieldwork phase, I cannot say with certainty that actor-network theory and 
its concerns with the nonhuman was not an influence upon the themes that began to 
emerge from my observations of events in the field. A concern with the material and in 
particular, the interweaving of the material with the social, gradually and erratically 
began to emerge a substantive empirical focus. Quite early on in the pilot work I had 
begun to notice and fix my attentions upon the use of material artefacts by the children I 
was observing. In particular, I had become intrigued and fascinated by how children used 
artefacts of various sorts during the course of their interactions with each other. At first, 
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it did not strike me as unusual that materiality was a feature of children's life worlds. 
The use of material objects such as toys in play is unsurprising after all. However, what 
did strike me as surprising was how some of these children were using their toys to 
achieve various positions of status and influence among their peers. 
One child in particular was remarkably skilled at using the various gadgets and gizmos he 
possessed to elevate his status within the peer group. Through the use of objects, he 
frequently managed to disrupt, reorganise and control the activities of the peer group. 
For the most part, he seemed able to achieve this because he possessed and had access to 
a range of toys that most of these children did not but desperately desired. His actions 
communicated that he himself was well aware of this desire in others. This child 
regularly entered the scene of activity and set about seducing the other children away 
from whatever the current activity was by offering access to whatever object 
accompanied him. From here, it was commonplace for him to organise the others into a 
queue to await the possibility of a chance to play with the object -a chance they 
frequently did not get. 
These observations and others similar to them began to slowly open the door to a 
consideration of objects as partners in interactions. However, I continued to resist the 
implication that objects should be considered as symmetrical partners. My own stance on 
this was perhaps similar to Suchman's (1997) stance in which she views nonhumans as 
`inferior partners' in the interaction (cited in Gomart and Hennion 1999: 221-222). It was 
clear to me that children were using objects to achieve desired effects but it was not my 
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view at this time that these effects were collectively generated between these children and 
their nonhumans partners. I began to think, however, that there was at the very least an 
exchange of properties from the object to the child, that is, that in some circumstances 
objects either gave something to children or children took something from objects that 
enhanced their abilities or their capacities to act in some ways. 
Thus, whilst it was clear to me that children could use objects to achieve effects, I was 
unwilling to credit the objects involved with anything other than a `walk on part'. I was 
certainly not willing to lend them agency. Agency (potential or actual), as I understood it 
implied some element of intentionality on the part of would-be-actors. As far as I could 
see these objects and artefacts of childhood were quite obviously lacking intent. 
Pickering's (1993) point that intentionality is a stable and real distinction between 
humans and nonhumans seemed valid to me. Therefore, I remained fixed in my 
presumption that agency was exclusively human. 
In recounting these observations from pilot fieldwork, I was again recommended to 
consider what actor-network theory had to offer. I could see a place for utilising some 
strands of thought from actor-network theory in relation to these observations but I 
remained reluctant to reject `human-only agency' (Hakken 1999: 187). Moreover, I could 
not fully comprehend a sociology that suggested I should be following artefacts. The 
concept of doing so seemed not only alien but acutely antagonistic to my original task of 
privileging the child. In any case, I worried about the repercussions of adopting an 
approach that was perhaps too anti-anthropocentric. 
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This was further complicated by the lack of sociological work on childhood that was 
informed by actor-network theory or thought of this kind. Whilst there are notable 
exceptions (cf. Prout 2000; Place 2000; Lee 2001) some of which remained unknown to 
me until much later on in my work, the apparent lack of a comparable study that provided 
an exemplar on the empirical application of actor-network theory to children's life worlds 
seemed problematic. This was of course provided in abundance elsewhere and perhaps 
here this implies a problem with imagination (or lack thereof) rather than the absence of 
methodological instructions. However, here, the lack of a reference point of some kind 
was both troubling and troublesome -a bit like floating in uncharted waters without a 
map. Then again, perhaps I was looking for the comfort I thought would be found in the 
discovery of a comparative case. 
In part, at this stage, the problem I had was in relating an approach that was derived from 
the sociology of science and the sub-disciplines of science, technology and society and 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, to the sociological study of children's peer 
relationships. The `diasporic' (Law 1999: 10) distribution of actor-network theory across 
these and other disciplines such as geography and management did little to aid my 
attempts to render actor-network theory and the divergent ways in which it is used by 
`anters' coherent for my purposes. Those areas had generated a collective literature that 
discussed such things as `quasi-objects', `quasi-subjects', `entities', `actants', `hybrids', 
`topology' and the like. In the different fields of application in which actor-network 
theory was incorporated these categories seemed to make sense. However, in the context 
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of the everyday play activities of children that I was observing I severely struggled to 
make connections. This, I think, was exactly the point. I was not making connections. I 
had been so caught up in rejecting actor-network theory because of the divisions that I 
considered existed between humans and objects that I did not alter my analytical focus to 
thinking about the connections made between humans and objects. Neither was I taking 
on board the point made by actor-network theory that it is not that divisions do not exist, 
`it is rather that such divisions or distinctions are understood as effects or outcomes. 
They are not given in the order of things' (Law 1999: 10). 
Out of the Mouths of Babes: Enrolment to Actor-Network Theory 
As I moved into my formal fieldwork site of the local primary school I continued, in 
practice, to resist actor-network theory. I say `in practice' because although I was not 
formally applying actor-network theory, I was almost sub-consciously following `things'. 
When I now look over my written field notes from the time, it is quite obvious that I had 
been developing a gradual preoccupation with documenting the materiality of the 
interactional settings and goings on I was observing. Whilst I was actively resisting actor- 
network theory, it is also obvious from these notes (and also in my recollections) that it 
was lingering in the background of my analytical thinking. Beside, for example, 
references to the various toys that the children brought into and played with in school 
there are also many words and phrases from the analytical vocabulary of actor-network 
theory. For example, phrases or questions to myself in my notes such as, `is this a quasi- 
object? ', appear frequently. Therefore, whilst I remained sceptical about adopting an 
actor-network approach, I was also increasingly moving my thinking towards it. 
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It is common for researchers to talk about `defining moments' or `breakthroughs' in the 
field within their research accounts. I have always thought discussions of these to be 
interesting but rather cliched. My own defining moment is perhaps just as cliched as my 
eventual transition to a rigorous analytical application of actor-network theory occurred, 
quite literally, because of the words spoken to me by a child. Before, considering the 
impact of the words of this child and the context in which these words arose, I would like 
to pause for a brief moment to situate these words within the analytical thinking of actor- 
network theory. 
Put simply, actor-network theory asserts that social relations are not only made in the 
associations that occur between people and things but also that social relations are held 
together by things (Law 1992). During my fieldwork period within the primary school a 
perplexing period of `inaction' arose. Quite literally, and for no obvious reason, the 
children apparently stopped interacting with each other. I found myself at odds with 
myself trying to figure out where all the action had gone and more importantly why it had 
disappeared. Children who previously had been quite boisterous in their activities had 
been transformed into motionless and passive beings who seemed unable either to act or 
interact. The climate of the playground was depressed and there seemed to be an 
undercurrent of silent frustration and confusion amongst the children. Bewildered, I 
asked a child, who looked particularly dejected, what the matter was. His reply, although 
seemingly innocuous, was a revelation: 
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`There is nothing to play with' 
This is the sort of commonplace statement a child would say that normally would pass by 
as unworthy of even the most fleeting of second thoughts. Had I been completely 
unfamiliar with actor-network theory, I would have dismissed this statement as the 
grumblings of a bored child. However, instead, and because of my until then, 
acrimonious relationship with actor-network theory, I stopped to consider the meaning in 
what this child had said. In particular, I thought about the meaning of the word `nothing': 
no-thing; not anything; not any thing - absence; absence of things 
In this play on words, I realised that in a setting that had not long since been rich in 
materiality only bodies remained. This child was right. There were no things. The 
things had gone - the `missing masses' had gone missing. In this moment I became 
conscious that what I had been observing were unmediated bodies incapable of social 
relations and incapable of holding social relations in place because the objects that had 
previously served to bind these children together - to weave the collective - were no 
longer active participants in the social setting. It was here then, in the absence of the 
material, that I came to realise that the material mattered and was woven into the fabric of 
social relations and it was here that my `enrolment' into actor-network theory formally 
occurred. 
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Recasting the Vision and the Shape of the Thesis 
I am not quite sure what came first; actor-network theory or the observations that resulted 
in my serious adoption of the stance. Perhaps the process can best be described as a 
`messy interaction between the conceptual and the empirical' (Bechhofer 1974: 73). I 
have often thought about what the story of the development of this thesis would have 
looked like if I had subjected the whole messy business to an actor-network analysis. I 
have resisted the urge but perhaps, in brief, it would have looked something like this: 
The heterogeneous engineer aligned all her allies 
The heterogeneous engineer enrolled them and took them back to a centre of calculation. 
Through a process of translation the heterogeneous engineer attempted to make them 
speak on behalf of the centre of calculation. 
For a while they did. 
They dissented. 
The heterogeneous engineer aligned other allies. 
They resisted. 
The heterogeneous engineer became the target of enrolment. 
The engineer was not convinced that her interests were the same. 
She resisted, her interests being elsewhere. 
Again she became the target of enrolment. 
Again she resisted. 
And so on, recursively. 
Another spoke on behalf of the enrollers. 
Her interests become aligned with those of these others. 
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She was enrolled. 
..... or was it counter-enrolment? 
Regardless of whether I enrolled actor-network theory or vice versa, my adoption of the 
stance recast my analysis and informed the eventual shape of this thesis. I retained my 
focus on power and because, as I see it, one implies the other, I shifted to a concurrent 
concern with agency. Both of these I have considered within the wider context of 
children's social relations. I have also considered more directly the wider role that the 
nonhuman plays in children's social relations. In particular, the ways in which the 
nonhuman holds children's relations in place. These themes inform the structure of the 
thesis. 
Within this chapter I have made many references to actor-network theory. As yet, the 
concepts and thought referred to have not been fully explained. The purpose of the next 
chapter is to address this and provide the reader with a more thorough critique of actor- 
network theory and its methodology. I then proceed in Chapter Three to discuss in more 
detail the methods used and in particular to draw out the practical, ethical and 
methodological implications of the parent-as-researcher approach. Here 1 also address 
more general issues of concern when one is conducting research with children. 
The substantive part of my analysis is found in the final five chapters of this thesis and 
reflects the themes mentioned above. Out of these, Chapter Four is the most exploratory 
and serves to introduce the reader to the role of the nonhuman in children's interactions. 
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It draws upon the early empirical observations of this work and functions to illustrate 
further how the analysis presented here began to materialise. The notion of children as 
heterogeneous engineers is the substantive theme in Chapter Five. I illustrate here that 
children in their attempts to achieve desired effects and establish themselves as agents 
with powers, attempt to build a network of alliances by constituting, mobilising and 
juxtapositioning a set of materially heterogeneous elements, obliging them to enact 
particular roles and fitting them together to form a working whole. It is, therefore, a story 
of translation. This account is presented through a combination of descriptive and 
analytical narratives. In this respect, it is also intended to serve as an illustration of the 
application of actor-network theory as an interpretive framework. 
Chapter Six shares similarities with Chapter Five in so far as there remains a focus on 
heterogeneous engineering and the process of translation. It is however, an account of 
how one child engineers an actor-network to overcome interpersonal difficulties with 
other children. Here, the nonhuman is widened to consider more than just material 
objects, for example, I describe the relationship between children and animals. 
Whilst a focus on agency and power are retained, the next two chapters see a change in 
emphasis to a consideration of the wider role of the nonhuman in children's relations. 
Both of these chapters draw on data collected during fieldwork conducted within the 
primary school. Chapter Seven concentrates on the `binding' function of the nonhuman 
within children's interactions. Here, I discuss `quasi-objects' and the circulation of these 
objects with the playground. Chapter Eight reinforces the points made and arguments 
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advanced in Chapter Seven when I consider the effects upon children's abilities to act and 
social relations more generally when the nonhuman is removed from the interactional 
scene. These discussions draw attention to and reiterate the argument which is 
interwoven throughout the pages of this thesis and brought to its final conclusion in the 
last chapter of this thesis: that children's agency, power and social relations take their 
form and are a function of the heterogeneous networks created in the associations made 
between people and things. 
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Chapter Two 
Actor-Network Theory: 
An Analytic Framework for the Study of Children's Agency, Power and Social 
Relations 
Introduction 
In Chapter One I highlighted that the adoption of actor-network theory as the analytical 
approach taken in this thesis was not a preliminary choice but rather the outcome of `a 
messy interaction between the conceptual and empirical world' (Bechhofer 1974: 73). 
However, as an analytical approach, actor-network theory is particularly suited to 
ethnographic enquiry because, and as Tatnall and Gilding (1999: 959) state, `like 
ethnography, actor-network theory is useful in handling complexity without filtering it 
out'. Indeed, ethnography (alongside case studies) has been described as actor-network 
theory's `favoured method' (Kavanagh 1997: 9), with many actor-network theorists 
drawing on ethnographic principles in their approach to research (Tatnall and Gilding 
1999). Analytically and methodologically, however, the application of actor-network 
theory and thought which is closely associated with the approach is considerably varied. 
McLean and Hassard (2004: 496) make this point when they state that we should note 
that, `the research produced often differs markedly in terms of methodological approach 
and style of analyses. Thus, there is no generic way to `apply' actor-network theory. 
This is further complicated by the disparate emphases of actor-network theory's 
proponents (Michael 1996). There are, however, some key elements to the approach that 
remain relatively stable (Walsham 1997), upon which the analytical thinking that has 
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informed this work has been founded. 
These key elements can be summarised thus: 
Table 1. Summary of Key Concepts of Actor-network Theory1°. 
Actor / actant Any material, i. e. human beings or nonhuman actors / actants. 
Actor-network Related actors in a heterogeneous network of aligned interests. 
General The symmetrical treatment of humans and nonhumans as a priori 
symmetry equal. 
Translation How actors generate ordering effects by negotiating or manoeuvring 
others' interests to one's own with the aim of mobilising support. 
Inscription Embodied translations into a medium or material. 
Enrolment Mobilise support by creating a body of allies through translation. 
Black box and A temporary simplification in a network that acts as a single unit so 
punctualisation that the network effaces into one actor. 
Quasi-object A nonhuman that is necessary for the collective to exist; An object 
that passes through a social group which in doing so forms relations 
between members of that group. 
Hybridity The idea that neither a human nor a nonhuman is pure, that is, either 
human or nonhuman in an absolute sense but rather entities produced 
in associations between the former and the latter. Thus, humans are 
considered as quasi-subjects and nonhumans as quasi-objects. 
1°This table is adapted in part from Walsham (1997). Here it has been modified and extended. 
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My own approach to `applying' actor-network theory has drawn upon these key elements 
to examine the associations that take place between children and the nonhuman in order 
to reveal that what we sometimes understand children's agency, power and social 
relations to be are effects generated in the associations that take place between children 
and nonhumans. Therefore, it would not be inaccurate to state that I have used actor- 
network theory as an `interpretive regime' to follow children and the nonhuman around, 
interpreting what they do, in order to produce these effects (Verran 1999: 143). 
Whilst actor-network theory is well developed within social studies of science and 
technology, and as Law (1999: 10) pronounces, `has spread', the use of actor-network 
theory to study children's lives remains [as yet] a peripheral move within sociological 
research and thought on childhood. This is despite prominent voices within the field who 
have suggested (and illustrated) the possibilities that such an approach may lend to this 
area of study. In particular, Prout (2000) The Body. Childhood and Society, and Lee 
(2001) Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty, in their respective 
volumes have attempted both explicitly and implicitly to demonstrate how actor-network 
theory and thought akin to it could assist childhood sociologists to, for example, move 
beyond `being-based sociologies of childhood' (Lee 2001: 141), that is, the essentialised 
treatment of agency that has characterised the social actor approach to childhood. In 
addition to agency, Prout (2000) has further argued via a critique of social constructionist 
thought on childhood, and here the body, for a consideration of not only the discursive 
practices that shape childhood bodies but also the material practices. Prout (2000: 2) 
argues for a comprehension of childhood bodies as `hybrid entities' and as 
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'translations.. . produced in and through patterned networks of heterogeneous materials' 
(2000: 14). In taking actor-network theory out of its traditional domain of application 
(Gomart and Hennion 1999), statements such as these have opened the door to the 
application of actor-network theory within the sub-discipline of the sociology of 
childhood. In doing so, they provide a valuable heuristic which marks out the possible 
directions that such an application might take. 
The aim of this chapter then is two fold: first, it introduces to the reader those aspects of 
actor-network theory (and work of this kind) that I have actively applied in the analyses 
presented in this thesis; and second, it considers actor-network theory in relation to the 
sociological study of children and childhood. In attending to this, I draw out of these 
discussions the analytical approach to agency, power and social relations taken in this 
thesis. However, in order to situate the discussion, I will begin with an introduction to 
the key tenets of actor-network theory that have informed my analytical thinking before 
moving on to a more critical discussion. 
Actor-Network Theory: Key Elements of the Analytical Framework 
As a paradigm that has emerged over the last two decades or so, actor-network theory has 
its roots in the work of Callon (1986a and 1991) and Latour (1987,1992 and 1993) and 
their studies of `science in action'. Latour (1987) demonstrated that the capacity of 
scientists to generate knowledge or truths was dependent and rested upon their abilities to 
align an array of discordant or heterogeneous elements or allies inside and outside of their 
laboratories. Michael (1996: 52) describes the various forms that these allies might take: 
11 For example, science and technology 
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`These allies might belong to what we would normally count as `the 
world of science' - for example, experimental materials and equipment. 
Alternatively (or complimentarily), they might reside beyond its 
borders - for example, consumers, funders, public supporters and the 
like. ' 
This reveals a picture of the agency of scientists as dependent upon associations with 
other heterogeneous elements, rather than independent and located within the self. Lee 
(2001: 129) considers Latour's (1988a) expose of Louis Pasteur to be the most distinct 
example of an actor-network approach to agency. In discussing this, Lee (2001) draws 
out that, Latour (1988a) in re-writing the history of one of France's greatest scientists 
illustrates how Pasteur's achievement and his work was not the sole result of Pasteur's 
cognitive capacities as a genius nor the exclusive product of social cognition. Rather, 
Latour (1988a) demonstrates, that it was the result of a series of relations between 
heterogeneous elements - both human and nonhuman. Thus, he exposes, through careful 
analysis, how it was that Pasteur's work was dependent upon the `Pasteur network' which 
consisted of `laboratories, domesticated strains of bacteria, notebooks, statistics... the 
journalists who witnessed Pasteur's spectacular experiment... the French electors Pasteur 
sought to convince' (Callon and Law 1997: 169) and so on. 
In The Pasteurisation of France, Latour wished to illustrate and understand the networks 
of associations and forces among actors. His explanatory method was to make no a 
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priori distinctions among the various allies involved in these networks of association. In 
this approach, Latour dissolved the methodological distinction between humans and 
nonhumans, in so far, as only the former are usually considered to be actors. Invoking 
the neologism `actant' in order to emphasise the `indeterminacy of the actor', (Callon 
1999: 181) to Latour (1997), an actor [actant] is: 
`... something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It 
implies no motivation of human individual actors nor of humans in 
general. An actant can literally be anything provided it is granted to be 
the source of an action'. 
Thus, actors are simply considered as any entity that does things. In the `Pasteur 
network', for instance, microbes are not inert, they cause unsterilised material to ferment 
whilst leaving sterilised material untouched. If they had acted otherwise, that is, if they 
did not collaborate with Pasteur - if they did not act (at least in the way Pasteur intended) 
- then the story of Pasteur might have been somewhat different. It is in this sense that 
Latour can speak of the microbes as actors. 
The Pasteur story serves to introduce some of the key (interrelated) elements of actor- 
network theory used here. First, in revealing Pasteur's agency as dependent upon the 
network of associations created between humans and nonhumans, it provides a method of 
opening up agency to empirical enquiry (Lee, 2001: 130-131). Second, it introduces the 
idea of `heterogeneous networks', that is, the `patterned networks of diverse (not simply 
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human) materials' (Law 1992) and the notion that effects such as agency are collectively 
generated in these networks. Third, and relatedly, in Latour's treatment of the human and 
nonhuman as a priori equal, the principle of `general symmetry' is given voice and 
allows for the scope of analysis to be extended to include the role that nonhuman actors 
or actants play in the creation of heterogeneous networks and the effects these networks 
produce. 
However, as Law (1992) has suggested: 
`... the task of sociology is to characterise these networks in their 
heterogeneity, and explore how it is that they come to generate 
effects... ' 
How then are sociologists / actor-network theorists to go about this process of 
characterising networks and understanding how it is, for example, that an individual such 
as Pasteur can appear as a single point actor? One methodological strategy is what 
Callon (1986a) and Latour (1987) refer to as translation which serves, as I understand it 
(and as I have used it in my analyses), as a heuristic device to conceptualise the process 
of how networks are assembled and therefore how effects come to be generated. This 
strategy is exemplified in Callon's (1986a) case study Some Elements in a Sociology of 
Translation: Domestification of the Scallops and Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in which 
Callon gives an account of the attempts of three marine biologists to convince a group of 
fishermen (and also scallops) of the advantages to be gained in the use of scientific 
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knowledge to increase scallop numbers. Here, Callon explores through what he calls 
the process of translation, the complex endeavours of these scientists to construct a 
`scientific network' by persuading, in exactly the same manner, both humans and 
importantly, nonhumans to comply with them (Edwards 2000; Murdoch 1997). 
The process of translation as described by Callon (1986a) in the aforementioned case 
study involves a number of overlapping stages or dimensions: problematisation, 
interessement, enrolment and mobilisation. Drawing directly on Callon (1986a: 196- 
224), these `four moments of translation' (1986a: 196) are described below in conjunction 
with a more anecdotal description of the translation attempts of the marine biologists at 
St. Brieuc Bay. 
Table 2. Stages of the Process of Translation in the Domestification of the Scallops 
and Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay. 
Stage Definition of Stage Description of Stage or What 
Happens 
Problematisation The researchers sought to 
become indispensable to 
other actors in the drama 
by defining the nature and 
the problems of the latter 
and then suggesting that 
these would be resolved if 
the actors negotiated the 
`obligatory passage point' 
of the researchers' 
programme of 
investigation. 
Fishermen: You are fishermen and we 
are marine biologists. You need to 
ensure adequate stocks of scallops and 
we have the solution to this. 
Scientific colleagues: You are 
interested in advancing knowledge 
about scallops. 
Scallops: You are being dredged from 
the sea. We can give you a shelter that 
will enable you to multiply and 
survive. 
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Interessement A series of processes by 
which the researchers 
sought to lock the other 
actors into the roles that 
had been proposed for 
them in that programme. 
Fishermen: Here is a towline. It 
protects scallops from predators, from 
dangerous currents and from dredges 
that injure them. They will be able to 
proliferate without any threat. 
Scallops: Here are collectors. You can 
anchor and grow without any threat. 
Scientific colleagues: There is a lack 
of knowledge about scallops. Their 
population is declining. Here is our 
evidence. It is important that we ensure 
their survival as a matter of economic 
necessity. 
Enrolment A set of strategies in Fishermen: No strategies needed they 
which the researchers are content to accept the role 
sought to define and envisioned for them by the researchers. 
interrelate the various Scallops: Strategies to convince 
roles they had allocated to scallops to anchor - physical violence 
others. against predators; alterations to 
interessement devices; consent without 
discussion. 
Scientific colleagues: Discussion of 
results and acceptance of previous 
evidence about scallop anchorage. 
Mobilisation A set of methods used by Fishermen: A few fishermen speak for 
the researchers to ensure all fishermen. 
that supposed spokesmen Scallops: A few anchored scallops 
for various relevant speak for all unanchored scallops. 
collectivities were Scientific colleagues: a few specialists 
properly able to represent speak for all specialists. 
those collectivities and Researchers: Displace scallops and 
not betrayed by the latter. fishermen from their home to a 
conference room, although the scallops 
have been transformed into a series of 
equations and diagrams. Enrolment is 
transformed into active support from 
fishermen and scientific colleagues - 
the former who want scallop numbers 
to increase and colleagues who 
consider the results valid and 
presumably scallops too considering 
that some have anchored and offered 
their support. At the end of the process 
the marine biologists speak for all. 
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In his analysis of the events that surrounded St. Brieuc Bay, Callon (1986a) illustrates the 
process of translation, that is, the building of an actor-network from human and 
nonhuman entities. In addition to this, he concurrently demonstrates how a particular 
agent (like Pasteur) or a group of agents (like the marine biologists) come to speak for all 
the other actors (both human and nonhuman) in the network. However, Callon (1986a) 
also demonstrates that the durability of the actor-network is dependent upon the 
robustness of its weakest links. For example, if one of the actors refuses to remain fixed 
in place then the network can break down (Akrich 1992; Latour 1987). This is more or 
less what followed in the `scientific network' of the marine biologists at St. Brieuc Bay in 
Callon's (1986a: 219-224) discussion of dissidence. When the experiment was repeated 
the scallops refused to anchor and the fishermen committed mutiny by harvesting the 
protected scallops of the first anchorage. In doing so, the scallops of the first anchorage 
were betrayed by all the other scallops they were supposed to represent and the 
representatives of the fishermen (who agreed not to fish the protected scallops) were 
betrayed by the fishermen they were representing (Michael 1996). Here Callon 
(1986a: 220) asks if anchorage was in fact the obligatory passage point all along and not, 
as was previously assumed, the marine biologists. Moreover, the support of the scientific 
colleagues of the marine biologists began to waver. In sum, the actor-network collapsed. 
The process of translation gives an explanation as to how potential or would be actors 
(like the marine biologists) attempt to establish themselves as actors by building an actor- 
network from various entities -a process which John Law (1987) has called 
`heterogeneous engineering'. Put simply, translation: 
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`... builds an actor-world from entities. It attaches characteristics to 
them and establishes more or less stable relationships between them. 
Translation is a definition of roles, a distribution of roles and the 
delineation of a scenario. It speaks for others but in its own language. 
It is an initial definition' (Callon 1986b: 25-26). 
However, Callon (1986b) reminds us that this process of defining and distributing roles is 
subject to resistance: 
'But ... no translation can be taken for granted for it does not occur 
without resistance... Successful translation depends upon the capacity of 
the actor-world to define and enrol entities which might challenge these 
definitions and enrolments' (Callon 1986b: 25-26). 
That is to say, the roles that are defined and distributed to the various entities within the 
actor-network may be challenged, resisted, undermined or destroyed. The heterogeneous 
nature of actor-networks means that any entity can refuse their role within the network or 
betray the role assigned. When this happens a general process of retranslation can occur 
or the actor-network may disintegrate (Michael 1996). Callon (1986a: 224) points out 
that being able to describe the ways in which actors come (or do not come) to accept 
particular roles and identities in actor-networks is a method through which an 
understanding of `what sociologists generally call power relationships' can be 
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understood. In discussing this Michael (1996: 53) states, for example, that: 
`... enrolment is not a unilateral process of imposition: it entails both the 
`capturing' of the other and the others `yielding'. It is a multilateral 
process'. 
The argument is that the operation of power can be followed by analysing the methods 
and stratagems used and deployed by enrolling actors to secure the conformity of target 
actors and the negotiations that may take place between these actors during this process 
(Law and Callon 1992). For example, in order to enrol the fishermen at St. Brieuc Bay, 
the marine biologists had to present their question about scallop anchorage in terms of the 
fishermen's need to have access to adequate levels of scallop stocks. This involved 
having to suppress the short-term interests of fishermen (harvesting as many scallops of 
possible) and persuading them instead to consider their long-term interests (durable 
scallop stocks). Therefore, the conformity of the fishermen was ensured through the 
manipulation and control of their interests, thoughts and desires. However, as Michael 
(1996: 57) points out, the `power' of the marine biologists was dependent upon the 
continuing consent of the fishermen and their adherence to this point of view. When the 
fishermen unashamedly harvested the protected scallop beds of the experiment, the 
`power' of the marine biologists or rather as he highlights `their relation of power to the 
fishermen' was broken. Furthermore, a similar scenario developed when the scallops 
refused to anchor. Therefore, the relations of power between the marine biologists, the 
fishermen and the scallops were desecrated. 
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In this case study the marine biologists fell from their position of power. However, 
whilst translation allows for the microsociological study of the mechanics involved in the 
ways that particular agents may gain (or lose) and extend (or fail to extend) influence, the 
view of power that is emphasised is one in which power is considered to be relational in 
so far, as actors gain their powers through the sets of relations they construct with other 
actors and therefore are an effect or outcome of these sets of relations (Law 1991). Thus, 
rather than subscribing to, for example, a traditional view in which power is considered 
as being the possession of agent, that is, as something that is located within the self 
(Edwards 2000; Fox 2000), power (like agency) is viewed as something that is distributed 
between the actors in a network and which arises a result of the collective action of the 
actor-network. Akin to agency then, an actor-network approach to power excavates what 
actors are dependent upon for their powers. In doing so, it is argued that the somewhat 
deceptive impression that power resides within a single actor is displaced: 
`Power is always the illusion people get when they are obeyed... [they] 
discover what their power is really made of when they start to lose 
it... it was made of the wills of all the others ... power [is] a consequence 
and not a cause of collective action' (Latour 1986: 268-9). 
Thus, for the marine biologists of St. Brieuc Bay, their dependence upon, for example, 
the wills of fishermen and scallops for their powers may have become apparent only 
when their respective betrayals dissipated these powers. 
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Here, actor-network theory is close to Foucault in so far as there is a shared concern with 
the constructed nature of power (and agency) (Michael 1996), for example, as Foucault 
(1986: 234 cited in Michael 1996) states: 
`The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a 
primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to 
fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or 
crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of 
power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain 
desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals. ' 
This far, my discussion has progressed from a concern with agency into a concern with 
power and back again. This is because, as Michael (1986: 63) suggests, these are issues 
which are interrelated and as has been illustrated here, `agency is like power -a product 
and an effect' of networks of heterogeneous relations. However, the concept of 
heterogeneous networks is considered by actor-network theorists to be applicable to `all 
of social life' (Law 1992). Therefore, as Law (1992) suggests: 
`... the family, the organisation, computing systems, the economy and 
technologies. . . all of these are ordered networks of heterogeneous 
materials whose resistance has been overcome. ' 
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According to Law (1992), what is radical about this is the claim that nonhumans are 
crucial participants in these heterogeneous networks and, therefore, in our social 
relations. Discussing the materiality of the social world, Law's (1992) claim is `that 
almost all of our interactions with other people are mediated through objects of one kind 
or another'(cf. Dant 1999 for a similar non actor-network argument). Similarly, Latour 
(1986) has suggested that the social is held together by things, or more precisely, in 
relations between heterogeneous actors. The argument is, that human interaction alone 
cannot hold social relations in place. 
In order to demonstrate this Latour (1994a, 1994b cited in Murdoch 1997) has provided a 
genealogy of the development of human society which emphasises the increasingly 
complex nature of configurations between humans and nonhumans. According to 
Murdoch (1997), Latour's (1994a, 1994b) suggestion is that as human society has 
developed, so too have associations between the human and the material. Latour begins 
with a vision of humans akin to simians and moves through a discussion of primordial 
society, agrarian society, industrialisation and concludes with a debate about 
contemporary environmental crises. 
In the beginning, he argues that humans are essentially like baboons living in a society 
which is solely dependent upon interactions between humans. He suggests that humans 
are constantly involved in negotiating and renegotiating their social order because 
nothing can last longer than the interactions themselves. In this stage, social order is 
never stable nor enduring but in a constant state of flux. However, humans progress and 
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in so doing, they begin to associate with material allies. To begin with these material 
allies are the simple tools of primordial man but in moving towards an agrarian society 
wherein farming techniques bring in a range of natural (animals and plants) others 
associations become increasingly more prolific, diverse and complex. This continues 
with the advent of industrialisation where another layer of material associations is added 
(machines and so on) and terminates with the nonhuman actors of the natural world 
which enter into society `as active participants, reconfiguring societies' (Murdoch 
1997: 328). 
Latour's thesis is that the development of increasing associations between humans and 
nonhumans results in removing humans further and further away from pure interaction 
(human only interaction). In increasing associations with nonhumans he argues, that a 
stable and enduring social order is built up in which relations are held in place by 
material objects. 
Latour (1994a, 1994b) takes this argument much further in order to demonstrate how it 
can be applied to overcoming sociology's dualisms, for example, macro/micro, 
agency/structure and so on, however, here the point of analytical interest lies with the 
proposition that material objects participate in and hold relations in place. Bending this 
point somewhat (although not completely), I wish to draw into the discussion Michel 
Serres' (1982) concept of the quasi-object. Simply stated, and reiterating the definition 
previously given above, a quasi-object may be defined as: a nonhuman that is necessary 
for the collective to exist; or `an object that passes through a social group which in doing 
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so forms relations between members of that group' (Carr and Downs 2004: 357). These 
are `special' objects, in so far, as human relations are considered to emerge from their 
circulation within social groups, that is, they are `weavers of collectivities' (Brown and 
Lightfoot 1999). 
In Angels: A Modem M tthh (1995: 47-48) the concept of the quasi-object as a weaver of 
collectives is given when Serres' character Pia states: 
`Look at these children out there, playing ball. The clumsy ones are 
playing with the ball as if it were an object, while the more skilful ones 
handle it as if it were playing with them: they move and change position 
according to how the ball moves and bounces. As we see it, the ball is 
being manipulated by human subjects; this is a mistake - the ball is 
creating the relationships between them. It is in following its trajectory 
that their team is created, knows itself and represents itself. Yes the 
ball is active. It is the ball that is playing. ' 
Serres' (1982) argument is that it is the ball - the quasi-object - that creates relations as it 
circulates and moves within the collective. Moreover, the subject, for example, the ball 
player, is defined by their relationship to the ball: 
`The subject is decentred because relations among subjects arise with 
the quasi-object and not, for example, by means of the Cartesian `I" 
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(Carr and Downs 2004: 357). 
Thus, for Serres quasi-objects are the source of relations within collectives and creators 
of subjects. 
Serres, suggests that objects, in particular those which circulate amongst groups of 
people, are implicated in and structure human relations. Although, never using the term 
`quasi-object' or referring to Serres at any point, Valentine (2002) in an actor-network 
account of food in the workplace illustrates how food and drink as nonhuman entities 
construct, maintain and stabilise relations between humans. Whilst she talks of 
assemblages between people and food, for example, in her account food and drink stuffs 
emerge at times as quasi-objects that circulate within the workplace binding groups 
together, ordering and producing their relations. At a more general level Valentine's 
argument is that there are no workplace relations without participation between humans 
and nonhumans. The point of argumentation is that social relations are held in place by 
objects (such as food or drink) that circulate and bind. Thus, it is argued that social 
scientists need to recognise that humans are not necessarily the `prime movers' in 
relations (Valentine 2002: 2; Akrich 1992). 
Serres' thought on quasi-objects (amongst other things) has been influential in the 
development of actor-network theory. Most crucially, it has paved the way for the 
description of humans and nonhumans in terms of assemblages and allowed for a 
consideration of nonhumans as active participants in social life, which has been 
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developed empirically in the works of Callon and Latour (as in the exemplars given 
above). Speaking of this and of quasi-objects in particular, Stuart Lee (2002: 65) in an 
expose of thought on `hybridity' discusses how, for example, Latour is often considered 
to be the `primary champion' of quasi-objects', with Serres' influence often being 
overlooked. However, Latour's sense of the quasi-object is bound up with the notion 
(and it is a related notion) of permeable boundaries between humans and nonhumans. 
Prout (2000: 14-15) phrases this well in discussing the associations between humans and 
nonhumans that constitute heterogeneous networks: 
`... so abiquitous are associations between humans and the rest of the 
material world that all entities are to be seen as hybrids - what Latour 
(1993) has termed `quasi-objects' and `quasi-subjects' - where the 
boundary between the human and the nonhuman is shifting, negotiated 
and empirical'. 
Thus, Latour's notion of the quasi-object (and quasi-subject) represents, in much the 
same way as Serres', another analytical tool that facilitates an articulation of the mutually 
co-constructive relationship between the human and the nonhuman (Lee 2002), although 
the empirical task is to examine the processes endemic to this co-construction. 
The empirical task here is intimately bound up with this examination of the mutually co- 
constructive relationship between the human and the nonhuman or more specifically 
between children and the nonhuman. This task is focused however on how this co- 
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construction produces outcomes like agency and / or power and also how children's 
relations can, at times, be seen to be held in place by these co-constructions. The 
discussion above serves to illustrate those aspects of actor-network theory and associated 
thought that has guided this task. However, before considering the foundations of an 
actor-network approach to children and childhood that have been already laid by theorists 
of childhood, I would first like to offer a consideration of issues, problems and criticisms 
that are relevant to my use of this approach. 
Critical Issues with Actor-Network Theory 
Actor-network theory has not been without its critics and there exists many critical 
commentaries on the approach. However, for the most part, the criticisms levied towards 
the approach that are relevant here, tend to oscillate around how actor-network theory 
treats the human and the nonhuman and who or what is included and excluded in actor- 
network accounts. Additionally, and somewhat relatedly, is the issue about who and 
what actor-network theorists can legitimately claim to represent in their works. Below, 
each of these issues is discussed in turn. 
Humans and Nonhumans 
Of all the debates that surround actor-network theory and its analytical repertoire, the 
symmetrical treatment of humans and nonhumans is possibly the most well known and 
contentious of these. As Hassard et al. (1999 cited in McLean and Hassard 2004) point 
out, it is because of the way that actor-network theory brings together humans and 
nonhumans in the same analytical view that it has gained so much notoriety. However, 
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as McLean and Hassard (2004: 502) do well to point out, it should be noted that: 
`... this is not a `concern' for proponents of actor-network theory, only 
for those who would call the approach into question'. 
However, whilst actor-network theorists may be `unconcerned' over the issue of the 
symmetrical treatment of people and things - indeed Doolin and Lowe (2002) consider 
actor-network theory's explanatory power to arise from exactly this stance - given that it 
occupies a major point of critique, at least among the protagonists, it would be somewhat 
of a misnomer to gloss over the issue. 
For the most part, there are two interrelated points of contention. First, actor-network 
theory's insistence that humans and nonhumans should be treated as analytically equal 
and second, that nonhumans should be considered alongside their human counterparts as 
potential actors. In proposing this, actor-network theory treads upon a set of ontological 
toes (Law 1992). It does so because it problematises traditional / modernist conceptions 
that maintain rigid divisions and distinctions between humans and nonhumans (Pels et al. 
2002). 
This breaking of the conventional boundaries and differences that are considered to exist 
between humans and nonhumans represents a major point of contention in the debates 
that surround actor-network theory. Star (1991) draws attention to this point of 
contention when she highlights that attempts to subvert the moral divisions between 
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humans and nonhumans are considered to be dehumanising ones. Vandenberghe 
(2002: 53) in a [humanist] critique of actor-network theory, for example, offers the 
following statement on the differential capacities of humans and nonhumans in respect to 
action: 
`Do cubes, bricks, slabs, beams, columns and bottles of beer act? Do 
they co-ordinate their actions through a common definition of the 
situation? Are they kept together or driven apart from each other 
through agreements and disagreements? Obviously not. Bottles, beams 
and slabs do not act. Only humans (and animals) act; not endowed with 
intentionality, artefacts do not act. 
This statement is close to the sceptical Collins and Yearly (1992: 312-316) who in 
discussing the possibility of Callon's (1986a) scallops possessing the ability to act ask: 
How is it possible to think of a scallop as deciding to attach itself to a collecting net? As 
far as Vandenberghe (2002: 53) is concerned humans and nonhumans `belong to different 
ontological regions' and constitute quite `different and incomparable ways of being'. In 
passing over different ways of being, he continues to argue that actor-network theorists 
reduce the analysis of human action, meaning and humans to an approach which 
essentially views humans as: 
`... rational action theorists who behave like `centres of calculation', 
strategically associating and dissociating humans and nonhumans alike, 
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pursing their own political ends by economic means... meaningful 
action disappears and all we are left with is a pasteurised and 
desymbolised world of strategically acting dehumanised humans, or 
humants' (Vandenberghe 2002: 55). 
On the other hand, some authors have raised concerns over how actor-network appears, at 
times, to grant a higher status to nonhumans vis-ä-vis humans (McLean and Hassard, 
2004). Collins and Yearly (1992), for example, have argued that actor-network theorists 
have assigned too much strength and importance to nonhumans and that in doing so they 
have returned us to technological determinism (McLean and Hassard 2004). Collins and 
Yearly (1992: 310) object to what they consider to be a misconceived extension of 
symmetry arguing that `symmetry between all kinds of actants once more removes 
humans from the pivotal role'. In discussing Collins and Yearly in their refusal to be 
drawn into what he refers to as a `Latourian ontological symmetry', Pels (1996: 297) has 
suggested dropping the symmetry principle and replacing it with a notion of `weak 
asymmetry, or a weaker notion about the permeable boundary running between humans 
and nonhumans'. However, as Doolin and Lowe (2002) point out diminishing the status 
of humans is not the task of actor-network theory. Rather, it wishes to consider the role 
of what Latour (1992) refers to as the `missing masses' (nonhumans) in the 
heterogeneous networks that characterise the social. 
As Law (1999: 4) states, `much ink indeed has been spilled over the importance or 
otherwise of the distinction between human and nonhuman'. However, for Law (1992) 
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criticisms levied towards actor-network theory of the sort mentioned above are somewhat 
misguided. Actor-network theory has never implied an equality of essence between 
humans and non humans nor has it proposed that nonhumans act with the intentionality 
that is imbued in human actors or equally that human actors have no intentionality or 
capacity for intentional action (cf. Pickering 1993). Rather, its `theory' of the actor is 
ambiguous: 
`... ANT is based on no stable theory of the actor; rather it assumes the 
radical indeterminacy of the actor. For example, the actor's size, its 
psychological make-up, and the motivations behind its actions - none 
of these are predetermined' (Callon 1999: 181-182). 
Thus, no a priori essential characteristics are attributed to actors. Law (1992) draws 
attention to the need to clarify that the symmetry principle is an `analytical stance, not an 
ethical position', and that advocates of actor-network theory are not suggesting that 
humans should be treated like nonhumans or vice versa, but rather that the divisions 
between them are negotiable, fluid and changing (cf. Woolgar 1992; Turkle 1984). 
Therefore, he argues that it is not that divisions or distinctions are not considered to exist 
but rather: 
`... such divisions or distinctions are understood as effects or outcomes. 
They are not given in the order of things' (Law 1999: 3). 
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It follows then that the symmetrical treatment of humans and nonhumans is, to adapt the 
point Star (1991: 30) makes in relation to technology, a kind of `heuristic flattening of the 
differences between humans and non-humans in order to understand the way things work 
together'. On differences, divisions, distinctions and states of being, the analyst's job is 
to explore how such things come to exist via a sort of `radical relationality' (Law 2000). 
Therefore, what an actor is or is not and what its attributes might be is very much an 
empirical matter (Doolin and Lowe 2002). However, the actor-network position is to 
always start out with an even playing field in which the human and the nonhuman are 
initially (and only initially) considered as equal and indeterminate entities (Law 2000). It 
is argued that this process of a priori levelling of differences allows analysis to overcome 
the boundaries that have precluded analysis from examining the ways in which the 
human and the nonhuman is interwoven (McLean and Hassard 2004). 
Who or What is Included /Excluded in Actor-Network Accounts 
Once one has yielded to the analytical principle of symmetry, moved towards a 
consideration of all entities as actants and begun the tracing of heterogeneous networks, 
another issue with the application of actor-network theory raises its head. Speaking of 
her discovery of actor-network theory during the process of writing her ethnographic 
experience, Janet Rachel (1994: 810) states: 
`I found myself constantly overwhelmed by the number of actants that 
could be construed at work around me and within me, and I was outrun 
by the speed at which these seemed to be moving through their 
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networks. In short, I was paralysed by the choice of actants to follow - 
humiliated by their agility - confounded by their constantly changing 
forms. Turning everything into an actor was stimulating to say the 
least. I found that if I took ANT literally and tried to render the 
networks visible, I lost the power of the theory altogether. ' 
Despite these statements, Rachel (1994) continues to write of the productiveness of actor- 
network theory in terms of being able to look between dichotomies and examine how 
things come to be constructed. However, her written statement expresses an issue 
associated with actor-network accounting - who to follow, who not to follow, who to 
include and who to exclude (Mclean and Hassard 2004). 
In theory, actor-networks are infinitely extendable. They can contain an infinite number 
of actants and an infinite number of connections. For example, if I sit here and think 
about the actor-network of this thesis and try to expose it in its entirety, then I am apt like 
Janet Rachel (1994) to become rapidly overwhelmed and my actor-network is likely to 
explode. In attempting to do so, however, I could start with identifying some quite 
obvious and ready-to-hand actants, such as my computer and perhaps the texts upon my 
table. I could also identify some not so obvious but present-before-me actants, such as 
coffee and chocolate that have sustained me through the whole writing process. For that 
matter I could add my husband who is charged with the task of making the coffee and 
endures endless trips to the local retail outlet to acquire the chocolate. Thinking of 
humans, I could probably add those from the academic community that have advised me 
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throughout the process and friends who have sustained lengthy telephone conversations 
in which they have to endure endless talk about matters that make sense to no one else 
but me. Then, I suppose I would have to include the telephone which makes all of that 
possible. I could continue and begin to think about including things further removed, 
such as funders, selection committees, academic advisers and so on and I could travel 
back in time and think about others long past who have taught me and envision a future 
of the obligatory points of passage in the guise of my examiners that this thesis will have 
to pass through and so on and so on. 
The actor-network so far seems quite simple but already I am not sure where it really 
begins and how far back I need to go in order to identify a `start point', if indeed there is 
one. Equally, I am not sure where the `end point' is likely to be because for the moment 
it is an actor-network in progress. This being the case, I have to constantly worry about 
the actor-network collapsing and I have to work endlessly to maintain it which I do by 
trying to strengthen it with the addition of new actants, for example, more texts and proof 
readers who I have convinced share my interest in flossing out my grammatical errors. 
On top of this, I have to adopt contingencies in case my computer betrays me and breaks 
down or a computer virus comes and sweeps it away. Anxious about all of this, I enrol 
storage devices in the multiple in case one of them betrays me and because I am still 
paranoid, I enrol another two computers and transfer all my text into their memory banks. 
I worry about unpredictable and threatening actants, such as fire and because my house is 
built on a flood plain and the nearby river has twice claimed my possessions, I worry 
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about the water that may turn up at any time and sweep through my house and carry the 
thesis away (I am sure it must be near impossible to claim for thesis loss through the 
buildings and contents insurance). To this end, I also need to worry about melting snow 
and torrential rain that I know from experience antagonises the river to burst its banks. 
Luckily, there are flood defences which I may be able to rely on and if I am really 
worried, when the rain comes I can get in my car and visit the device that monitors the 
flood potential of the water level. It has, however, betrayed me before and I had to leave 
my house in a rowing boat. Now in a state of hyper-paranoia I duplicate everything and 
transport it elsewhere. This is all very tiring and feeling that there is little else I can to do 
to ward off other entities that may come along and destroy my actor-network, I find the 
only other entity I can enrol is that `mystical' entity (Michael 1996: 155) otherwise 
referred to as God, that Nietzsche's madman tells me no longer exists, whom I silently 
ask to protect my actor-network and whom I try to convince to send me an entity called 
inspiration to enrol into the `thesis-network' as I think it would be useful. As this god 
never seems convinced enough to send me this entity, I am pretty cheesed off and wonder 
if a pact with the devil would be more productive. 
The `thesis-network' I am attempting to expose is fast exploding so I will stop. However, 
when I stop, I have to think about what is behind all these entities identified thus far. 
Now the actor-network becomes increasingly more complex because I am now trying to 
account for the fact that each one of the actants, in addition to being a actor-network 
itself, (Law 1991) is also at the same time embedded in multiple other actor-networks 
(Star 1991). 1 am not going to attempt to expose all of this because after endeavouring to 
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do so with the actant called `texts', which is in itself a collective and each member of this 
collective is a collective and each member of this collective a collective and so on ad 
infinitum, I am worn out and have decided, that not only do I lack the time to properly 
attend to this, it is probably empirically impossible. So instead, I shall enrol the actant 
called `texts' and ignore the multiple others implicated in its composition (protagonists 
will of course consider this evidence that my account of the `thesis-network' will be 
eternally unsatisfactory) and try to render this discussion academically acceptable. 
There is a problem in philosophy that it is referred to as infinite regress which can loosely 
be defined as an explanatory procedure that necessitates its own re-application without 
limit. However, because such an explanatory procedure can potentially generate an 
infinite number or `series of conditions or variables', it is considered unreasonable (Audi 
1995: 371). Van Hemert (2001) contends that because of the potential infinity of actor- 
networks, any analysis is susceptible to the problem of infinite regress. This being the 
case, he argues, that it is possible that actor-network theory cannot render anything 
useful. However, the issue of the extensibility of actor-networks, or to put it another way 
- that networks are `multiplicitous and multidimensional' (Michael 1996: 65; Star 1991) - 
is recognised amongst its proponents. Furthermore, actor-network theorists do not, as a 
rule, attempt to expose their actor-networks in their entirety or consider this necessary. In 
the case of actor-networks within actor-networks (Michael 1996) the complex task of 
accounting for the actor-networks that compose each actant is considered a problem that 
can be avoided or made easier to deal with through a process of punctualisation (Law 
1992). 
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Law (1992) considers that it is possible to `punctualise' an actor-network and consider it 
as a `single block', that is, as a single actor. In doing so, the associations of 
heterogeneous elements from which that actor-network is composed are rendered 
invisible. However, Callon (1987) warns that when this is done it must be remembered 
that behind these punctualised actors there are a mass of invisible others. Each actor then 
can be considered as a black-box. If we wish, or if it is necessary, we can choose to open 
the lid of the black-box and look inside to see what constitutes the whole actor-network 
of the black-box or the sets of complex associations of heterogeneous elements within 
(Callon 1986b). This strategy can be applied in blanket fashion. For example, the actor- 
network which is the focus of analysis can, in itself, be considered as an actor and `can be 
compared to a black-box that contains a network of black-boxes that depend on one 
another both for their proper functioning and for the proper functioning of the network' 
(Callon 1987: 95). However, punctualising an actor-network in this fashion has to treated 
with caution. Law (1992) warns that punctualisation is precarious. Seemingly stable 
actors may desert the actor-network they belong to or may be become unstable if new 
actors enter the actor-network (Callon 1986a; 1986b). 
In part, the issue being discussed is the problem of where to `cut the network' (Strathern 
1996). If it is not possible to consider everything then the actor-network theorist is faced 
with decisions about which actors to follow and the related issue of determining where 
the actor-network starts and where it stops (McLean and Hassard 2004). The end of the 
actor-network is perhaps the point when the network appears durable and the need to 
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open up black-boxes and examine their contents disappears (Law 1987). However, the 
issue of where to start and what to follow is more difficult. 
The general rule of thumb seems to be to contained within the slogan `follow the actors' 
(Latour 1987). As a rule of thumb, it seems a bit vague and implies that one should wait 
around (or follow around) and assume that what should be followed will emerge (see 
Law 1991). Miller's (1996 cited in McLean and Hassard 2004) advice is more 
pragmatic and more strategic than this, as he suggests, it is simply a case of picking out 
what you wish to follow and ignoring what you do not according to which actor-network 
you wish to examine. In speaking of Miller's advice, McLean and Hassard (2004) 
suggest that in practice things are more uncertain than this. 
McLean and Hassard (2004) indicate that this is not a problem confined to actor-network 
theorists in the field because no researcher can possible follow all actors everywhere 
(Jessica Mesman tried following just one all of the time and found the process exhausting 
because the actor walked at such a speed 12). Thus, they suggest, that in reality all 
researchers engage in a process of selecting and sorting which ones to follow and 
presumably, as a consequence, which ones to represent. It appears that somehow the 
researcher has to make an analytic decision as to where the network should be cut and in 
the process of doing so, remain open to the charge of neglecting those that have been 
excluded and criticised and for the inclusion of those that have not. 
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Representation 
If inclusion and exclusion is the hands of the analyst, then the issue of who is represented 
in actor-network accounting can be considered equally so. This issue of who actor- 
network theorists can legitimately claim to represent is closely tied to the debates on 
symmetry and is discussed in relation to how symmetrical (or otherwise) the treatment of 
nonhumans vis-ä-vis humans is in practice. Here, the sceptical Collins and Yearly (1992) 
have been the most vocal critics on issues of representation arguing that in order to be 
truly symmetrical, actor-network theorists would need to include the voices of the 
nonhumans they claim to represent in their accounts. 
These issues are raised by Collins and Yearly (1992) in their now infamous paper 
Epistemological Chicken. The crux of their argument is that the symmetry principle is, 
more or less, invalidated because actor-network accounts can only ever be human- 
centred. They can only ever be so, they argue, because the points of view of nonhumans 
such as scallops can never be represented. Thus, they ask: 
`Would not complete symmetry require an account from the point of 
view of the scallops? ' (Collins and Yearly 1992: 313). 
As Callon cannot claim to be able to give voice to scallops, Collins and Yearly (1992) 
suggest that the account of scallops Callon gives is prosaic, despite it being a good 
expose of the relationships between humans and nonhumans. This is because it 
represents an essentially human-centred asymmetrical story. It does so because it 
12 Mol and Messman (1996) 
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presents an account in terms of the complicity of scallops which depends entirely on a 
human-centred interpretation of scallop complicity. Collins and Yearly (1992: 313) offer 
tantalising suggestions on how the point of view of scallops may have been different: 
`Would it be sensible to think of the scallops enrolling the scallop 
researchers so as to give themselves a home and to protect their species 
from the ravages of the fishermen? ' 
Michael (1996) following Collins and Yearly's arguments suggests that this is a highly 
problematic issue for actor-network theory, in so far, as actor-network theorists claims to 
give a voice to `things', conceals the fact that the voices of things are, in reality, highly 
dependent upon human mediation. That is, things `never speak directly - they must 
always be `articulated' or rather constructed through human categories' (Michael 
1996: 75). This, it is argued, results in reinstating the social as the true site for 
sociological investigation. However, as he continues to point out, for actor-network 
theorists the primary concerns are the associations that take place between humans and 
nonhumans. The response of Callon and Latour (1992) to the criticisms of representation 
and symmetry is that nonhumans are woven into the fabric of the social and social 
relations. Therefore, it is the interactions between humans and nonhumans and the 
properties exchanged between the two that is the object of study (Michael 1996). 
Hassard and McLean (2004) consider that issue of how objects are represented in actor- 
network accounts is an important methodological concern and that there is a need to 
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consider how actors are represented and how our conceptual tools and understandings 
influence this representation. As they point out, `for Callon, this relies on the observer 
being agnostic to ensure that no point of view is privileged and no interpretation 
censored'. However, the issue of how symmetrical representation can really be still 
remains (McLean and Hassard 2004: 503). 
Problems with the Actor-network Approach 
In the discussion above I have highlighted some of the problems with the actor-network 
approach that are relevant in the context of thesis. Briefly stated, the approach has been 
criticised for apparently granting agency to things and in the process reducing people to 
the status of things. For the most part, these criticisms are interwoven within ontological 
debates. However, for actor-network theorists this flattening of ontological differences 
between the human and the nonhuman is an analytical strategy. It is not, as Law (1992) 
reminds us, `an ethical position'. Thus, and as McLean and Hassard (2004) have pointed 
out, for actor-network theorists, analytical symmetry is not an issue of concern. 
However, there are methodological problems that are of concern to actor-network 
theorists. Problems with where to `cut the network' (Strathern 1996), what actors should 
be followed and which ones should be included remain. Additionally, there are 
methodological problems with the fact that actor-networks are apt to explode and may be 
potentially infinite. Advice on the former (cutting the network) is that in following actors 
things will `emerge' and what should be followed and included will arise from the act of 
following itself (Miller 1996 cited in McLean and Hassard 2004). The advice here puts 
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the selection of what actor-networks are traced by the researcher firmly in their own 
hands. However, according to McLean and Hassard (2004) that this should be the case is 
not a situation that is unique to actor-network accounting. The solution to the latter set of 
problems (exploding networks) is considered to lie in the analytical strategy of 
punctualisation (Law 1992) as long as the analyst punctualises with caution (Callon 
1986b; Law 1992). The advice here is much more prescriptive than that offered on 
network cutting, although Callon (1986a; 1986b) reminds us that the analyst must 
remember there are invisible others. 
The issue of representation remains highly problematic. Things do not speak. This much 
is fact and I find Collin and Yearly's arguments in respect to how symmetrical actor- 
network can claim to be quite legitimate on these grounds (although I have not found an 
actor-network theorist who has claimed to have been able to authentically represent the 
voices of nonhumans). However, whilst this issue of representation should be 
acknowledged in accounting, it does not necessarily imply that the `first instance' 
analysis of the associations between humans and nonhumans is not a project worth 
pursuing, given that the nonhuman is implicated in the social. 
This has not been an extensive or all encompassing review of actor-network theory. 
However, this was not the intention. Rather, the intention has been to introduce those 
aspects of actor-network theory that have informed this work and to highlight what I see 
as being the major problems with the approach in respect to this. However, before 
moving to consider the approach and its associated problems in respect to the account 
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given here, I would like first to consider the possibilities of an actor-network approach in 
relation to sociological thought on children and childhood. 
Actor-Network Theory and the Sociology of Childhood 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter; the application of actor-network theory to the 
sociological study of children and childhood remains a peripheral move despite the 
presence of prominent voices within the field who have advocated its use and mapped out 
the possible directions that an actor-network approach to childhood could take. 
Therefore, in the present climate of the sub-discipline actor-network theory is not a 
developed approach. Consequently, there is not a substantive volume of either 
conceptual or empirical work that can be directly drawn upon here. As it currently 
stands, there are only a very few authors that have either considered the theoretical 
possibilities or who have engaged in an empirical application of actor-network theory. 
However, between them they provided a valuable heuristic. In doing so, they have 
mapped out a starting point for a programme that, for the sociology of childhood, has the 
potential to move the debates on from their current foci. It is with this programme that 
this thesis primarily wishes to connect. 
At present the potential contribution of an actor-network approach to the sociology of 
childhood is intimately connected to a project of opening up children's agency to 
empirical analysis. Given that the case for considering children as `social actors' (James 
and Prout 1995; Prout and James 1990) has long since reached critical mass and the 
granting of agency to children now appears as theoretical orthodoxy within sociological 
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studies of childhood, a `moving on' of the debates is perhaps timely. At present, the 
orthodox treatment of children's agency is founded upon a view of agency as the property 
of persons. Whilst an essentialising of children's agency in this manner has been 
considered strategically necessary in order to both let children pass into sociological 
discourse and develop the sub-discipline (Lee 1998), Prout (2000: 16) in The Body, 
Childhood and Society, suggests that, `the agency' in children's agency remains 
inadequately theorised', he states: 
`Whilst instances of children's agency are readily found and the limits 
on it beginning to be specified (cf. Mayall 1996) there is a tendency to 
leave matters at the level of discovery and description. Whilst the 
excitement of registering and mapping the hitherto unnoticed is 
understandable, it is open to the criticism that it treats children's agency 
in an essentialist way. It is valorised, but treated as a given but 
previously overlooked attribute of children. Instead, I suggest, we need 
to decentre agency, asking how it is that children sometimes exercise, 
that is bring about some effect in the relationships in which they are 
embedded, whilst on other occasions they do not. The observation that 
children can exercise agency should be a point of analytical 
embarkation not a terminus' (2000: 16). 
Prout (2000) considers that the sociology of translation offers a theoretical starting point 
for examining how children's agency is produced. Whilst his primary project in the cited 
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volume is concerned with the body and not with agency per se (although it is a salient 
theme), he illustrates quite convincingly through his discussions of childhood bodies as 
translations how the approach could be used to open up children's agency to analysis. 
Doing so, would move the issue of children's agency from a `being-based' approach to 
one of `becoming'. The theoretical ground for doing so, is also picked up by Lee (1998). 
In an article entitled Towards an Immature Sociology, Lee (1998) revisits the debates 
surrounding the sociological granting of agency to children and the notions of 
completeness, independence, self-possession and maturity that are implicated in the 
essentialised treatment of agency. Here Lee considers, the reasons behind and the 
implications of, the decision to `mature' children to grant their entry into sociology. By 
this, Lee means that children, hitherto considered as incomplete, dependent and lacking 
in self-possession and maturity, had to be granted (by sociologists of childhood) the same 
agentic status that `make adult `beings' so sociologically significant' (Lee 1998: 461). 
Lee stresses the `either / or' nature of this decision by childhood sociologists when he 
summaries the decisions being made as, more or less, being reduced to having to: 
`Treat children as `becomings' and risk complicity with age-based 
hierarchies (Oldman 1994) and systematic distortion of one's research. 
Treat children as `beings' and avoid complicity with age-based 
hierarchies while also ensuring that one's research allowed for a full 
and undistorted reflection of children's activities, cultures and voices' 
(1998: 462). 
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As Lee (1998) argues, because children had been considered to have been marginalised 
within sociological thought and research due to dominant understandings of them as 
`becomings' the need to make a decision to push for a view of children as beings was 
considered necessary (cf. James and Prout 1990; Jenks 1996). Whilst a paradigm shift 
ensued that has widespread implications for sociological research on childhood 
(Christensen and James 2000) and a mushrooming research literature has appeared, Lee 
(1998) highlights what this need for a paradigm shift reveals about current sociological 
theory. In particular, he highlights sociology's preference for the mature, finished and 
self-possessed over the immature, unfinished and dependent. Although, this, he 
considers, overlooks the dependencies of the seeminingly independent mature. 
However, what Lee (1998) proposes for the problem of children's ontological status is 
quite provocative. Drawing on the work of Jenks (1982) which presents children's 
ontological status as ambiguous, in support of his case for the thoroughly constructed 
nature of childhood, Lee outlines a case for what he refers to as an `immature sociology': 
`Childhood can open the door on an unfinished world because 
childhood cannot be finished. It is neither a state of `being' nor a state 
of `becoming'. Instead it continually poses the question of being and 
becoming as it moves through the social, disturbing social ordering 
practices and calling for temporary resolutions as it goes' (1998: 465). 
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Thus, if children's ontological status is ambiguous then, as I understand Lee's argument, 
children's agency can be posed as a question. This theme of ambiguity is continued inter 
alia by Lee (2001) in Childhood and Society: Growing up in an Age of Uncertainty. 
However, here, the notion of childhood ambiguity and its implications for `being' and 
`becoming' are drawn out in relation not only to children but also to the increasingly 
unstable state of `being' that characterises contemporary adulthood. Lee (2001: 106) 
provides us with `sensitising concepts' that allow us to forge a middle path between the 
categories of `being' and `becoming' and deal with ontological ambiguity and treat 
agency as question. 
Drawing particularly on the works of Derrida, Delueuze and Guattari and also Latour, 
Lee (2001) presents a convincing portrayal of both adults and children as dependent upon 
supplementation, mediation and extension in order to `become'. Lee (2001) discusses 
how humans enter into assemblages with other humans and with endless other things 
such as animals, nature and the material in order to extend themselves, their powers and 
their capabilities. However, these assemblages are seen to be constantly changing and 
evolving into new and different assemblages. 
In his account of children's performance as witnesses in court, Lee (1998,2000,2001) 
demonstrates how in order to `become' a witness, children's self-reporting is dependent 
upon external mediations. He draws attention to how children enter into assemblage 
with, for example, technical devices such as video-recorders, in the course of becoming a 
witness. In such ways, children as witnesses, are revealed as dependent upon various 
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extensions which increase their capacities as witness: 
`The child witness becomes more agentic and can pass as more self- 
present as more `actors' are added to their `network'. Video-cameras, 
videotape, television screens, and the police and social workers who 
help children to produce their testimony all contribute to redistributing 
the burden of childhood ambiguity so that it does not all come to rest on 
child witnesses' shoulders' (Lee 2000: 130). 
In this example, Lee is explicitly illustrating the relevance of an actor-network approach 
to childhood. Whilst noting that actor-networks are similar to Deleuze and Guattari's 
(1988) concept of `assemblages', upon which he draws in discussions of how people 
extend themselves through collaborations with endless others, Lee (2001: 130-131) goes 
on to suggest that: 
`The principal advantage of this approach is that, since it does not 
assume agency is a simple possession, it opens agency up to empirical 
study and analysis. We can ask what a given person, whether adult or 
child, depends upon for their agency. So with this approach to agency, 
instead of asking whether children, like adults, possess agency or not, 
we can ask how agency is built or may be built for them by examining 
the extensions and supplements that are available to them. ' 
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This connects with the arguments and points advanced by Prout (2000) suggestion that 
children's agency should be opened up for analysis and his advocation of an actor- 
network / sociology of translation approach to the question of children's agency. Given 
the now widespread currency of the social actor approach, moving towards a notion of 
the `becoming child' may be seen as a `retrograde step' (Lee 2001: 134) by sociologists of 
childhood - even if the objective is to consider what children's agency consists of or 
what they depend on to extend their capacities. However, Christensen and James 
(2000: 3) have pointed out that (and this is possibly testament to its success), `for some 
this move to recognising children as social actors is implict and taken-for-granted'. 
Without wishing to flex the sentiments expressed in this statement too far, I believe that 
the words contained within it, point to a problem of theoretical stagnation within the 
sociology of childhood insofar as the social actor paradigm has appeared to me to be now 
so taken-for-granted that it is presented, all too frequently, in research accounts as the 
informing theoretical framework, without any seeming need to warrant it explanation or 
consideration. That this should be the case (in some instances), indicates that it is perhaps 
an opportune to time to begin questioning - as Lee (1998: 463) puts it - the `conditions of 
possibility'. However, Lee (1998) also reminds us that it is only because of the steps 
previously taken to develop a sociology of childhood in the `being' mould that taking 
such a path now is conceivable. 
Bringing it Together: Issues in the Current Work 
In the discussion above I have outlined the key elements of actor-network theory that 
have informed this work; points of analytical and methodological critique and problems 
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associated with the use of the approach that are relevant here; and outlined how theorists 
of childhood have envisioned the use of actor-network theory / sociology of translation 
(and thought of this kind) as a possible device for the analysis of children's agency. By 
way of conclusion, I wish here to connect these three streams more explicitly to the 
account presented here. 
Broadly stated, my project here primarily connects with the related programmes of Prout 
and Lee (above). Drawing heuristically upon the analytical repertoire of actor-network 
theory introduced in this chapter, my objective is to examine inter alia how children 
create effects such as agency and power. The emphasis is upon the processes involved in 
the generation of these effects and in exposing the heterogeneous networks that children 
as heterogeneous engineers assemble in order to extend their capacities as actors. 
Additionally, I have tentatively extended the programme towards examining the role that 
nonhuman play in holding together children's social relations. 
However, as I discussed in Chapter One: this work adopted prima facie the `social actor' 
paradigm. Therefore, whilst actor-network theory was subsequently adopted as an 
analytical framework for the thesis, I cannot claim that the account presented here is 
entirely analytically symmetrical. The symmetry principle is used, however, it is used in 
conjunction with an appreciation of children's understandings. It should be noted 
however, that the tendency towards a human-centred account is more salient in some 
parts of the discussion than others. Here, it is not considered that this undermines the use 
of the symmetry principle, rather it is considered that gaining an understanding of 
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children's reasons and rationales in respect to, for example, the entities they enrol, 
facilitates a greater depth of analysis. Inevitably, this implies a weaker version of 
symmetry. 
Following this point, I have not disengaged from the thought that has emerged from 
research conducted from the social actor perspective. My analysis draws on sociological 
work on childhood throughout the text. It is my view that the account presented here 
should not radically depart from this body of work but rather supplement it, albeit 
through a somewhat different theoretical lens. However, in acknowledging my `impure' 
use of actor-network theory perhaps I can propose my analytical approach as a sort of 
`hybrid' to those who may view this as blasphemous. 
The chapters that contain my analysis reflect both themes that have `emerged' during the 
fieldwork period and those actors and networks that I have chosen to follow. In part, I 
have discovered the `truism' that analysis - in terms of what is followed and represented 
- is indeed in the hands of the analyst. To say that a great deal of ordering and selecting 
did not occur in the process of deciding which actors to follow, which networks to trace 
and which of these are represented here would be inaccurate. Related to these issues of 
selection and representation are the methodological strategies of cutting and punctuating 
networks and actors. No actor-network can be considered to have been fully exposed in 
its entirety (and its possible infinity) and no actor has been thoroughly un-black-boxed. 
At times black-boxes have been opened and at others they have not. My approach to 
`cutting the network' has been to represent only those actors that I have been able to 
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empirically trace and only those that are local and contingent to the specific ethnographic 
sites of this study and the interactions that characterise these sites. 
As I have mentioned above, I have not disengaged entirely from the paradigm of the 
social actor. My research practice has been heavily informed by the prescriptions, 
perspectives, insights and advice it offers into research with children that is scattered 
throughout its collective literature. My task now is to turn to these issues and inform the 
reader of both the approach I have taken to research with children and the techniques and 
practices that have been used. 
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Chanter Three 
Practice, Process and Method 
Introduction 
The non-linearity of the research process that has characterised this thesis was brought to 
the reader's attention in Chapter One of this account. The main thrust of this discussion 
was to draw attention to the development of the `research problem' and how it was 
produced rather than to address issues of practice, process and method. However, these 
two points of foci are intimately connected in so far as there was considerable overlap 
between the development of the research problem and the research practice. Thus, part of 
my project here has already been completed. The informing objective in my `accounting 
for the means of production' in Chapter One was to render visible how this thesis 
`became' and to do so explicitly. This reflects my deep belief in documenting (as far as it 
is possible to do so) the realities of doctoral research in particular and research in general 
and as a consequence, my deep distrust of those accounts that do not or perhaps do so by 
invoking a standard notion of reflexivity and paying passing lip service to the iterative 
nature of the research process. Research can be, as Pearson (1993: vii) states, `a messy 
business' as any good book on ethnography communicates. 
In relation to this, the obligatory methods section (Mol and Messman 1996), 1 have given 
considerable thought about whether or not to give the standard text book portrayal that 
appears to characterise discussions of practice, process and method in theses in order to 
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`satisfy some fetish of documentation or legitimation' (Van Maanen 1988: 23) that may or 
may not convince the reader of the candidate's competency in the sociological crafts. 
Whilst this appears as the safest route, it implies a whole-scale cleansing of what I 
consider to be the reality of my research practice. To my mind, this undermines the very 
essence of reflexivity and reminds me of Gouldner's (1970) argument that a reflexive 
sociology is characterised by the relationship between the sociologist and his or her own 
work. Thus, it strikes me as antithetical to subvert or conceal this relationship in order to 
perhaps appear more competent. Competence in doctoral research, whatever this may be, 
must surely also imply a concurrent development of competencies based on experiential 
learning `in the field' and a demonstration of the same (the reader may recall my 
argument that `doing a doctorate is an experience in learning' (Hanrahan et al. 
(1999: 401)). 
I have chosen, most deliberately therefore, not to portray a text book account in the 
discussions that follow. The research process was, as I have pointed out - messy; my 
research practice was not (as I consider it) without fault; and my methods like my 
theoretical framework were very much an in situ development during the preliminary 
stages of my doctoral programme and my early exploratory phase, rather than the result 
of the well thought out executive plan rigidly established in the original research proposal 
and executed forthwith. In part, this of course reflects the nature of the moving target 
that is the research process. However, here my points of self-critique are more pertinent 
to issues related to research with children and in particular, the interweaving of this with 
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my parent-as-researcher (PAR) approach and the decision to study the community of 
children to which my own children belonged. 
In their use of the PAR approach Adler and Adler (2001), whilst thoroughly considering 
the advantages and disadvantages, come out their discussion advising only that potential 
PARs find some sort of balance within their role-fused position. My own stance is much 
more critical than the Adler's and here I wish to draw attention in particular to the 
complex ethical difficulties with the PAR approach - the navigation of which I consider 
too arduous and too tenuous for me to recommend the approach to novice researchers 
who may be unfamiliar and inexperienced in negotiating ethical issues appertaining to 
research with children. These issues of ethics are intimately related to the tensions and 
conflicts that arose between the parental role and the researcher role and the difficulties in 
maintaining equilibrium between these two status positions. Whilst my discussions of 
the PAR approach are given a relatively large proportion of space and are interwoven 
throughout much of this chapter, this does not overshadow the need to discuss more 
formal issues of method that require statutory attention. 
As I indicated towards the end of Chapter Two, on a broader level, the approach I have 
taken to my research has been influenced by the methodological thought associated with 
the social actor paradigm. Therefore, my approach to research with children and my 
research practice has been informed by insights derived from contemporary debates about 
research with children in particular and theoretical debates about children and childhood 
more generally. Although, and in relation to the previous points above, maintaining this 
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methodological stance where the research participants and the ethnographic site forms 
part of your personally and practically lived daily life can be tenuous. 
Whilst a salient theme in this thesis is to decentre children's agency and ask how 
children, as would-be-actors, go about the task of becoming actors with powers, I have 
not, as a consequence, disconnected entirely with the social actor paradigm. Indeed, a 
project which aims to ask what children rely upon for their agency necessarily carries 
with it an underlying assumption that children are capable of exercising agency. Of 
course this is implicit in Prout's (2000: 14) call to decentre children's agency when he 
states (and I am reiterating these statements here): 
`The observation that children can exercise agency should be a point of 
analytical embarkation not a terminus'. 
It follows then that the argument is not over whether children can or cannot exercise 
agency - the empirical case for this has already been made as Christensen and O'Brien 
(2003: 2) point out, `studies of children's lives, circumstances and welfare in 
contemporary societies have provided empirical evidence for agency' (cf. Prout 2000). 
Rather here, what is asked is what children depend upon for their agency. Thus, 
recognising that children can be agentic is therefore crucial to the central task of this 
thesis although the need to essentialise children's agency is not. 
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However, the most salient methodological insights of the social actor approach are 
retained here - although not altogether unproblematically. For example, whilst I take on 
board the recognition stemming from the social actor approach that, `children can 
actively participate and communicate their ideas in research' (Harden et al. 2000: 4) in the 
same way as adults, I also take on board related arguments surrounding which research 
techniques are considered to facilitate children's communication in research and the 
assumptions that underlie the adoption of various techniques. For example, James et al. 's 
(1998) suggestion that researchers should consider that children possess different not 
lesser competencies than adults has led some researchers to develop and adopt more 
`task-centred' (James et al. 1998: 190) techniques for data collection (Harden et al. 2000) 
and the use or development of so called `innovative methods' has been particularly en 
vogue. However, there are no `innovative methods' here. Instead, I have used the 
traditional methods of participant observation and unstructured interviewing. This 
reflects my concurrence with Christensen and James' (2000: 2) argument that carrying out 
`research with children does not necessarily entail adopting different or particular 
methods', and that: 
`... like adults, children can and do participate in structured and 
unstructured interviews; they fill in questionnaires; and on their own 
terms, they allow the participant observer to join with them in their 
daily lives. Thus, although some research techniques might sometimes 
by thought to be more appropriate for use with children, with regard to 
particular research contexts or the framing of particular research 
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questions, there is, we would argue, nothing particular or indeed 
peculiar to children that makes the use of any technique imperative' 
(2000: 2). 
However, the ways in which the exploratory pilot phase affected my choice of methods is 
also of relevance here. In addition to a consideration of the rationale behind the use of 
these methods and the methods themselves, I also attend to detailing the characteristics of 
those children who participated in this study and the analytical procedures used to record 
and make sense of the data. However, before doing so, I wish first to present a discussion 
of the ethnographic locations used, which for the reader incorporates a consideration of 
how those sites were identified and accessed. 
Sociology on the Doorstep: Locating the Ethnographic Other 
In discussing the differences between the fieldwork locations of anthropologists and 
sociologists, Van Maanen (1988: 21) makes the following statement: 
`The most fundamental distinction is that anthropologists go elsewhere 
to practice their trade while sociologists stay at home... sociologists, by 
and large, focus their work on urban contexts that are literally close to 
home. ' 
For Van Maanen (1988: 22) this `close to home' involves, at the very least, a commute on 
the part of the sociologist in his or her Volkswagen. However, the fieldwork locations 
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used in the present study were quite literally close to home. No Volkswagen was needed 
- just a step off the doorstep or a hundred yard walk in order to observe the life worlds of 
the community of children that lived beside me playing and interacting in the outdoor 
spaces of the housing estate in which they and I lived or in the playground of the local 
primary school which the majority of the children attended. 
As Chapter One may have indicated, it had not been my intention to conduct a 
community based study within my own neighbourhood. Neither had it been my intention 
to study children's interactions and activities within what could loosely be described as a 
suburban housing estate and contrast them with those interactions and activities that take 
place within the setting of the school playground. Although, I had originally intended to 
secure access to a primary school in order to generate a sample of participants for 
interview, my sole objective in doing so was motivated by the opportunity schools give 
researchers to access a naturally occurring cluster sample of participants. However, the 
identification of the fieldwork locations (like the research objectives themselves) was 
very much an in situ development of the research process arising partly through incidence 
and partly through opportunity. The result of which was a study which compared 
children's interactions with their local neighbourhood and within the school playground. 
Whilst studies of children's peer cultures have traditionally used formal play settings 
such as the school (Corsaro 1997: 118) and more recent geographically orientated work 
has began to widen understandings of children's peer cultures in wider variety of 
contexts, including their own neighbourhoods (cf. Christensen and O'Brien 2003; and 
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Holloway and Valentine 2000), far fewer are the number of studies which have 
concurrently studied and followed children's daily lives within both their local 
neighbourhood and at school. Indeed, few studies have sought to concurrently examine 
children's lives in different spheres 13. Therefore, the combination of, and the contrast 
between, these different sites has possibly yielded a more diverse set. of empirical 
materials than is perhaps usually the case. 
Most crucially, carrying out fieldwork in different locations allowed for a comparison of 
these children's daily lives, activities and interactions with each other in these different 
sites. In particular here, this comparison allowed for an analysis of how the 
heterogeneous associations between children and the nonhuman differ and are affected by 
the different play spaces that children occupy (this is illustrated in Chapters Seven and 
Eight). What was revealed through this was that the school represented a site in which 
the heterogeneously available was very much subject to adult control and restriction 
whereas within their local neighbourhood children could draw on a more diverse pool of 
heterogeneous elements that, by and large (although subject to local contingencies), was 
under their own control (again, see Chapters Seven and Eight). 
Had only one fieldwork location been used, it is doubtful that observations such as this 
would have been made. Therefore, gathering data from two different sites has enriched 
the understandings that have been presented in this thesis and has allowed for a 
comparison between how, for example, children's translations are structurally effected by 
13 A very good exception to this is Mayall's (1994) study of children's health negotiations at home and at 
school. 
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the extent of adult control that operates in different childhood spaces. As Ely and Anzul 
(1991: 178) state, `the main intellectual tool is comparision' - here, analysis has benefited 
enormously from the comparison of the data generated between the different sites 
explored. 
Below I wish to outline how the two fieldwork sites were identified rather than, as would 
perhaps normally be the case, simply giving a descriptive account of the features of these 
sites (although description is attended to). My rationale for doing so is informed by my 
belief that the development of this research into a study of a group of children within the 
community in which I live warrants discussion primarily in order to adequately portray 
the research process as it actually was rather than cleansing it of reality details but also 
because of my relationship to the location and the research participants. 
Identifying 'Greenspace' as a Ethnographic Site 
In Chapter One, I discussed how my casting of a `sociological eye' over the daily goings 
on of the community of children to which my own children belonged resulted in the 
identification of the interactional space adjacent to my home as an ethnographic location 
for exploratory fieldwork. Referred to from now on as Greenspace because of its 
uniqueness as a relatively large grassed site within a housing estate that can otherwise be 
more or less described as the proverbial `concrete jungle' - this particular space was used 
by the children that lived in the houses adjacent to and nearby as play area. Whilst other 
children from further afield in the housing state did and do occasionally frequent 
Greenspace in the 12 years that I had lived beside this site I had watched the children 
(including my own) who lived around me enter the site as toddlers under the gaze of their 
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parents and continue to use and retain social ownership of the site (until adolescence 
arrives and generally carries them off to further away places). 
Of course and as McKendrick, et al. (2000) point out, neighbourhood sites such as this 
represent common play spaces for children. However, and as McKendrick et al. (2000) 
also implicitly draw out; the use of such spaces by children is subject to local 
contingencies such as age, gender and co-presence of peers. When, I first took up 
occupation of my home in this neighbourhood very few children lived either adjacent to 
or near the site and children rarely played in this space. Over the years as more young 
couples and families moved into the area the number of children living in close proximity 
to Greenspace increased. This proximity of children to each other appears to have led to 
the site developing as space for children's play. Many of these children are close in 
terms of age. At the time of the study the majority of the children were in the latter 
stages of primary school - mostly between the ages of nine and twelve. However, there 
were also children who were younger and older than this (some of whom were siblings) 
who played together regularly. In respect to this, proximity rather than age seems to have 
been the determining factor in the development of Greenspace as a play space. 
Interestingly though, the majority of these children were boys and boy's play activities 
dominated the use of Greenspace. Only four girls lived adjacent or close to the site. 
However, three of those girls usually chose to interact within the peripheral areas of the 
site or to confine their usually, domestic fantasy play (mother / baby routines and so on) 
closer to the private domestic sphere of the home (doorsteps, front gardens and back 
gardens). One of the girls infrequently played with other girls preferring to be involved 
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instead in the boy's activities. To all extents and purposes the boys treated her as a `token 
boy' because of her prowess at sport, particularly football. In respect to this, and with the 
exception of `Terry' who in lay terms would be labelled as a `tomboy' these patterns of 
gendered space use and play activities reflect those that have been previously observed 
and reported in studies of children's peer cultures (cf. Corrigan 1979; Thorne 1993; Voss 
1997). Thus, Greenspace was first and foremost a `boy's place' (cf. Matthews 2003). 
That is was so may have simply been because of the disparity in numbers between boys 
and girls who lived close to the site. However, reflecting back on McKendrick et al., 
(2000) above, it is possible that gender - that is, the relatively large number of boys 
living in close proximity to each other - was perhaps a contingent factor influencing the 
development of Greenspace as a site for children's play. 
As a site for play activities the almost panoptic spatial organisation of the houses that 
surround the site affords parents a constant gaze if they so wish (see Appendix One). The 
opportunity for parents to exert a constant gaze and Greenspace's perceived freedom 
from the dangers of, for example, traffic has meant that as a public space used for play 
parents are neither concerned nor fearful for their children's safety. Therefore, many of 
the parental anxieties revealed in the research literature in respect to children's use of 
such spaces (cf. Valentine and McKendrick 1997) are of little relevance here. Many of 
the surrounding gardens of the houses adjacent to the site (including the garden of my 
own house) `back on' to Greenspace, thus its local reference as `out the back'. This 
being the case, over the years Greenspace has become a peculiar sort of communal 
garden - an area of public space which is considered by those who surround it (children 
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and adults alike) as an extension of their own private space. For those who live on its 
boundaries who do not have children the use of Greenspace by children has been a 
continual source of conflict between them and those adults who have children and 
between these non-parents and the children themselves. For these non-parents the daily 
use of Greenspace by noisy, sometimes squabbling children, was a source of constant 
frustration and annoyance. These non-parents held a different and conflicting set of 
beliefs about the children's use of this public space in this way. Their presence in 
Greenspace was seen as problematic, disruptive and undesirable. Moreover, their use of 
Greenspace appeared almost to be regarded as invasion of these adult's own private 
space. These negative views of children's presence in public space has usually been 
suggested in research accounts to be directed towards older children whose use of public 
space is often considered problematic by adults and their presence within it threatening 
(Matthews et al. 2003; Matthews et al. 1999; Sibley 1995). However, these children 
who were, for the most part, of primary school age were considered and regularly treated 
as troublesome by non-parents. 
As a public space used for children's play Greenspace became the target of my 
`sociological eye'. My gazing upon the unsuspecting children who utilised the space 
perhaps carries with it a connotation of voyeurism in so far as my observation of the 
children in this manner was not altogether that of an impartial or innocent onlooker. 
Additionally, there is perhaps an inkling of an ethical issue in so far as there was no 
consent gained for my enquiring gaze. 
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However, this sort of `gazing' prior to formal entry into a particular ethnographic location 
is not entirely uncommon. Ensign (2002), for example, discusses informal preliminary 
observation of this sort in her account of qualitative research with homeless youths. 
Although Ensign's (2002) engagement in carrying out preliminary observational work 
was quite deliberate, her primary purpose was to identify areas where homeless 
adolescents `hung out' and to assess what forms their street-based activities took. Unless 
she was directly asked what she was doing she did not inform anyone as to the reasons 
behind her presence. In her account, Ensign (2002) appears to consider her informal 
preliminary observation to be relatively unproblematic (ethically speaking) because it did 
not form part of her research and because she did not engage in collecting or recording 
information on the activities and persons she observed. However, she does not address 
how her informal observations perhaps fed into future project developments. 
I do not consider that my own - and I hesitate to even call it this - preliminary 
observational work was intense enough to warrant a full blown ethical discussion on 
issues of consent. It did not constitute part of an official project to `check out' 
ethnographic possibilities in the same way as Ensign's (2002) observational work most 
obviously did. Here, it would be more accurate to state that I was making casual 
observations about aspects of these children's interactions with each other that prior to 
my engagement with the sociology of childhood had been of no previous particular 
interest. If anything, I was caught up in a fascination with how a sociological lens was 
altering my view of these children's activities and interactions as I went about my daily 
life. Moreover, this is not a unique experience amongst researchers of childhood. Jeni 
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Harden (2000) for example discusses how after beginning as a research fellow on a 
project investigating the impact of risk and parental anxiety on the everday worlds of 
children, her growing awareness of children around her: 
`Other than the children of one close friend, I had little contact with 
children in my daily life. Yet when this project began I started to see 
and hear children everywhere. I became much more aware and, I 
suppose, interested in their presence in my adult world' (Harden et al. 
2000). 
Whilst I did disclose these casual observations informally with others within the 
university setting, I did not engage in recording my observations or thoughts. It did not 
occur to me to do so because I was not purposely investigating the potential of the site or 
even considering it as a possible location for fieldwork. Thus, I do not believe there is 
ethical argument to be had. However, in my discussions with significant academic others 
about this site, my continuing interest in it and the pressing need to conduct an 
exploratory pilot phase to focus the direction of the research, it developed as a location 
which was considered suitable for the purposes of a small exploratory phase. There 
were, of course, other reasons influencing this choice of site. Primarily these were: the 
low costs involved; the proximity of the site; and the possibility of establishing formal 
access relatively quickly and with less difficulty and bureaucracy than would normally be 
the case in negotiations for access to a more formal setting such as a school. However, 
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the latter of these assumed advantages, that is, access - proved ethically problematic in 
terms of `putting the `informed' into `consent' (discussed later). 
Putting these ethical issues temporarily aside for the moment: subsequent to informed 
consent being obtained from both parents and children I began carrying out some 
preliminary observation of the children's interactions with each other at Greenspace. As 
intimated in Chapter One: At this time the need to focus the direction of the research was 
the primary reason for the identification of a suitable site and a suitable sample of 
participants for a short period of exploratory fieldwork. However, during this short 
exploratory phase, Greenspace emerged as a rich sociological site for studying children's 
relationships as they naturalistically occurred with each other in the context of their 
everyday mundane play activities. Having an already established role in the lives of these 
children14 appeared at the time to indicate that the major advantage of retaining 
Greenspace as a fieldwork site for the main study would be my ability to conduct 
prolonged periods of observation without the children necessarily paying me any more 
attention than would normally be the case and without my presence in their scene being 
anything out of the ordinary. I had felt that what observations I had already undertaken 
and the data collected as part of the exploratory phase were free from the possible 
influence upon behaviour that an unfamiliar adult research presence might bring. In 
respect to this I believed that the children would continue, as I then thought they had, to 
14 Adler and Adler (2001) consider PAR's to have a `complete membership role'. I would question the use 
of the term 'complete' here as I have an adult / parental membership role within this community of children 
but remain as an adult / parent excluded from their `child world'. I discuss this more fully in the section on 
fieldwork roles below. 
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go about their activities without being constantly aware that someone was gathering 
information on their daily goings on. 
In addition to this, the site offered the opportunity to conduct fieldwork in a non- 
educational site. Considering that the majority of studies that explore childhood are 
conducted within educational settings (James et al. 1998), it seemed that it would be a bit 
of a misnomer not to continue with the research in this non-educational or non-formal 
setting, particularly as access had already been negotiated15. Therefore, the decision was 
taken to capitalise on the ethnographic possibilities that Greenspace offered and retain 
this site as a fieldwork location for the main study. 
Identifying Hillend as Fieldwork Site 
As the original intention of my research was to investigate primary school children's 
perspectives on bullying, in the very first instance I had begun negotiations with the local 
authority for access to primary schools within the local authority in which I lived16 17. 
Following standard protocols, permission was initially sought through the director of 
education by a letter accompanied by a short synopsis of the then intended programme of 
research. Following this, I was granted permission to conduct a research study within a 
15 Perhaps it should also be noted that as a novice researcher I had not considered that anything other than a 
`formal' setting such as, for example, a school or after-school club would be acceptable as a fieldwork site. 
However, it was pointed out to me that this did not necessarily have to be the case and there was no reason 
why I should not conduct fieldwork with a neighbourhood setting. Suffice to say, had I been engaging 
more thoroughly at the time with the literature within social geography appertaining to childhood I would 
have been perfectly aware that there are now a growing number of studies wherein researchers have 
conducted fieldwork in such settings - although participant observation is rarer. 
16 This local authority was selected in order to keep down fieldwork expenses - particularly travel costs. 
" It should perhaps also be noted that at this time I was considering conducting a comparative study of 
different types of schools, for example, comprehensive and public schools. Therefore, at this time I also 
sought, was granted but later politely declined access to two public schools. 
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local authority primary school with the proviso that I underwent an enhanced disclosure's 
19 
Given the twists and turns that led to the identification of Greenspace as a fieldwork site 
and the changes made to the focus of the research as a consequence of engagements with 
the literature and observations made during the exploratory research phase at Greenspace, 
I considered that it would be beneficial to the study to be able to observe Greenspace's 
children within their local primary school as opposed to utilising the permission granted 
by the director of education to negotiate access with another primary school within the 
local authority. My rationale for this, was that access to this school would allow me to 
study the children's interactions with each other (and with other children) and their play 
activities in school. This I considered might facilitate a productive comparison between 
these children's activities in different spatial locations. In particular, I was interested in 
how the school playground as an institutional space in which `adults attempt to control 
children' (Holloway and Valentine 2000: 14) may possibly act to structure these 
children's play activities in various ways. Although, Greenspace was subject to a certain 
amount of adult control and influence, by and large, children experienced a relative 
amount of autonomy and adults rarely intervened, interrupted or co-ordinated their 
activities. When adults did intervene in the children's activities in Greenspace it was 
1e It should perhaps be noted that as a former employee of the education department the director of 
education (although they did not occupy this post during my time of employment with the education 
department) was a former work acquaintance and that it is probable that this perhaps had a direct bearing 
on my being granted access. 
19 Although, I had previously been through disclosure with this local authority because of the lapse of time 
it was necessary to be re-vetted. 
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usually due to concerns over safety (for example, climbing a tree too high or playing 
games on the roofs of garages). 
I therefore approached the head teacher of `Hillend' by letter with a view to negotiating 
access. At the head teacher's request I later met to discuss my requirements. As it 
transpired the head teacher was quite relaxed about the possibility of my conducting 
observation within the school. However, many of the other teachers were not. It was 
explained to me that because many of the teaching staff were relatively near the 
beginning of their teaching careers, there was a great deal of anxiety about any possible 
classroom based observation that may be conducted. Additionally, and from what I could 
gather from this conversation, there was some concern about the likelihood of a constant 
research presence within the school. As I did not consider it vital for my project to spend 
time within the formal classroom setting I agreed to confine my observations to the 
school playground. In respect to what appeared to be concern over the possible 
constancy of my presence, I accepted the headteacher's suggestion that I limit the time 
spent within the school each week by rotating which recreational periods I would observe 
and the days they would be observed on. Necessarily, this meant that I was not able to 
conduct continuous fieldwork within the school. However, because I considered this 
particular primary school to be of greater value to my research than any other within the 
local authority, I considered these concessions reasonable and worthwhile in order to 
secure access to the site. Since the playground (and children's interactions and 
playground activities) and not the classroom was my primary site of interest within the 
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school, exclusion from the teaching areas of the school was not be considered to be either 
problematic or necessarily detrimental. 
Greenspace and Hillend then became the primary ethnographic locations for this 
research. Despite the issues associated with the PAR approach (discussed below), the 
ability to follow the majority of my participants in both their neighbourhood and their 
school was most definitely beneficial to the analysis. Many analytical observations and 
themes were refined or modified due to the ways in which the data collected from one 
site contrasted with the data collected in the other during comparative processes. It also 
gave me a fuller picture of the daily lives of the participants as opposed to the very 
limited snapshot that may have been the result of a solo site study. 
There were, however, disparities between the quantity and depth of data collected 
between the two sites and the time that was spent observing and talking with children was 
unevenly spread over the fieldwork locations. As time restrictions were placed upon my 
access to Hillend, fieldwork was limited to two or three periods of observations per week 
that lasted between fifteen minutes and one hour depending upon which recreational 
break I was observing (mid-morning, lunch time or mid-afternoon). My time at Hillend 
was stretched over the school terms between November 2001 and May 2002 inclusively. 
By contrast fieldwork at Greenspace was stretched over a much longer period of time. 
Just how long is difficult to estimate because even now I feel that because I live in the 
site, I have never been able to fully leave the site. However, I formally began (and I 
include the exploratory phase here) fieldwork at Greenspace in July 2001 and stopped in 
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August 2002, although, the time that I spent officially conducting fieldwork was mostly 
limited to the times that children were not in school (weekends and holidays). I also spent 
periods of time engaged in just `watching' rather than `recording'. However, because I 
could not stop my `sociological eye' from roaming back to Greenspace, I am unsure how 
accurate this may be given the frequency of these `revisits'. Additionally, and as my 
participants were part of my own and my children's daily lives they have been present 
throughout the analysis and writing up of this thesis. Despite `leaving the field', I 
remained within it and these children continued to inform my work. For example, the 
writing of this thesis about them was a source of constant curiosity. When these children 
would come into my house they would ask if I was still writing the `book about them' 
and ask what in particular I was currently writing about and if they were included in that 
part. Sometimes they would stand behind me as I sat at my computer and read from the 
monitor bits of the narrative. In particular, my own children have engaged in doing quite 
a bit of this over the shoulder reading. Although, towards the end they became quite 
bored of it all and of my continual questioning of them about certain aspects. 
Denscombe (1995: 178) of course argues that the success of an ethnography is dependent 
upon: the researcher maintaining their involvement with their participants; remaining 
close to those who are being studied; and perhaps returning to the field many times. This 
is thought to require a prolonged period of fieldwork (Rist 1980). However, Walford 
(1991) raises the issue of how prolonged is prolonged as well as questioning what 
prolonged means in relation to ethnography. Spindler and Spindler (1992: 65) consider 
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that the issue of time spent in the field should not be considered in terms of numbers but 
rather by the degree of understanding a researcher requires: 
`The validity of ethnographic observation is based on observation in 
situ that lasts long enough to permit the ethnographer to see things 
happen not once but repeatedly. [... ] We must observe these happenings 
often enough so that finally we learn nothing significant by their 
reoccurrence. A researcher knows when that point has been reached. 
Then one should observe still longer, to be sure that one's sense of that 
point in time is not premature nor the result of fatigue. ' 
Additionally Spindler and Spindler (1992) argue that, if for example, a researcher intends 
to conduct three months of observation in a classroom (a length of time they consider to 
be adequate) which consists of spending a portion of each day engaged in observation, 
then it is better that they spread this three months over the period of the whole school 
year rather than compressing it into a three month period. Their reasoning for this 
argument is that the need for arriving at some form of completeness in ethnography is 
better able to be achieved if the researcher observes the culture under study in different 
places and at different times. 
My own approach to length and time more or less corresponds to Spindler and Spindler's 
(1992) recommendations. Therefore, I would re-emphasise that my fieldwork was not 
continuous but spread across the time periods outlined. However, a major advantage of 
113 
following the same group of children (with a few exceptions) within their local 
neighbourhood and within their school was that I was able to discuss school based issues 
with them outside of the school setting. Therefore, it was possible to compensate in some 
small ways for the disparity of time invested in each of these locations. 
Characteristics of the Sample 
There were twenty-two core participants in this study. I have used the term core here 
because although I conducted observation within the local primary school, I did not 
sample (for the purposes of, for example, interview) any of the children within the 
primary school20, although aspects of the `research converstations' I had with some of 
these children appear in this text. The core participants were exclusively those children 
who regularly used Greenspace as a site for play and who lived adjacent to or near this 
fieldwork location. Therefore, to use the technical jargon - this was a purposive sample 
selected entirely because of the member's attachment to a particular spatial location. Of 
these twenty-two core participants, seventeen also attended the local primary school. 
Three of the other children attended a different primary school and two were in the early 
stages of secondary school. 
At the time the research began these children were aged between five and thirteen years 
old. Therefore, quite a wide range of ages are represented here. However, as I pointed 
out earlier, the majority of these children were between the ages of nine and twelve; with 
the breakdown of age given in table 3 below. I did not collect data on these children's 
20 It should be noted, however, that there is an occasional use of oral material from children who were not 
in the core sample. 
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socio-economic backgrounds or family formations and so forth. However, in drawing 
upon my local knowledge of these children I can confidently state that these are, without 
exception, children from traditional working class backgrounds (as discussed previously). 
Table 3. Age and Gender of the Participants 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
Male 1 2 1 1 3 4 3 2 1 18 
Female 1 2 1 4 
Total 1 2 2 1 5 4 4 2 1 22 
As evident from the table above and highlighted previously; there was a very uneven 
spread between the genders with approximately 82% of the sample being boys. 
Unfortunately, this was not able to be compensated for because of the relatively exclusive 
concern to study and follow the life worlds of the children that used Greenspace as a site 
for play coupled with the retained social ownership of this space by the children (and 
parents) who lived adjacent to or immediately near the site. Therefore, the gender spread 
of the participants was locally contingent. However, this has important consequences in 
respect to the analysis presented in the proceeding chapters. Most crucially, there is a 
bias towards the activities, interactions and social relations of boys and this is salient 
throughout the thesis. It is, however, an unfortunate outcome of the local geographical 
dispersion of gender in the primary fieldwork location. It is considered that it was out 
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with the remit of this study to attempt to compensate for this. Considering the spread of 
ages and the discrepancies noted in respect to gender, and given that this research focused 
primarily on a very particularised community of children there are no claims made as to 
the representativeness of the sample. 
Ethical Issues 
Fieldwork within both Greenspace and Hillend, presented multiple and sometimes 
frequent ethical dilemmas and difficulties. Many of these stemmed from my PAR role 
which I felt, at times, arose because of the conflict between the obligations and 
responsibilities attached to each of the fused but separate roles and identities of parent 
and researcher. Others, I believe arose as part of the process of doing research. Davis 
(1998) for example, highlights that in ethnographic research with children ethical issues 
confront the researcher on a daily basis. However, other ethical problems arose during the 
process of, for example, negotiating access and obtaining informed consent -I would 
also add there were particular problems in ensuring that the children were aware of when 
I was wearing my `parent hat' and when I was wearing my `researcher hat' - although the 
difficulty here was that, at times, I was at odds to identify which hat I was wearing 
myself. Throughout many of the ethical difficulties I encountered I found that there was 
sometimes little guidance to be found because many of the problems that occurred were 
contextually specific this study. Of course, official guidelines can only ever. be exactly 
this - guidelines - they can never provide a comprehensive `fits-all-situations' set of 
prescriptions for ensuring research is conducted ethically. Thus, and as Roberts 
(2000: 229) highlights, `although ethical guidelines do not give us all the answers, they 
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can lead us to ask the right kinds of questions'. However, official guidelines that are 
specific to research with children are thin on the ground. One oft cited exception to this 
is Alderson's (1995) guidelines which provide some useful rules of thumb. 
Too much can be made of ethical issues where the research participants are children. 
Alderson and Goodey (1996) for instance suggest that there is a danger in further 
exacerbating the notion that children need to be treated differently than adults in 
academic research practice. Harden et al. (2000) suggest that as there is little reason to 
consider that research with children will necessarily carry a `greater ethical burden' than 
that with adults: 
`The main ethical issues should not revolve around children's innate 
difference but relate to children's social location as subordinate to 
adults. ' 
In relation to this the primary areas of ethical concern are considered to be centred around 
issues of informed consent, unequal power relations between children and adults and 
issues of protection (Morrow and Richards 1996). Thankfully, I did not encounter 
problems related to the latter of these in so far as I understand this latter category to refer 
to children disclosing information that they are at `risk'. However, there were particular 
problems associated with issues of informed consent and unequal power relations. 
Whilst these are drawn out below, I wish first to discuss the problems I encountered with 
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the children's adult gatekeepers in ensuring that the `informed' in consent was indeed 
informed. 
Putting the `Informed' into `Consent' with Greenspace Parents 
On the latter of these points I considered I would be able to capitalise on my friendships 
and acquaintances with the parents of the children who used the site in respect to parental 
consent. As a corollary to this I believed that because these parents knew me relatively 
well (some better than others) then there would perhaps be less hesitancy about their 
children's participation in research. 
As it turned out, the process of negotiating consent with parents was considerably more 
difficult than I had anticipated. However, this was not because parents were reluctant to 
agree to their children's participation - quite the reverse was true and paradoxically this 
presented me with immediate difficulties in obtaining informed consent from parents that 
satisfied what I considered could reasonably be viewed as the `informed' in `consent'. 
All of the parents of the children who frequented the site were happy for me to officially 
observe their children at play and to speak with their children about their relationships 
and play experiences with each other. Thus, consent was not the issue. The problem I 
had was that most of the parents were not particularly interested in being informed. My 
attempts to communicate the nature of my research, my interest in the site and the 
children and the aims and objectives (as all of this then stood) were met with a lack of 
interest. Primarily, (and I intend no disrespect to these parents here) this appeared to be 
interwoven with these parent's misconceptions about my university study and a lack of 
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understanding about what a PhD is. These parents generally perceived me as a college 
student and interpreted my request as assistance with a college project. As I tried to 
explain what a research degree was and the `type' of project I was doing, I was often met 
with looks of confusion or facial expressions that conveyed they were not familiar with 
what I was talking about. I became aware that for many of these parents, all of whom 
were of working class or lower working class backgrounds (in so far as they were 
generally employed in manual work or in some instances in receipt of state assistance) 
that the requirements for higher degrees by research in particular or higher education in 
general was not something they were familiar with or necessarily understood. In addition 
and relatedly, it was obvious that academic research was an entirely alien phenomenon to 
these adults. Therefore, I found myself trying dismally to explain much of the `ins' and 
`outs' of all of this to these parents. 
My perception of reactions to these discussions was that some of these parents felt 
awkward and embarrassed as I tried to explain that I needed them to thoroughly 
understand the nature of what I was doing and as corollary to this what I was asking of 
them. I tried to handle this without causing offence and felt as I was doing so that I was 
exacerbating their embarrassment at their own lack of understanding about such things. I 
felt that some parents were handling their felt uneasiness in my attempts to `inform' them 
by waiving what I saw as their need to be informed, that is, by gesticulating and 
verbalising that what I saw as something I needed to communicate to them was not really 
something they felt they needed to know or harboured any concerns about. 
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It had not occurred to me beforehand that I would need to explain my research in this 
way or that the communication of my purposes would be so enormously difficult a task to 
negotiate. However, I did feel it was necessary in order to ensure that the consent I was 
given was indeed informed. I had anticipated that I would need to address the `informed' 
in consent with children but not with adults in their capacity as proxy decision makers or 
gatekeepers in relation to their children's participation in research. Although discussing 
these issues primarily in relation to children and informed consent David et al. 
(2001: 348) draw attention to the issue that the presentation of information and facts about 
research objectives for the purposes of fulfilling the ethical obligations of informed 
consent is often assumed to be unproblematic arguing that: 
`The concept of `informed consent' and especially the notion of the 
information on which that consent may be based has rarely been 
interrogated. ' 
Coming from a medical research ethics perspective, Green et al. (2003) discuss the need 
to consider how to prepare information whether oral or written that sufficiently addresses 
the researcher's obligations to properly inform research participants and also the parents 
of child participants. In particular, they highlight the problems that may be encountered 
in communicating research objectives in a manner that the target audience understands. 
Green et al. (2003) draw attention to the fact that many researchers do not have any 
difficultly communicating this in the technical jargon of academia but are less 
experienced and equipped in translating this into a plain language that satisfies the 
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information needs of, for example, parents. They argue that `true consent implies 
complete understanding' and that consequently researchers have an obligation to `ensure 
that the information provided is both comprehensive and lucid' (Green et al. 2003: 701). 
In addition to this I had to communicate to parents the reasons for obtaining informed 
consent from the children themselves. Generally speaking, the parents did not understand 
why, if they had consented, I would need to seek consent from their children. Here I 
found it necessary to explain, as best I could in lay terms, ethical issues appertaining to 
research with children. Interestingly, and even more surprisingly, I had a similar problem 
once the `in-principle' access to the local primary school was finalised. When I had 
intimated that I required to disseminate information about my research and consent forms 
to adults caretakers and also to children, the head teacher did not understand why this 
was necessary. Whilst it was easier to communicate research objectives to educational 
professionals, I was alarmed that I had to also communicate contemporary ethical 
practice. However, this particular head teacher was due to retire (in fact he did so during 
the fieldwork period) and perhaps he had become out of touch with such issues21. 
Having, first approached parents verbally regarding issues of access and consent, I was 
able to take on board the issues raised in these verbal exchanges and use them to inform 
the written information leaflets that I produced. Retrospectively, I considered that the 
whole uncomfortable verbal exercise allowed me to more fully address the information 
needs of these parents and also how this information needed to be presented in, for 
example, terms of language and the level of complexity of language that was necessary. 
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Lessons learnt about the use of academic jargon to communicate research objectives and 
so on to lay audiences assisted in the production of this material and forced me to address 
my own competencies at communicating such things to non-academic audiences. 
Children and Informed Consent 
In contrast to the problems that arose with adult gatekeepers, I found that the 
communication of research objectives to children was much easier22. However, because I 
had fell foul of my own belief that it would be children's information needs that I would 
have to address and not adults, I had prepared much more thoroughly for this and 
invested a lot more time and thought into the ways in which I would inform children. 
Additionally, I was able to draw on the experience of others who were able and kind 
enough to provide me with exemplars of explanatory leaflets they had produced and 
assist me in producing my own and issue advice on how to talk about such issues to 
children. Given the age range of the participants, it was necessary to verbally inform 
some of the younger children who lacked literacy skills. Likewise, I spoke to the 
children who were in the early year groups (primaries one and two) at Hillend to explain 
the research and my presence in the school. Previous work experience had also equipped 
me with more developed skills at communicating with children and young people of 
different ages about a broad range of subjects - more so, I had found, than any skills I 
thought I might have had in respect to communicating with adults. However, and as I 
21 I am not making a judgement that educators should necessarily be `in touch'. 
22 Morrow and Richards (1996) suggest that academic research is no less free from western notions of the 
child as incompetent. In issues of informed consent it is clear to me that I made assumptions about the 
respective competencies of adults and children. That is, I assumed adult competence and children's relative 
incompetence. This is evident in the fact that I considered that it was necessary to prepare for addressing 
children's information needs but not adults. 
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note below, I was not skilled at interviewing children for research purposes and had to 
develop this skill in situ. 
Maintaining the `Informed' in Consent During Fieldwork at Greenspace 
The problem I had with the principle of informed consent with children was in 
maintaining an understanding with children, particularly in Greenspace, that I was in fact 
observing them and recording details about their daily goings on. I had not considered 
that my parental identity would generate ethical problems for the maintenance of 
informed consent. To put it more directly - the children tended to forget too easily my 
researcher role. Whilst this may sound advantageous in terms of presumably being able 
to access naturalistic behaviours, I began to feel that there was an uneasy, almost covert, 
element to the research. I became quite concerned about the fact that it did not always 
appear that the children remembered the meaning of my temporarily changed role in their 
life world. In fact, at times, some of the children were blatantly confused about this and 
confused about at which times I was `watching' and at which times I was not. However, 
it should be noted that at times I was confused about this myself. In the PAR role where 
there is no clear demarcation of your identity and role as a researcher (because the 
parental identity continues to supersede it) this becomes problematic both for the 
participants and for the researcher. 
In consultation with the children, we agreed that when I was watching I would wear a red 
jumper to clearly signify that at that particular time I would be watching and recording 
what they were doing. For the most part, this worked quite well, although sometimes 
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when I talked to these children, as I would normally do as a parent and adult in their life 
worlds, they did ask (red jumper or not) whether I was asking as a researcher and whether 
I was writing it down or going to write it down or not. Thus, the problem was never fully 
overcome. Likewise the wearing of the red jumper did not mean that they automatically 
stopped considering me in my natural role rather than my superficially constructed 
researcher role. They still approached me and interacted with me primarily as a parent 
but as a parent who also wrote things down about them. Whilst the situation in respect to 
all of this was somewhat lessened within Hillend, news of who I was in Greenspace 
spread rapidly and I remained (despite the fact that my own children did not attend this 
school) somebody's mum. I never really managed to fully dilute the parental identity. 
Parent-as-Researcher and Relations in the Field 
Necessarily, and given that it was only possible at times to weaken the parental identity, 
there are issues here about power relations between children and researchers that are 
perhaps more potent than is usually the case. A great deal is said in the pertinent 
literature about the need to dissolve as far as it is possible the power differences that exist 
between children and adults in the context of research practice an idea that has been 
widely discussed in feminist debates about relationships between researchers and 
participants (cf. Oakley 1982; Ribbens 1989). However, Harden et al. (2001) note that, 
`one of the features of child research is that inequalities of power between children and 
adults are duplicated in the research process'. This is considered to have implications in 
terms of influencing what children are willing or feel able to say to researchers in, for 
example, interviews (Hill et al. 1996). 
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Some researchers have argued for the adoption of particular field roles in order to 
minimise the structural differences that exist between researchers and children. For 
instance, Mandell (1991) proposes the notion of the `least adult role'. With the exception 
of physical size, this involves the researcher attempting to suspend their adult traits. 
Previously, Pollard (1987) argued for a similar role that involved the researcher 
attempting to ensure they were not seen as a `proper adult'. Some authors have argued 
that such roles are difficult to maintain in practice because of the asymmetrical nature of 
child-relations (James et al. 1998). Moreover, whilst James et al. (1998) suggest that the 
researcher could attempt to develop a friendship relationship with the children 
participating in their projects, for much the same reasons they argue that this may prove 
difficult. 
In my attempts to construct a lesser adult identity, I found that the parental identity with 
its associations of authority were very difficult to erode. At times, I was concerned that 
when I spoke to children they were doing so because they felt they had to. I also 
considered and often got a sense that some children found my attempts to dilute my 
parental identity were strange - perhaps because I was trying too hard to shift my 
naturally occurring identity, which in spite of its more negative associations with issues 
of asymmetries of power and so on, was, after all, how many of the children related to me 
prior to my entering the field. 
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I found that trying to become less than adult / parent was very difficult in these 
circumstances. Given this, I opted for a while in trying out the `detached observer' role 
which is more common in psychological research (Mayall 2000: 121). In doing so, I tried 
to refrain entirely from becoming involved in the children. Whilst useful at times when I 
needed to just watch the children at play and listen to their talk with each other (and I 
intermittently did just this), this too was impossible to maintain because the children had 
a tendency to `draw me in'. For example, when disputes occurred they would frequently 
approach me to settle these disputes which in turn led to other problems with field roles 
and also, at times, resulted in ethical dilemmas (see Chapter Six). 
Eventually, I opted for and tried to maintain (as far as it was possible to do so whilst 
carrying a parental identity) a sort of midway point between the `least adult' and 
`detached observer' roles that endeavoured to integrate Butler and Williamson's (1994) 
suggestions about how to `bridge the gap' between the adult researcher and the child 
participant. This, `bridging of the gap' they argue is about more than just attempting to 
construct an acceptable identity. They suggest four key factors need to be considered by 
adult researchers if this gap is to be narrowed in research practice. First, they suggest that 
researchers should engage their participants in a role which exhibits `naive curiosity'. In 
doing so. they should be empathetic, honest and open in a way that is neither 
condescending nor patronising. Second, they should attempt to be non-judgemental. 
Third, researchers should provide opportunities for their participants to express and 
explore their own views within the context of the issues being considered and their own 
(the participants) agendas. Finally, they should remain flexible and take into 
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consideration the differences that exist between children when they engage them in the 
research endeavour. 
I found this a much more useful approach than relentlessly trying to find an acceptable 
field role that diluted power differentials and so forth. Of course this involved shifting 
aspects of my parental identity and changing some of the ways I would have normally 
interacted with these children but I believe this did so in a less `forced' way. Also, 
because I considered Butler and Williamson's (1994) suggestions to be represent, more 
fundamentally, some prescriptive advice on how to communicate and treat children (as 
people) that is applicable in any context (not just research) I believe that this stance 
facilitated a more fluid movement between the two identities / roles of parent and 
researcher and assisted their fusion. 
Adler and Adler (2001) consider that as the PAR approach has much in common with 
other role fused approaches such as counsellor-as-researcher or teacher-as-researcher, the 
above sorts of issues are not unique (nor more potent) to the PAR method. However, 
they highlight that the methodological problems and issues with these others sorts of role- 
fused approaches are little discussed in research accounts. In their discussions of the 
teacher-as-researcher, Jones and Tannock (2000) highlight similar problems in relation to 
issues such as power asymmetries and the difficulties in balancing the dual roles of 
teacher and researcher simultaneously. Jones and Tannock (2000) also draw attention to 
the fact that it is difficult to divorce the teacher role from that of researcher role and vice 
versa. Additionally, they too highlight that, at times, their participants were also 
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confused, citing an example of a message a children wrote in a Christmas card to one of 
them which stated, `to Mrs Jones, sometimes teacher, sometimes helper' (2000: 93). 
However, in these accounts of role-fused research approaches the focus of the debates 
presented primarily oscillate around issues of bias, validity and reliability and consider 
the influences that role-fusion has upon influencing findings or conclusions in terms of 
the construction, analysis and interpretation of data. Lewis (1992) suggests that such 
researchers need to consider the extent to which data can be distorted as a consequence of 
role-fusion. In relation to teacher-researchers some authors have argued that such 
problems can only be overcome by the use of quantitative methods (Elliot 1991 cited in 
Jones and Tannock) whilst others have argued that bias can enter here too (Yin 1994). 
Jones and Tannock (2000) suggest that although it is important that role-fused researchers 
consider the pitfalls of their roles, ultimately these issues depend upon the skills of the 
individual researcher. However, they also note that, `children behave and respond 
differently to different people' (Jones and Tannock 2000: 93). Thus, there is no reason to 
consider that the use of a different sort of researcher would necessarily minimise such 
issues. 
My own conclusions are that the issue of the researcher role and how that role is 
performed in the field and the minimising of its effects is an active process. By this I 
mean that it is not possible to superficially adopt and rigidly adhere to any one particular 
field role. Field realities do not allow for this. However, they do allow for a negotiation 
between and movement amongst different role positions. 
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Watching and Asking 
Although never intended, the approach to this research has been broadly ethnographic. 
By this I mean most specifically that I have employed participant observation as my main 
data collection too123. Having used participant observation in the exploratory phase I 
considered that the major advantage it offered was the opportunity to observe a 
community of children in situ (cf. Denscombe 1995) within a naturalistic non-formal 
setting. Whilst I would not go as far to suggest that I entered the field with a tabula rasa 
(Wilcox 1982) I considered that because the direction of my research lacked clarity (see 
Chapter One) that participant observation allowed for a more flexible approach that 
facilitated the development and refinement of the focus of the research in tandem with 
emergent themes. 
A distinguishing feature of ethnography is that it allows for the development of theory as 
a process wherein theory can be developed and refined in tandem with data collection 
and the collection of new data (Gold 1997). In addition to the above I also lacked a 
theoretical framework for the research (although aspects of this were beginning to be 
developed as a result of the exploratory phrase). Therefore, I considered that the approach 
would offer the scope to allow for a theoretical framework to develop out of the process 
of data collection (Gold 1997). 
Certain arguments surround the issue of theory and research with children. In particular, 
it is suggested that the development of theory `should not be the driving the force ... rather 
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it should emerge' (France, et al. 2000: 151; cf. Mayall 1996). France, et al. (2000) point 
out that there are parallels between this argument and the grounded theory approach of 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) which argues theory should evolve from the analysis of 
empirical data thus, theoretical or analytical models should not be imposed. 
What is implied in these statements is that theoretical models should not be adopted a 
priori but rather be allowed to emerge from the data24. However, others have challenged 
this type of approach to theory building because it can be difficult to do in practice 
(Mason 1998; Hammersley and Atkinson 1984). Whilst in this research the application 
of actor-network theory and thought associated with it was not systematically applied 
until the data collection phase was complete, the conceptual thought associated with it 
progressively influenced the focus of my observations in the field and as a consequence 
the data I was collecting. Wilcox (1982: 462) suggests that one of the goals of 
ethnographic work is to synthesise the empirical with the theoretical in the hope that the 
end `story' is: 
`... deeper and fuller than that of the ordinary outsider, and broader and 
less culture-bound than that of the ordinary insider. ' 
23 The reader may have noticed that up until now I have declined use of the term participant in `participant 
observation'. This is because I do not feel that I could in any real sense of the term `participate' in the life 
worlds of these children. I therefore find the use of the term misleading. 
24 Personally, I do not endorse an atheoretical approach to research (Layder 1998). Rather, I consider that 
research should be characterised by an ongoing process of interaction between the theoretical world or 
writings of one's discipline and the empirical world in which one is engaged in order to go beyond simple 
story telling (Hughes 1994). Additionally, I think there are issues with the notion that researchers can 
suspend or bracket in some way their theoretical engagements with their discipline when they enter the 
field and somehow prevent these from invading their thought processes altogether. 
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The exploratory phase had also convinced me of the accrued benefits that the practice of 
combining `looking' with `asking' could produce. In particular, I found that being able to 
`ask' children about the things they did and said when they did and said them or soon 
afterwards was advantageous. Additionally, if I was following a particular theme that 
was emerging from observations I could subsequently explore the theme in conversations 
with children. I found this to be a more useful approach than attempting to construct 
interview schedules however loosely structured and applying them in blanket fashion. 
Therefore, I had found that letting the `research conversations' (Mayall 2000) flow from 
my participant observation was beneficial. 
In adopting this approach to collecting verbal data I felt it lessened some of the 
awkwardness the children felt when I attempted to conduct more formal interviews. As I 
have mentioned the children knew me and related to me first and foremost as a parent, 
therefore, when I had tried to interview children more formally they seemed ill at ease 
with the unnaturalness of the situation. By contrast the Adler's (2001) consider that their 
PAR role facilitated a closer relationship and identification with some of their 
participants. Therefore, their impression is that many of their participants discussed 
issues with them they considered they would probably not have discussed with either 
parents or researchers25. However, I found that if I took a more conversational approach 
(which maintained a suitable distance whilst facilitating a better rapport within a more 
Zs I get a certain sense of uneasiness when I read about such claims in the Adler's work. For example, the 
disclose information about how they became the 'cool parents' ; offered food and rest room facilties; 
helped children do their homework; functioned and confidantes, friends and mentors; bailed children out of 
trouble; and discuss 'priding themselves on having the best snacks (which they appear to consider results in 
children visiting them as a 'way station'. Personally, I find this more than a little problematic perhaps even 
coercive. Although the Adler's appear to be attempting to 'prove' their closeness to their participants. 
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natural kind of interaction) and integrated these conversations with the periods of time I 
was formally conducting participant observation the children appeared more relaxed. 
To begin with I had found it difficult to talk to children for research purposes and perhaps 
this came through in my formal interview attempts. That this should have been the case 
surprised me because I had assumed that my previous experience in youth work would 
have prepared me for this. However, I found out that there was a vast difference between 
the skills needed to conduct a research interview with children and those I had used in 
practice based work where principally children were asking me for information. 
As things developed my verbal skills with children improved and I became more able to 
focus these research conversations on issues I wanted to find out more about whilst at the 
same time allowing room for the children to manoeuvre the conversation. However, I 
retained the emphasis on conducting these conversations in tandem with participant 
observation. Having developed the `red jumper code' eventually some of the children 
began to approach me with things they wanted to tell me. Sometimes, some children 
asked if I would put the `red jumper on' so they could tell me things. Although a very 
simple method of distinguishing between times when I was `researching' and times when 
I was not, it proved relatively effective. It also gave me a sense that I was attending to 
what I felt was an ethically difficult matter - that of my role being explicit to the children. 
I believed this was important. In their PAR role the Adler's (2001: 21) discuss taking a 
`more explicit parent-as-researcher role'; however, they do so only in relation to the 
audio-taped interviews they conducted. A great deal of the Adler's work seems to have 
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been conducted without clearly identifying when they were collecting data on children's 
lives and when they were not. Whilst I am not claiming that I magically managed to stop 
myself from `gazing' when I was not wearing the `red jumper', considering the issues 
outlined above I did endeavour as far as it was possible to find a way for the children to 
identify when I was doing so. 
I dispensed with the wearing of the `red jumper' whilst conducting observational work at 
Hillend. With the exception of the core participants, the majority of the children at 
Hillend did not identify with my parental status. However, news (as they say) travels fast 
and it did not take long for me to be identified as `so' and `so's' mum (even although my 
own children did not attend this school). Even here then, there were problems with 
shifting the parental identity. 
For the most part fieldwork at Hillend was free from many of the problems that the PAR 
role brought although it brought new ones in terms of attempting to build relationships 
with members of staff some of whom held reservations about my presence even though 
this presence was confined to the non-teaching areas of the school. As my presence 
became mundane it appeared to become much less of a concern to staff who had been 
generally guarded in their interactions with me. However, a change in headship during 
the fieldwork period brought with it a person who gave me the impression that she was 
less than enthusiastic about my activities within the school. To this day I remain 
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confused as to what the reasons were for this or if indeed my impression was 
inaccurate26. 
Data Collection in the Field 
Whilst each ethnography differs in emphasis, ethnographers generally rely upon a 
mixture of data collection methods or sources of data in their attempts to achieve 
`intimate familiarity' with the lives and meaning making practices of their participants 
(Emerson 2001). As previously highlighted; the present study used three methods of data 
collection - observation, participant observation and interviewing. Using these methods 
of data collection on a more or less simultaneous basis is generally considered to allow 
the researcher to develop a more holistic understanding of their participants and their 
daily lifeworlds. For the most part, there is also a great deal of consensus about the 
enhanced quality of ethnographic data (in respect to amount and depth) given that it is 
acquired through researchers investing a significant amount of time observing and to 
varying degrees, participating in these settings (Prus 1996). 
In their accounts, it is common for researchers to draw out the advantages of field 
methods through reference to the above sorts of benefits and through their arguments that 
these allow for the development of a fuller, more complete understanding of their 
participants and the lifeworlds they inhabit. Similarly it is common for accounts to pay 
some attention to the practice of analysing the yields these methods produce, that is, the 
`processing' of fieldnotes (Emerson et al. 1995). However, notwithstanding discussions 
Z6 I discuss field relations with this person in chapter eight. Therefore, for the sake of expediency I shall 
not replicate this discussion here. 
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of such things as gaining access, fieldwork roles and so forth, it is less usual for 
researchers to acknowledge or discuss the actual practice of using these methods `in the 
field' (Corsaro and Molinari 2000). Generally speaking, the tendency in ethnographic 
writing has been to abstract these process from the act of doing ethnographic research 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986; Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Hammersley 1992). However, by 
definition, an ethnographic approach communicates that the researcher is intimately 
involved in an ongoing process of collecting rich, detailed and invariably voluminous 
data. Considering this, it is useful to consider some rudimentary features of the practice 
of data collection during fieldwork. 
Data collection in fieldwork is routinely reported in terms of describing the systematic 
and careful recording of the routines of the fieldwork setting in terms of the actions and 
interactions observed in the field, snippets of conversation and so on through the 
construction of fieldnotes. However, as a novice researcher I found that the majority of 
accounts which discuss these aspects of fieldwork tend to advance little explanation 
beyond summary statements that make claims to this process being rigorous. 
Consequently, it seemed that little existed in terms of procedural guidelines for data 
collection practices during fieldwork. Therefore, in the first instance my approach to data 
collection and in particular the business of data construction (the taking of fieldnotes) 
proceeded haphazardly, in a somewhat frenzied attempt to manually record `everything'. 
Although common sense informed the recording of mundane but nonetheless important 
details such as the date, place of observation, actors present in the scene and so forth, 
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attempts to write down, in detail, everything the eyes see and the ears hear soon exposed 
itself as impossible and impractical (if not outright foolish). Moreover, the written 
products of this presented an unmanageable transcription task for a lone researcher in 
terms of the constraints on time presented by the realities of daily life outside the field. 
That is not to say that I was not aware of existing experiential advice that highlights the 
necessity of putting aside blocks of time for transcription of field data (Chiseri-Strater 
and Sunstein 1997) but rather that I had misunderstood what is practically possible in 
terms of the construction of such data in situ. 
Here two points emerged relatively early on: firstly, that it is not possible to record 
`everything' in extended detail in situ and secondly, that my attempts to do so were 
premised on a misconception about what constitutes good procedural practice in respect 
to data recording. Apart from the fact that this lead to a situation in which I `overfed' 
myself with information, it also highlighted a point often made about the impossibility of 
being able to capture the essence or reality (the use of this term alone being hotly 
contested) of ethnographic settings completely (Van Maanen 1988). 
Retrospectively, my procedural folly I put down to a lack of experience but also my lack 
of rigor in familiarising myself more fully with ethnographic methods prior to my entry 
to the field. Latterly discovering that the construction of fully fledged notes should be a 
task which is undertaken after a particular period of observation / participant observation 
was somewhat of a relief in so far as my sense of competence was restored but also a 
lesson about acquainting oneself more fully in regard to method. 
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Following Chiseri-Strater and Sunstein's (1997) advice that in situ data recording should 
aim at the construction of what they term `jottings' (short summarised notes of events) 
from which more detailed field notes are latterly constructed, I shifted my practice 
accordingly. However, as Chiseri-Strater and Sunstein (1997) note, the process of 
recording and producing fieldnotes is highly personal and individual researchers differ in 
respect to how much or indeed how little detail they record first hand and construct at 
some later time. As field work progressed and the study became more focused in terms 
of what I wished to find out (see Chapter One and below in the present Chapter) I became 
more flexible and also more confident about when to change from `jotting' to more 
detailed recording. Additionally, I began (as previously mentioned) to appreciate the 
value of suspending in situ note taking altogether in favour of just watching which was 
invaluable when `testing' an analytical idea. 
I also attempted to adopt a more rigourous approach to the data collection process 
throughout the main fieldwork phase. This incorporated messages from experienced 
ethnographers regarding sensitivity to sensory impressions, my own personal response to 
events in the field, recording in analytic memos the development of analytical thought, 
questions that events in the field stirred and the much reinforced point of writing up 
fieldnotes as soon as possible after leaving the setting (if not immediately) (Chiseri- 
Strater and Sunstein 1997; Emerson et al. 1995). 
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At its core, however, ethnographic fieldwork and the process of data recording is messy 
and rigor in method quickly materialises as a rhetoric which is difficult to consistently 
maintain in reality. This is because researchers rarely find themselves in ideal situations 
for writing in the field (Emerson et al. 1995). As mentioned earlier, there are tensions in 
respect to fieldwork roles and relationships, and in the practical problems of attempting to 
participate and simultaneously record events. For example, in the school site the gaze of 
teachers often made me reluctant to be seen to be recording. In what were at times quite 
tense relationships with staff, fear of offending staff through being seen to record teacher- 
pupil interaction (particularly where disciplinary issues were present) were ever present. 
Children would on occasion require attention for bumps and bruises, request assistance, 
wish to chat or sometimes invite me to join in games. Inevitably, such occurrences caused 
interruptions to the recording of observations. These realities inevitably have an impact 
upon the artifacts of fieldwork (Sanjek 1990; Emerson et al. 1995). 
Van Maanen (1988) reminds us that the result of these sorts of practical issues is an 
understanding that is always incomplete and represents the fieldworker's recorded 
memories of a setting and its inhabitants. He argues that the data collected in fieldwork 
is `not data per se but rather primitive approximations of the writer's later knowledge and 
perspectives of those studied' (1988: 118). 
Recording and Analysis of Data 
The most extensive part of my analysis is drawn from the written field notes taken in stiu 
or constructed as soon as possible after the events. However, as the reader moves 
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through this thesis they will find that I have occasionally used what I refer to later on as 
analytical memos, which have been drawn from personal writing I occasionally used as 
an attempt to order my thoughts. A great deal of material was generated from fieldwork 
notes. However, a proportion of this material was also lost. During transcription I found 
that the notes I had written were sometimes disjointed or so random that I could not make 
sense of what their meaning was. Whilst, I endeavoured to transcribe written notes as 
soon as possible after periods of observation, it was not always practical to do so. 
Therefore, I found myself frequently having to engage in blocks of transcription work 
that given the delay between the `field and the computer' sometimes suffered from recall 
problems when I was at a loss to makes sense of these notes or remember the events to 
which they related27. 
The `research conversations' I had with children (and very occassionally with adults) 
were not always audio-recorded. I audio-recorded where I thought it was appropriate to 
do so, when the child(ren) was comfortable with the conversation being audio-recorded (I 
gave them the option to decline my use of a dictaphone), and when I was following a 
particular theme or topic that I felt would benefit from as full as verbal record as possible. 
In sum, I collected eighty-six recorded `research conversations'. However, some of these 
were relatively short - some no longer than a few minutes28. Although, earlier formal 
27 Van Maanen (1988: 118) argues that the `glop of materials we refer to as fieldnotes' are invariably 
incomple and insufficient. He considers that they only ever are a recorded memory or a small part of the 
memory of the researcher from the fieldwork period. He argues that field notes are data per se but 
approximations. 
ZI do not think that because some of these taped `research conversations' were short in respect to the 
length of the conversation that this necessarily implies that there is less quality or depth in the verbal data. 
This assumes that there is a relationship between the quantity of data and the quality of data or as Harden et 
al. (2001) quoting Brownlie (1999) put it: `the more talk the better data'. Here they argue that length does 
not necessarily imply depth or mean that the data gathered is useful or better. 
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interviews held during the exploratory phase were recorded and transcribed only three of 
these have been used as data in the final analysis. This is primarily because the focus of 
the research changed. However, this is true for much of the data collected. Once the 
themes were worked through during analytical processes a great deal of selection went 
into those parts of the data that have been represented in the material presented in this 
thesis and those aspects of these children's lifeworlds that have been included here. 
Therefore, in so far as I have framed this thesis as ethnographic, the inherent partiality of 
the `story' means that it is not a full ethnography. This of course is an outcome of the 
`slicing' and `dicing' of the data during analysis (Van Maanen, 1988). 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) consider that analysis is pervasive throughout the research 
process and is not a separate phase towards the end of the research that is followed by an 
equally distinct phase of `writing the findings'. However, I did not subject the data to 
what could be considered to represent a formal and substantive analysis until I `left the 
field'. Some authors suggest that analytical processes should be divorced entirely from 
the other phases of the research process and left until all the data has been transferred 
from its raw state and made amenable to analysis. Bryman (1988) for example considers 
than any concurrent analysis may impose theoretical constructs on the data that do not 
correspond to the reality experienced by the participants of the study. Despite formal 
analysis not being conducted until the data was transferred from its raw; as a process 
analysis was pervasive throughout the research. Where it started I cannot answer 
definitively but I would venture that it began when I was working through the literature 
prior to `entering the field' and refining my ideas in relation to the reading I was doing. 
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Certainly, I would argue given the continued interaction and exchange between my 
empirical observations within the field and my disciplinary engagements out with the 
field that the analytical processes were potent throughout (see Chapter One). For 
instance, my increasing interest in actor-network theory progressively invaded my 
analytical focus within the field to the extent that its various elements were shaping the 
focus of my observations which were increasingly being recorded and framed in my 
notes using the analytical repertoire of actor-network theory. 
I do not see this interaction between theory / observation / analysis and so on as 
problematic as Van Maanen (1998: 117) states: 
`The working out of understandings may be symbolised by fieidnotes, 
but the intellectual activities that support such understandings are 
unlikely to be found in the daily records'. 
Moreover, in so far as this is perhaps antithetical to those who advocate that these 
supporting intellectual activities should not be pursued until after the researcher has 
disengaged from the field, there is as Dey (1993: 63-4) puts it: 
... a 
difference between an open mind and empty head. To analyse 6 
data, we need to use accumulated knowledge, not dispense with it. ' 
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As will be evident to the reader from the discussions presented in Chapter One; by the 
time I left the field to begin the substantive analysis, there was a clearly developed 
analytical approach. Additionally, the themes that I wanted to reflect in the thesis had 
emerged through the interactions that characterised the concurrent processes of fieldwork 
and engagements with the theoretical and empirical literature - one informing the other 
and vice versa. As this and the analytical framework used (see Chapter Two) have 
already been discussed, I shall not reiterate these discussions here. 
Raw data, however, have to be made amenable to analysis in a manner which facilitates 
the building of explanations and arguments (Mason 1996). There are no hard and fast 
rules for this (Strauss 1987) and ultimately the method for making sense of the data is the 
remit of the individual researcher (Ely and Anzul. 1991). However, it does require that 
researchers organise data both practically and analytically (Denscombe 1998). Thus, the 
differences between the practical organisation of data and the analytic organisation of 
data are often indistinct and frequently there is an underlying logic to the way in which 
researchers store data (Mason 1996). 
A common approach to generating categories for analysis amongst qualitative researchers 
is to search through the data for themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 
1984; Strauss 1987). However, this is often simultaneously influenced by the aims of the 
research and prior theoretical interests (May 1997). As a starting point my own approach 
utilised the themes developed in the fieldwork phase as a starting point to `focus down' 
the data. This was easier to do with fieldwork material that had been analytically 
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annotated in the field. As I mentioned previously, the focus of observations in the field 
had become progressively influenced by actor-network and thought akin to this. 
Therefore, in parts where in situ annotation had occurred or where I had added analytical 
annotations during the editing process that characterised transcription this task was less 
difficult. Thus, if I had signposted the theme of, for example, quasi-object or human / 
nonhuman interaction then this eased the identification of themes in the text. 
Much harder to identify or `trace' were the actor-networks in which effects like agency 
and / or power and so on were generated. A great deal of re-reading of the material was 
necessary here as the tracing of actor-networks were not foremost in my analytical 
thinking during parts of the data collection. Retrospectively, analysing field material for 
actor-networks is painstaking when the data gathered was not collected with this specific 
purpose in mind. Here, the orientating concept has to be outcome or effect. Therefore, it 
becomes necessary to manually search the material for- effects that children have 
generated. For instance, Chapter Six which illustrates a child putting together an actor- 
network to retaliate against other `bigger' children who have harassed him was identified 
in the data through its outcome which was `the bigger children go away'. The actor- 
network was relatively easy to trace in this instance because the fieldwork notes for the 
events which began with the harassment episode were detailed. There was also 
additional verbal and background material that supplemented the analysis through which 
the identification of what Mills (1940) would refer to as vocabularies of motive 29 (cited 
in May 1997) could be discerned. Once identified, translation becomes the analytical 
29 These may be identified in, for example, verbal data as the reasons individuals give for performing 
various actions in various situations (May 1997). 
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method for unpicking the process through which effects are generated or `engineered' 
(Chapters Five and Six serve as exemplars of the bringing of the analysis to the fieldwork 
material). 
The analysis of the data, in as structured a framework as this, opens up some analytic 
possibilities whilst closing off others (Mason 1996). 1 am quite sure that this has 
happened. I am even more certain, to use the words of Van Maanen (1988: 117) that: 
`... no-where in my fieldnotes does this story [or the `stories' I have told 
here] appear in a form even remotely comparable to the shape, tone, 
concern for detail, background information or personal posturing that 
I've given it here'. 
- and further echoing Van Maanen (1988: 120); 1 am also quite certain that my analysis is 
not finished, just over. 
Conclusions 
It has not been possible to cover everything I would have liked to have discussed in this 
section. Therefore, I have drawn out what I have considered to be the most important 
issues and those that are necessary to communicate. As I intimated at the beginning of 
this chapter; the research process which has characterised this thesis has not proceeded in 
text book fashion. The communication of this is all the more complicated because of the 
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manner in which this thesis has shifted and developed. Adding to this complexity has 
been the non-conventional (although not unprecedented) use of the parent-as-researcher 
approach. Therefore, more room has been given to discussing the dynamics of field roles 
and the interweaving of field roles with ethical problems, practical problems and data 
collection and so forth. The continual search for what was perhaps personally felt to be 
an acceptable field role is a fundamental difficulty with the PAR approach and it has the 
tendency to tread on the fine line between what is ethical practice and what is not 
(although this is perhaps a subjective issue). If it is part of the remit of doing research to 
ask at the end of it all if you would do it the same way - then I would advise this 
approach only for the experienced and not for the novice. However, its major advantage 
is the depth of acquired knowledge that living within a fieldwork setting and having a 
history of shared interaction with your participants has. I considered that I knew these 
children well before the research and in many ways I discovered I did and this helped me 
work with their particular personalities and peculiarities. In many ways I discovered I 
knew them not at all. 
In moving now to present the analysis to the reader, the proceeding discussions begin 
with introducing the early observations of the exploratory phase to the reader. The focus 
here is upon the emergence of children's interactions, associations or assemblages with 
the nonhuman as a fundamental theme in the development of this thesis. As a starting 
point, this provides an introductory gateway through which the reader can pass before 
moving to explore the rest of the text. 
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Chanter Four 
Exploring Associations between Children and Nonhumans 
Introduction 
In Chapter One I highlighted that a consideration of the associations that took place 
between children and nonhumans first emerged as an analytical theme during the 
exploratory study that was conducted prior to the main fieldwork phase. As the reader 
will recall, this exploratory phase was carried out in order to collect preliminary data and 
focus the direction of the research. The use of pilot methods for these purposes is not 
uncommon. Indeed, some authors positively recommend that a pilot phase is carried out. 
Frankland and Bloor (1999: 154) for instance, suggest that for qualitative researchers a 
major advantage of a pilot phase is that it offers a way to narrow the focus of the 
research. Additionally, and more relevantly here, they consider that it is a useful exercise 
where the researcher is inexperienced or a novice. 
Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) highlight that it is common for the data collected in 
qualitative pilot studies to be incorporated either in whole or in part into the main study. 
This is seen as relatively unproblematic because qualitative data collection (as opposed to 
quantitative) is seen to be a progressive process because the focus of the research is 
constantly being refined in light of data that has already been collected and also as new 
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lines of exploration emerge. Despite the extensive use of pilot studies, Van Teijlingen 
and Hundley (2001) also point out that the findings or processes of pilot studies are rarely 
reported. Whilst they attribute this underreporting to publisher bias they also consider the 
numerous disadvantages that this results in. One of the disadvantages they list is the lack 
of opportunity this presents to learn about the theoretical thinking of others. In the 
present study the foundations of the theoretical thought that has characterised this work 
were an outcome of the exploratory work that was conducted. In this respect, this work 
was critical to the overall development of this thesis. Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001) 
consider that researchers should communicate about these (and also other) aspects of 
pilot work. 
In part, this chapter does this as it draws primarily upon the data collected during the 
exploratory phase. However, the discussion below should not be considered as a separate 
account of the themes that emerged from the exploratory phase. These are to be 
considered as part of the major findings of this thesis. As mentioned above, it is common 
for qualitative researchers to incorporate such data into the main study. Here, I am 
making the place of this data much more obvious to the reader than is perhaps usually the 
case. In doing so, however, this chapter serves an additional function: it introduces to 
the reader children's associations with the nonhuman. Thus, it provides a contextual 
background to the rest of the thesis. 
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The Presence of Nonhumans in Children's Play: Glimpses of a Countervailing View 
The observation that children's play often involves the use of material objects such as 
toys is so unremarkable that it hardly warrants any attention. Within the research 
literature the use of such objects often invades descriptions of children's play activities. 
However, references made to these objects usually serve as mere background (Dugdale 
1999). They are treated as `mere things' (Mol and Messman 1996: 428) and granted a 
small, unimportant walk on part. Their presence in these descriptive accounts appears as 
inconsequential to the social relations being described - the description and analysis of 
which takes precedence. Their presence is there none-the-less. A very good illustration 
of this is contained within Corsaro's (1997: 172-173) re-description of Evaldsson's (1993) 
discussion of children playing marbles: 
`Marbles involves skills in playing the game - that is, aiming and 
shooting marbles at a hole or at another players marbles, quickly 
anticipating the flow of play, and shouting various restrictions 
regarding shooting. Evaluating the value of marbles from a 
competition and trading standpoint is also important. Although the 
children in the study played marbles in dyads, there was always an 
audience of nonplayers who observed and often participated in 
arranging matches, evaluating the play, and negotiating marble 
trading ... The games and trades had natural 
histories in that the occurred 
over the school term, and during this period of time the children came 
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to assess each other in terms of these various skills ... Evaldsson found 
that the children's selves were intimately related to status, which was 
linked to the possession and negotiated value of marbles as things. ' 
Nonhumans, (here marbles) invade this description. Moreover, an explicit connection is 
made between these nonhumans and the development of the children's selves and 
identities within this particular dyad. However, as fast as this connection is made it 
disappears into a subsequent statement that fails to acknowledge the connection existed: 
`Thus we see the notion of identity or self embedded in the collectively 
produced peer culture' (Corsaro 1997: 173). 
In this statement the nonhumans become inconsequential to the perceived outcome of 
these interactions and their role is dismissed 
According to Dant (1999) this is a result of a disciplinary bias that privileges human 
actors and the relations that take place between human actors. Sociology, he argues, has 
tended to overlook the important role of material objects within the social world, the 
interactions between objects and people, and the manner in which objects contribute to 
the construction of relations within the everyday world. Thus, it is hardly surprising that 
the nonhumans in the extract above are merely considered as instruments of the 
children's play. 
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A countervailing approach could extend the glimpse of recognition these nonhumans 
were briefly given. The marbles could be seen as a supportive ingredient in this activity 
that makes it possible for the children to play together and construct these identities and 
selves. Therefore, the marbles could possibly be viewed as mediating these relationships 
between the marble players allowing them to construct a complex collective. 
Part of the process of documenting the children at play in Greenspace was to detail the 
sorts of activities the children engaged in and the many and varied kinds of objects they 
played with. Initially, these objects were considered as instruments of children's play 
rather than, for instance, a vital element in the activities that took place. Therefore, as 
mere background, nonhumans were present throughout my descriptions of children's 
activities but to begin with they were ignored. A similar description to that of 
Evaldsson's marbles is found in this extract summarising my observations of children's 
use of beyblades: 
They [the children] frequently play beyblades. Some of them have vast collections of 
different play beyblades and a lot of the activity is taken up in the exchange and 
discussion of the range of different beyblades and the qualities of the different sorts of 
beyblades for play. The type of beyblade that is played with seems to be considered to 
have an effect on the ability of a player to win. Therefore a lot of this trading is bound up 
with acquiring better beyblades. Likewise, the rip cords are also heavily traded because 
some types of rip cords are considered to give the beyblade a better spin. The collecting 
and trading of beyblades seems to be as important a part of the game as the game itself. 
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Sometimes it appears more important as frequently there is more time spent engaged in 
exchanging and discussing beyblades than game play. For some children involved in 
beyblading this seems to be the most enjoyable part of the activity. Not all of the children 
are skilled traders and often some of the younger children are frequently coaxed out of 
the beyblades they possess in unfair trading deals. For example, because some types of 
beyblades have a higher status or desire value than others older players target these 
forms of beyblades in younger players collections. Here the younger players are 
`tricked' into thinking that being given three lesser status beyblades in exchange for one 
higher status beyblade is a good bargain. The older players are wiser and do not fall 
foul of the misconception that quantity is better than quality. Players with vast collections 
of these high status beyblades are admired. A considerable amount of loaning of these 
high status beyblades goes on because of many of the players reluctance to exchange 
these. Directly linked to all of this and the gaming aspect is the fact that this activity is 
based on an animated television programme. The players set up complex scenarios that 
mimic the latest episodes and attempt to recreate the dramatised television beyblade 
battles. On other occasions they set up round-robin style tournaments, frequently 
gambling their beyblades in the process. Players who are skilled in the game and the 
selecting of beyblades that win are given a high kudos within the group. When two highly 
skilled players do battle there is much excitement and many others gather around to 
watch them engage in battle. 
In many ways the complexity of the interactions that surround the practice of beyblading 
is similar to the marbles example above. Therefore, a similar countervailing argument to 
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that applied to marbles could easily be applied here. As nonhumans, beyblades in their 
multiple numbers could be considered as a key element in the interactions taking place. 
Indeed, all activity revolves around these nonhumans and the children take up their 
positions within the activity group in relation to them. 
This view brings the analysis close to a conceptualisation of these nonhumans as being 
`quasi-objects' - objects that are necessary for the collective to exist, which in passing 
through the members of the beyblading group forges relations between them (Carr and 
Downs 2004: 357). Whilst this line of analytical thinking is more fully developed much 
later on in Chapter Seven and the importance of these types of nonhumans for holding 
relations together is drawn out in Chapter Eight, at the exploratory phase a related but 
much more diluted analytical theme was emerging from similar observations noted about 
children's associations with their nonhuman instruments of play. 
Working at the time with the theme of `power' I had been interested in trying to identify 
the ways that children became powerful - how they did power. However, rather than 
focusing on the concept of power per se which I considered too abstract to work with 
empirically, I had drawn upon related concepts from the literature that I considered were 
more suited to the enquiry as it stood at that time. Fundamentally, I was focusing on 
identifying the ways in which children acquired positions of control, domination, 
influence, status and so on (cf. Prus 1999) within the peer group. Although dominated by 
social psychological approaches to group dynamics (cf. Hogg and Abrams 1998; Tajifel 
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and Turner 1986) there is a large and extensive literature on these aspects of children's 
peer relations30 which was heuristically useful for this task. 
Acquiring Status Within the Peer Group: The Use of Nonhumans 
Both the marbles example drawn from Evaldsson's (1993) study and the example of 
beyblades above, consider that children can acquire positions of status within the group 
through their skills at playing the game. A different approach which considers these 
nonhumans as quasi-objects for example, would see these status positions as deriving 
from their relation with or to the quasi-object. However, a similar but slightly different 
theme to this began emerging directly from exploratory observations, although, most 
peculiarly in relation to a child who was regularly excluded and rejected from the other 
children's activities and occupied a low status position within the peer group. Rather 
than, as perhaps would be expected, a popular child. Although I was previously aware 
that this child was not popular amongst the other children; in my observations of the 
children's activities he tended to stand out on a daily basis. However, Merton (1986a) 
observes that rather than their presence being obscured by virtue of their marginalisation 
from peer groups, these children do tend to stand out. Therefore, the very fact that this 
child spent the vast majority of his outdoor play time apart from the crowd perhaps 
resulted in making his presence more visible to me. 
This particular child, Richard, closely represented what Eder (1995) refers to as a `social 
isolate'. Drawing upon discussions with children asked about why these children were 
rejected and excluded by the peer group(s) Adler and Adler (2001) report that the primary 
30 Adler and Adler (2001: 220-225) provide a lengthy annotated list of this work. 
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reason expressed was difference. Evans and Eder (1993) suggest that the three main 
types of difference that characterise children distinguished as social isolates are: 
appearance; deficient mental capacity; and inappropriate gender behaviour. Most of the 
children at Greenspace considered that Richard exhibited all three of these differences. 
This was evident in both the manner in which the other children spoke to him and also 
how they spoke about him. 
Although there was nothing dramatically different about Richard's appearance, the fact 
that he sported old fashioned `home haircuts', wore glasses and did not dress in the 
popular sporty trends the other children did, resulted in him being ridiculed. However, 
ridicule episodes of this sort were infrequent and tended to be contained to times when, 
for example, he had been given a fresh `home haircut'. The largest part of the other 
children's derision of him stemmed from their perception of him as `stupid' and his 
effeminate physical demeanour. 
Locally this boy was referred to by children and parents as `daft Richard'. However, the 
belief that he was less mentally competent that his 10 years suggested he should be was 
entirely based on his social competencies. Academically, Richard was an exceptionally 
intelligent boy particularly mathematically. However, he lacked interpersonal skills and 
socially his behaviour appeared considerably immature for his age. This lack of what is 
considered to be appropriate social competencies has been a previously recognised 
characteristic of children who are rejected by other children (Dodge, Coie and Brakke 
1982). 
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Richard's effeminacy resulted in his exclusion from the dominant sport activities at 
Greenspace in particular football. However, in common with the observations of others 
about social isolates Richard, would hang about the edges of the activities of the other 
children and as a result would occasionally be permitted temporary access to the peer 
group (Merton 1996). Usually, this would be to make up the numbers rather than 
because the other children wanted to play with him. During his participation in these 
games Richard was often subjected to continued taunts about his effeminacy. His lack of 
skill at sports games would result in the other children calling him derogatory and vulgar 
names such as `woose' and `gay boy' which directly vocalised their condemnation at his 
effeminacy. More typically, during these games, they called him names such as `doss' 
and `mong' that verbalised their perceptions of Richard as mentally deficient. 
Despite the level of ridicule he had to contend with Richard rarely reacted to these 
insults. He appeared to accept them and he continued to hang around the margins of 
these children's activities. Although, there were periods of time that Richard appeared to 
withdraw entirely from the interactional scene and stay indoors. I occasionally asked him 
why he had not been out for so long but he always gave the same answer and told me it 
was because he did not want to come out31. 
"I should note that Richard was not at all open to discussing the way in which the other children treated 
him. On the infrequent occasions that I did try to speak with him about this he was defensive to the point 
of almost denying that it went on. However, he did once venture the opinion that it was he that chose not to 
play with these other children. This contradicted the occasional pleading with the other children that he did 
to convince them to let him join in. I thought it was better not to push for his views on this because it was 
obvious that he did not want to discuss these issues. 
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Contrary to his marginalised position within this group of children, Richard frequently 
managed to considerably elevate his status within this peer group. His method of doing 
so was almost always the same and was generally very successful. The fact that Richard 
was materially advantaged in comparison to the other children was at the root of his 
ability to raise his status within the peer group. In lay terms, Richard could have been 
considered as a `spoiled child'. His parents lavished him with gifts and he was always 
bought the latest (and frequently expensive) toys that came on the market32. This being 
the case, Richard had a wide range of things that the other children did not have but 
desired possession of or access to. The most desired of these objects were the 
technologically advanced computer games devices such as the Nintendo Game Boy. 
Even when other children eventually acquired such objects Richard seemed to be able to 
keep one step ahead by always having the latest model or design on the market. He also 
had a collection of robotic, electronic and remotely controlled toys that were beyond the 
economic means of most of Greenspace's parents. 
Richard capitalised upon the fact that many of the play items he possessed were desired 
goods that many of the other children did not have and he repeatedly used his possession 
of these objects to entice the children away from whatever activity they were engaged in 
that he was currently excluded from. His method was almost always the same. He would 
disappear through his garden gate and into his house to re-emerge soon afterward with 
one of these desired objects. If his and the object's presence went unnoticed by the other 
children he would verbalise his and the object's attendance within the setting by shouting 
32 Feeding into this are issues to do with the marketing and dissemination of children's toys within the mass 
media (Kline 1993). However, I am not going to digress into a discussion of this here. 
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to the other children that he had the object. Thus, he would declare `come and see my 
Game boy' or `I've got a new robot'. If his object received no immediate interest he 
would repeat this exercise or perhaps add a further enticement such as `who wants a 
shot'. If necessary, Richard would go back indoors and return with another object and 
repeat the same scenario. 
More often than not, the other children's interest would be immediately aroused by 
Richard's object. Sometimes the interest was such that the current activity or activities 
that were holding the attention of the other children were entirely abandoned in favour of 
Richard's object. If the offer of access to the object was not forthcoming from Richard 
himself it was commonplace for the other children to plead with him to let them play with 
the object. Sometimes Richard did not acquiesce to these requests preferring instead to 
show his object off. In such instances he seemed to enjoy the prolonged pleading of the 
other children to use the object. Moreover, it appeared that he enjoyed even more telling 
the others that they were not getting to use it. 
More commonly, however, Richard would engage the other children in a `turn taking' 
process. He would organise the children into a queue with each child's position in the 
queue decided by Richard. It was usual for Richard to order this queue hierarchically 
according to his `favourites' in the cohort. These favourites, who would be prioritised to 
the front of the queue, were the younger children who unlike the older children were 
more predisposed to play with Richard. This playing with others of lower status within 
the peer group by social isolates has been previously commented upon. Adler and Adler 
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(2001) suggest that rejected children often form friendships with younger children 
because this allows them to leave their stigmatised low status identities behind and take 
up a relatively high status position based on their advanced age. However, those children 
who chastised and excluded Richard the most found themselves placed at the back of 
these queue formations. Therefore, in placing these children in low status positions in the 
queuing order, Richard reversed their usually high status positions within the cohort as a 
whole. At times he varied the queuing system and opted instead to, for example, insist 
that everyone sat cross-legged on the grass and await their turn with the object. Here 
Richard was mimicking school based disciplinary practices that target the body as a site 
of control and compliance (cf. Simpson 2001). Moreover, he appeared to enact the 
authoritative role of teacher in these organising rituals, often speaking to the other 
children in teacher tones, ordering them to sit or stand still and so forth. Therefore, 
Richard was clearly appropriating information from the adult world and incorporating it 
into these rituals. This was evident in the ways in which he based such modes of control 
upon those seen in the teacher-pupil relationship (cf. Corsaro 1992). However, it should 
be noted that the use of queuing rituals by children in order to control the access of others 
to their toys and so on were common within Greenspace (see Chapter Five). What was 
particular to Richard was this occasional use of the cross-legged method. 
When it came to actually giving anyone a turn at playing with whatever the current 
particular object of desire was Richard tended to delay access to the object. Sometimes 
he made the others observe lengthy demonstrations of the object's capacities or how it 
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was to be used. For instance, if the object was a remotely controlled car33 then the 
children would have to watch what were often lengthy displays of the car's abilities and 
instructional sessions on how the car and its controls should be operated. 
These observational and instructional sessions frustrated the other children. Some 
children's patience would wear out which would result in these children disengaging 
from the events to go and do something else. When it became apparent to Richard that he 
was losing his audience he would quickly halt and announce that people could now get 
their turns. Sometimes this would successfully retain the impatient children for a further 
length of time. However, the older children were more likely to remove themselves from 
the interaction. 
Richard's orchestration of the turn taking process seldom resulted in all children gaining 
temporary access to the desired object. He also tended to make changes to the order of 
the queue which caused a great deal of frustration and objections over the fairness or 
otherwise of these changes. Additionally, the length of time any particular child got to 
spend playing with the object was variable. Some children were allowed to play with the 
object longer than others and again this resulted in more frustration and more objections 
about the fairness of these arrangements. Richard would interrupt the turn taking process 
by intermittingly playing with the object himself which meant that the other children had 
to watch him instead. 
33 This was not an uncommon object. Many other children also possessed remotely controlled cars. 
However, Richard's fleet of remotely controlled vehicles were expensive, top of the range models, more 
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After receiving a turn, children would leave Richard's assembled group. Eventually, 
children waiting for their turn would get fed up and drift off into other activities with 
other children although, their desire to temporarily access the object could result in them 
waiting for quite lengthy periods of time. Once the interests of other children could no 
longer be held and he was again left alone, Richard would sometimes attempt to disrupt 
whatever activities the other children had become involved in by approaching individuals 
and offering direct access to the object. Sometimes these individual children would take 
up the offer but sometimes they did not. 
In these sequences Richard could temporarily raise his status within the group. He would 
take charge of the other children, organise them into queues and control (and restrict) 
their access to the object before once again coming to occupy his marginalised and 
stigmatised status and identity within the cohort. On the one hand, this illustrates that 
status hierarchies are not fixed within children's groups but are as Goodwin (1990) has 
pointed out, likely to be constantly changing. Likewise, Corsaro (1997: 154) has 
highlighted that children frequently attempt to gain control over one and other and use a 
wide variety of strategies to do so noting that, status hierarchies can be `highly fluid' and 
open to constant negotiation. Additionally, this also draws attention to Corsaro's 
(1997: 167) argument that rejected children despite their peripheral status to core groups 
sometimes still remain `active participants in the peer culture'. However, the ability of 
very low status and marginalised children to substantively raise their social position 
within these groups (even if only for a very short time) does not appear to be a 
commented upon feature of children's peer relations within the pertinent literature. 
usually bought by adult collectors. 
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Although, it does correspond with Evans and Eder's (1993) suggestion that although it is 
almost impossible for socially isolated children to change their excluded status, there are 
exceptions to this. 
Richard's attempts to raise his status appeared to be egotistically driven (cf. Martini 
1994). His actions and methods seemed to indicate that at times he was enjoying 
controlling those who marginalised and stigmatised him the most. This was evident by 
the fact that it was these children whom he would most frequently place last in his 
queues, give very short periods of access to the desired object, or deny access altogether. 
Alternatively, this could also be considered as a strategy for inclusion within the cohort 
which was frequently successful albeit for a temporary period of time. 
Agency and Power: Moving Towards a Consideration of the Role of Nonhumans 
All of the children used objects to raise or change their status position within the group. 
However, these status changing episodes from other children appeared less frequently to 
be as blatantly egotistical as Richard's. Within Greenspace Richard was by far the most 
successful at using material objects to change his status. The more frequently Richard 
employed this method the more obvious it became that the key ingredients that facilitated 
his ability to elevate his position were the desirable objects he possessed that others did 
not. Thus his relative success vis-ä-vis the other children was intimately related to the 
fact that his objects were, with few exceptions, `better objects'. Thus, Richard's objects 
had a potency that other children's objects did not. Therefore, Richard had `cultural 
capital' (Wells 2001: 305). This however, reinforces a point made by Corsaro (1992) 
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where he highlights that the contribution that children's consumer objects make to the 
status hierarchies that operate within children's peer cultures are in some ways directly 
related to the economic resources of parents. 
Extending this a little further in relation to the objects Richard possessed; the role that the 
economic resources of his parents played in his and other children's acquisition of 
material goods was something that Richard himself demonstrated an acute awareness of. 
He often discussed his own parent's relatively advantaged economic status and reinforced 
to other children that their parents could not afford to buy them the toys that he had. He 
would often talk about how his father was rich and earned lots of money and how other 
children's fathers were poor and did not. However, Richard's concept of what rich was, 
in financial terms, was based upon his understanding that his father was in a slightly (but 
only slightly) higher occupational category than other children's fathers34 35 
The more potent these sorts of observations became during the exploratory phase (and 
afterwards) the more I began moving towards thinking that it was the object itself which 
permitted a child such as Richard to elevate his status within the group. In the first 
instance I considered this to be an instrumental use of objects as resources. As an 
emergent theme, the various forms of effects that children created through the use of 
objects as resources became salient. Whilst status elevation continued to be a common 
'a Richard's father worked in management. Richard understood that this implied that his father had more 
money than other fathers who tended to be in manual occupations (street sweepers, factory workers and so 
on). 
35 Lunt (1995) comments that Leiser et al. (1990) consider that young children do not understand the link 
between the exchange of money for goods and the exchange of money for work. Clearly, Richard's 
explicit understanding of this association contradicts this point. 
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theme others too became visible. For instance, children's use of objects to increase or 
extend their verbal capacities in processes of negotiation, persuasion and influence began 
to surface. 
These observations produced the first glimpse of an analytical move towards considering 
associations between children and nonhumans. However, as I began to more thoroughly 
consider that the use of nonhumans increased children's positions of status and influence 
and enhanced their agentic capacities in ways that allowed them to be more effective as 
agents, I began firstly to move towards a more materially orientated conception of agency 
based on the instrumental use of objects by children. Most specifically, this early 
consideration of the use of objects and its relation to agency and power (or its associated 
dimensions of status, control, influence and so on) rested on children's appropriation of 
objects which placed emphasis on agency as being a purely human capacity. Therefore, 
whilst `associationalist thinking' (Murdoch 1997: 321) was beginning to creep into the 
analysis of children's use of nonhumans it did not fully develop until much later on in the 
main fieldwork phase (see Chapter Eight). However, interaction between children and 
the nonhuman remained a salient theme throughout as a consequence of these early 
observations. 
Nonhuman Diversity 
The examples given highlight some fairly obvious nonhumans - primarily toys - that 
children engage in play and also in the sorts of scenarios and interactions that 
have been 
described above. However, children do not just use toys they also creatively use all sorts 
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of other materials in their play activities (Factor 2004). What Michael (1996) refers to as 
`natural nonhumans' were also incorporated into children's interactions. The 
documentation of children's use of natural nonhumans also invades research accounts in 
the same way as more noticeable nonhumans such as toys as the following extract from 
Russell (1994: 98) illustrates: 
`The girls used physical and natural features of their chosen playsite to 
represent their home and other far-away lands they travelled to... [One 
girl's] bed was a low pine fence, her shop was a pile of stones, and the 
kitchen a clump of bushes with a strategically located sawn-off branch 
that served as the controls for the oven. ' 
At Greenspace children's associations with natural nonhumans of the sort described by 
Russell (1994) was as common as their associations with commodified nonhumans such 
as toys. For example, the branches of the trees were often appropriated and transformed 
into swords (see Chapter Eight) and their trunks often served as goalposts. This 
incorporation of forms of nature into the cultural lives of urban children has been 
commented upon by Wells (2002). Wells argues, that in freely associating with 
forms of 
nature within urban contexts, children disrupt, through their practices, the pure 
boundaries that are considered to exist between, for example, the natural and the urban 
world. However, she also draws attention to the fact these forms of nonhumans enter 
into 
the cultural repertoire of urban children. 
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Wells (2002) also draws attention to other forms of natural nonhumans that urban 
children appropriate that Michael (1996) also mentions - animals. In Greenspace 
children also frequently associated with animals as pets. These too could be used to 
elevate a child's status within the group. During the exploratory phase the use of pets in 
such ways was a much less frequent stratagem used, however, it did occur from time to 
time particularly if the pet involved was infantile, for example a puppy, or held some 
other added novelty value. For instance, one very young child, Toby, enjoyed a few 
weeks of status elevation within the peer group because he had a new pet baby rabbit. 
Toby would bring the baby rabbit into Greenspace, attached to its `bunny harness', and 
exercise it in much the same way as one would a dog. The combination of the rabbit's 
infancy and the novelty of the rabbit being walked in a similar fashion to a dog always 
attracted the other children to gather around Toby and his rabbit, wherein a lot of cooing 
and stroking of the rabbit commenced followed by the commonly invoked turn taking 
ritual (see Chapter Six for a further example of pet enrolment into an actor-network). 
In discussing these various forms of natural nonhumans Michael (1996: 154) asks the 
question: How heterogeneous is heterogeneous? Whilst he offers a few speculations, he 
never fully begins to answer this question. Once it was recognised that children did draw 
nonhumans into their interactions and used them to achieve various effects within their 
relationships, this opened up the way for a consideration of the diversity of forms that 
these nonhumans took and there was much diversity indeed and the forms that these 
nonhumans could take were potentially limitless. 
165 
Conclusion 
Whilst the nonhuman in its varied forms entered into the research as a substantive theme 
during the exploratory phase and continued to invade the main phase, the adoption of 
actor-network theory as an analytical framework, to more fully consider the associations 
that took place between children and nonhumans, was not applied until much later on in 
the lifespan of the thesis (see Chapter One and Chapter Nine). The rest of this thesis is 
concerned with the analysis and extension of the themes that have been introduced here. 
However, it is hoped that through the incorporation of this discussion, which has 
highlighted the ways in which the children's associations with the nonhuman first entered 
this analysis, that this has provided the reader with a grasp of the background against 
which this thesis has developed and the elementary but crucial observations that first 
informed the theoretical thinking that has gone on to characterise this work. The next 
chapter moves directly to illustrate the application of actor-network theory to children's 
interactions and to draw out much more explicitly how children create effects such as 
agency and power through drawing together diverse heterogeneous elements into an 
actor-network. 
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Chanter Five 
Building a Bicycle Ramp: An Illustrated Example of the Process of Translation in 
Children's Everyday Play Activities 
Introduction 
Actor-network theorists are fond of description and of telling descriptive stories based on 
ethnographic observations and case studies about the minute and the particular. 
Unfortunately, the fact that they do so is treated by some as point of critique and here 
actor-network theory stands accused of providing endless description (or stories) that 
produce weak explanations (cf. Laurier and Philo 1999). Others still have asked if what 
actor-network theory does is simply re-description. As Mike Michael (1996: 56) suggests 
- `well possibly'. However, actor-network theory if it is anything (and also, if it is not a 
theory (cf. Latour 1999)) is a method for (re)description. As for explanation - it was 
never intended to produce explanations per se. Rather explanations, if they exist, are 
considered to emerge from descriptions but only if the descriptions themselves are good 
enough (cf. Latour 1991). Thus, my prior definition of actor-network theory as an 
analytical or theoretical framework may make some proponents baulk. Perhaps, I should 
have called it my method. 
Here, I would like to tell a story in which description and (re)description is presented 
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simultaneously. I have intentionally chosen not to clutter the story with the borrowed 
observations and explanations of others that are traditionally brought to bear in order to 
strengthen, compliment or contrast points made and arguments advanced. This short 
detour from writing conventions is not, however, supposed to be experimental. Rather, it 
is a `one off' ttempt within this thesis to let the description / (re)description stand alone 
and perform the explanation. However, the analytical repertoire of actor-network theory 
has `contaminated' (Latour 1999: 20) those parts of the story that may be defined as 
(re)description. The narrative structure of this story alternates between description on the 
one hand and (re)description of the other. This method of presentation then doubles as 
exemplar of the application of the descriptive method of actor-network theory. The 
methodological device used for (re)description here is translation. The story told 
therefore, is a story of translation. Thus, part of its purpose is to analytically extend the 
observations and speculations presented and made in the previous chapter about 
children's heterogeneous associations and reveal the particularities of the processes in 
which these associations are drawn together to create actor-networks. 
This story does not describe a very grand, extraordinary or particularly exciting event. In 
fact the event the story captures is quite mundane but this is the point and the choice (for 
there were a plethora of events to choose from) was quite deliberate. So this deliberately 
mundane choice is intended to highlight that the mundane events and goings on of the 
children's everyday activities and interactions are not very mundane at all. They are 
interwoven and shot through with strategic attempts to construct the self as powerful, as 
agentic and as an actor in charge of others. 
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A major point of argument in this thesis is that children are continuously involved in the 
labour intensive and often complex task of heterogeneous engineering. This story is an 
illustration or a case study of one episode of heterogeneous engineering by one child in 
Greenspace. There is not much that is unique about this episode except its particularities. 
By this I mean that the events described are specific to this particular episode. Of course, 
it is argued that this is all that actor-network theory can do - describe events that provide 
explanations that are `local, contingent, practical and reflect the character of the specific 
network under study' (Michael 1996: 56). 
Drawn from empirical data, this story is about one child's attempts to build a bicycle 
ramp. It is also however, a story about the `ramp-network' and how it was engineered. 
By way of situating the story I begin with a summary version -a short paragraph which 
tells the events well enough but glosses over the intricacies and complexities. Following 
this, the text moves to tell the story again although alternating between description and 
(re)description. For ease of comprehension those parts that can be defined as description 
appear in plain text and those which can be defined as (re)description are italicised. 
Here, the story is told in the present tense to allow the reader to enter into the 
ethnographic present (as far as this is possible through textual description) and try to 
visualise the events as they unfold. 
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Story Summary 
Aaron got a new bike and he wanted to build a ramp to ride his new bike over. He built 
his ramp on the edge of the grass area where the other children were playing football. 
Some of these other children helped him build this ramp - they located the bricks and bits 
and pieces of wood from which the ramp was constructed. After it was built, Aaron rode 
his bike repeatedly over the ramp. Some of the other children took turns in using Aaron's 
new bike to ride over the ramp. However, the ramp broke and ramp riding stopped. 
Describing and (Re)describing the Building of a Bicycle Ramp 
Aaron has been playing football with Marc, James, Thomas, Lewis, Terry, Stephen, Alec 
and Jordan. Aaron's dad has just called to Aaron to come to the garden. Aaron leaves 
the game of football but soon returns with a new bike. Aaron rides his bike around the 
perimeter pavement shouting to other children to look at what his dad has bought him. A 
few glances are cast, Aaron keeps riding, and the rest of the children keep playing 
football. So Aaron continues with riding his bike around the perimeter pavement but 
now he is riding faster. Now Aaron is telling or rather shouting that his bike can go fast 
and imploring the others to look at how fast his bike can go. Marc tells Aaron - `so what 
all bikes can go fast'. Football continues and Aaron keeps riding. 
Now intensely engaged in getting others to look Aaron continues riding fast but this time 
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he performs skids on the approach to each corner of the perimeter pavement. Aaron has 
now `upped the anti' so to speak - he is riding, he is riding fast and he is skidding and 
now we have yet another vocal implorement to look. Another few glances are cast in his 
direction but again football continues regardless. 
Not giving up on acquiring the other children's attention and interest, Aaron continues 
riding, riding fast and skidding round the corners but this time he adds sound effects. He 
now mimics the sound of screeching tyres. This time no appeals to look follow, because 
this time Aaron has noticed that Liam has just ventured onto the scene and Liam is 
looking. Moreover, Liam is asking questions. He is asking if this is a new bike. Now 
interest is aroused albeit by the arrival of Liam, Aaron performs his riding, riding fast, 
skidding round the corners and sound effects. However, this time it appears to be for the 
benefit of the one person audience that consists of Liam. Aaron is asking Liam to look at 
what his bike can do - it can go fast and it can skid on corners. So Aaron is now riding, 
riding fast, skidding on corners and producing sound effects and Liam is looking. 
Now it seems here that Aaron's goal is to get people to look at his bike and it appears 
that, in part, he has been successful because someone (Liam) is looking. So how has this 
been achieved? Well to begin with there is Aaron and there is his bike. Then there is the 
pavement and the text. Now Aaron has managed to quickly reach the stage of enrolment 
as far as the bike, the pavement and the text are concerned - they are all allies, they are 
all entities involved in attempting to get the footballing children to look and so far none 
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of these entities are resisting. However, it is not enough he needs more allies and so he 
enrols other entities - here speed (going fast) and sound (screeching) - and there seems 
no reason why these elements should not be counted as important aspects of Aaron's 
heterogeneous engineering. So we have a combination of actants all acting together, 
performing their various roles - the bike, the pavement, the text, speed and sound. Aaron 
is using this assemblage of entities to attempt to enrol the footballing children into 
looking. The fact that Liam becomes enrolled into looking is quite accidental because this 
assemblage of actants has not been directed towards enrolling Liam, but this has 
happened none-the-less. This could be because at this point Liam was not enrolled into 
some other network such as football. He was a sort of floating entity without a role. 
Equally so, it could be that Liam is attempting to enrol Aaron and build his own network. 
Now this is a point to hang onto and consider because problematisation, (the attempted 
enrolment of others to an agent's agency) is not necessary unidirectional. Network 
building can be a process of mutual enrolment, wherein two or more heterogeneous 
engineers are attempting to enrol each other within a network (Bloomfield and Best 
1992: 541). 
However, Aaron knows something about Liam that is not immediately obvious: Aaron 
(despite the fact that Liam's enrolment has been contingent) knows that Liam does not 
own a bike. From Aaron's point of view this is useful knowledge and makes enrolment 
easier because he now has the potential to define his interests in terms ofLiam's interests 
(which could be considered to be accessing a bike. Therefore, Aaron can establish 
himself as indispensable, that is, an obligatory passage point through which Liam must 
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pass in order to access the bike (if indeed this is what Liam wishes). In this respect 
enrolment might just suit Liam fine and he may not need much convincing. However, so 
far all that can be really be determined is that Liam has accepted the role of observer 
Aaron wished to oblige the other children to enter into and has been enrolled into 
looking, albeit accidentally. 
Aaron now has Liam's attention and Liam is asking for a shot of this bike that ride fast 
and skid round corners. Aaron however, poses a different scenario. He suggests that 
together the two of them should build a ramp to ride the bike over. In doing so, he is 
offering Aaron a shot of his bike if he helps with this ramping building exercise. Liam 
now appearing very keen to ride this bike agrees. So Aaron is now issuing Liam with 
instructions to locate the necessary materials needed to build a ramp. He is telling Liam 
that they need bricks and they need big pieces of wood and that they need to find these. 
Liam quickly sets about the task of finding bricks and pieces of wood. Aaron continues 
riding his bike, riding fast, skidding round corners and making screeching noises. 
However, now he is shouting to the other children that he is going to be building a ramp. 
None of the other children demonstrate any interest in either the bike or the possible 
bicycle ramp and football continues uninterrupted. 
It can now be deduced that Liam is perfectly happy to be enrolled into Aaron's network 
and for exactly the reason we thought - he would like a shot of Aaron's bike. Aaron has 
however now changed his objectives slightly because now he wants to build a ramp. 
173 
Recognising that Liam desires a shot of his bike he has posed the idea of ramp building 
in the terms of Liam's interests. In doing so, he has positioned himself as an obligatory 
passage point through which Liam must now pass in order to gain access to the bike. 
However, access to the bike is conditional and offered in futuristic terms. Moreover, 
Aaron has changed Liam's role in the network in order to suit his new interest. Liam is 
no longer an observer he is now a potential mutual enroller of other actants and has been 
successfully convinced into this 'gofer' role. He has after gone to seek out those 
nonhumans (bricks and pieces of wood) considered necessary for the construction of the 
`ramp-network'. 
Whilst Liam is seeking out bricks and pieces of wood, Aaron continues with riding his 
bike, riding fast, skidding round corners and making screeching noises. This goes on for 
about five minutes until Liam returns. However, Liam has not brought any bricks and he 
does not have pieces of wood. He tells Aaron that he cannot find any bricks or any 
pieces of wood. However, Aaron remembers that James' father happens to have bricks 
and pieces of wood. The topic under discussion now is how best to procure these bricks 
and pieces of wood from James' father. After a little debate and tactical discussion on 
strategies to acquire these bricks and pieces of wood, Aaron decides that they should get 
James to ask his dad. 
Aaron shouts to James (who is engaged in playing football) to come over to him. 
However, James tells Aaron he is playing football and refuses to go over. Aaron persists 
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and has another attempt to gain James' attention, although this time, he rides his bike 
across the grass to James. In doing so, he disrupts the game of football and now there are 
several unhappy children shouting at Aaron to get out of the way. Aaron tells them he is 
speaking to James. He is asking James to get bricks and pieces of wood from the stock of 
bricks and pieces of wood that Aaron knows James' father has in his garden. 
At first James refuses telling Aaron his father will not let them take the bricks and pieces 
of wood from the garden and anyway he is playing football. So Aaron explains to James 
that he is building a ramp with Liam and that they can not find any bricks and pieces of 
wood and again asks if James will go and get these from his garden. Now James does not 
dismiss the request entirely he offers to do it later as he is playing football. Aaron, 
however does not stop and he suggests it will not take long. Moreover, he tells James 
that he wants to build a big ramp and that the ramp will be cool and James can use it and 
borrow his bike. This must seem a little more attractive to James because he tells Aaron 
to wait there and tells the children he has been playing football with that he will back 
shortly. 
Now James's house like many of the other children's is just beside the area where the 
children are all playing so he opens his garden gate and hollers for his father. James' dad 
appears at the gate shortly afterwards and asks James what he wants. James asks if he can 
have some bricks and some pieces of wood to build a ramp. His father agrees but insists 
that they are returned. He also insists that the ramp is to be built on the grass not on the 
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perimeter pavement because James might get hurt if he falls on the concrete and he might 
damage someone else's garden fence should he crash his bike into one. Additionally, the 
ramp says James father must not be built on or near the car park either in case any cars 
come about. James agrees and sets about selecting bricks and pieces of wood. 
Aaron, who has been lurking about James' garden gate and has realised that bricks and 
pieces of wood are imminent, is now in the garden with James and has started to 
command the activity of selecting bricks and pieces of wood, telling James what bricks 
seem best and what pieces of wood look likely to make the best ramp. Liam, who has 
also been hanging about the gate, is told to take the bricks and pieces of wood over to the 
grass. Now there is a `to and fro-ing' of bricks and pieces of wood. These bricks and 
pieces of wood are, however, being stock piled in the middle of the grass and therefore in 
the middle of the football playing area. 
Aaron's enrolment attempts in respect to the footballing children are still proving to be 
unsuccessful. Likewise, Liam has been unsuccessful in his enroller / 'gofer' role as he has 
been unable to either identify or obtain potential entities for enrolment. However, Aaron 
has remembered where such entities can be found but has recognised that this will 
necessarily involve the successful enrolment of another entity (James) who so far has 
resisted along with the other footballing children to become enrolled into Aaron's 
network. James' enrolment into the network depends upon Aaron's ability to manipulate 
him into the role of an enroller that will enrol another entity (James's Dad) who, as 
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owner as the desired entities (bricks and pieces of wood), has the potential to become an 
obligatory passage point through which James would have to pass to access the (bricks 
and pieces of wood). However, Aaron successfully enrols James into his 'ramp-network' 
by offering him the use of any ramp that is built and his new bike. Here, Aaron again 
poses his own interests in terms of another's consequently gaining James' compliance. 
Already it is becoming apparent that this relatively mundane activity involves complex 
interactional processes. Aaron knew that the entity `James' may have been more difficult 
to enrol. Bike riding is not a novelty to James in the same way as it to Liam because he 
has his own bike and Aaron has seen James build ramps and bike over ramps many 
times. Additionally, James was already an intermediary in another child's (Jordan's) 
football- network' which was successfully constructed prior to Aaron's current network 
in progress. Therefore, Aaron needs to both entice James to break from the network he is 
currently involved in and develop strategies for doing so. The solution as Aaron sees it is 
to disrupt (at lease temporarily) this other network. This he achieves by riding his 
bicycle over the playing area which disturbs the collective action of the football- 
network'. Biking across the grass (a natural actant) stops the grass acting as a football 
pitch (at least temporarily) in the same way as snow or flooding or some other 
phenomena might (although these too can be classified as entities / actants). 
As play stops, Aaron manages to temporarily disrupt the functioning of this other 
network. In doing so he has created an opportunity to procure one of its entities and 
177 
carry it away should he be successful in convincing it to enter into the role he has 
envisioned. Aaron's strategy to lure this entity away comes again in the shape of his 
bike. As mentioned previously, however, James already has a bike but as luck would 
have it (for Aaron at least) Aaron knows that James's bike happens to have a snapped 
brake cable. Additionally, Aaron knows that James has been prohibited from using his 
bike until this cable is fixed. This is useful local knowledge upon which Aaron 
strategically draws in order to solicit James to enter the 'ramp-network'. For now, 
however, it seems James' participation within the 'ramp-network' may only be temporary 
as James has indicated that he will return to football playing. 
In entering the 'ramp-network' James has desisted from the football-network' he was 
previously part of However, the loss of James as an intermediary in this other network 
does not result in the disintegration of this network. It readjusts and re-continues (I will 
not digress into the particularities of this other network here). James quickly enters the 
role that Aaron has conceived for him and he sets about the task of brick and wood 
enrolment. However, this task entails taking on the challenge of attempting to enrol his 
father, who also has the potential to become an obligatory passage point through which 
he must pass in order to secure these nonhumans. 
James' father is not known to object too much to the use of articles from his stockpile of 
materials in his garden and his garden shed by children. James, Aaron and countless 
other children know this. However, he is known from time to time to object if he happens 
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to be caught in a bad mood and again the other children know this. So the potential for 
James' father to refuse is a possibility and the challenge is therefore somewhat 
precarious. As chance would have it, on this occasion James' father does not refuse but 
whilst the option to enrol bricks and pieces of wood is now present the question of 
whether James' dad was enrolled into the 'ramp-network' or instead became an 
obligatory passage point is difficult to deter. James' father never really appears to join 
the network except in the most transient sense, although the role he plays is no less 
crucial to its construction. However, the option to successfully enrol bricks and pieces of 
wood is issued in terms of the future return of these entities to the possession of James' 
father and this therefore implies the loss of these entities from the network at some future 
time. This being the case, the temporariness of the 'ramp-network' is relatively 
predetermined (unless alternative entities are found) before the enrolment of bricks and 
pieces of wood even commences. So perhaps James's father should be seen as an 
obligatory passage point after all as access to these entities and any role they might play 
is ultimately under his control. 
Having passed through this possible obligatory passage point, Aaron has begun to 
redefine the roles of both James and Liam. Liam is currently a floating entity whose role 
has been left undefined since his lack of success at his 'gofer' role. Now Aaron has 
decided that the enrolment of bricks and pieces of wood should be under his direction 
and redefines Liam and James as transporters of the entities newly selected for 
enrolment. As transporters Liam and James, mindful of the terms of the possible 
obligatory passage point (who has placed conditions on the use of these entities via his 
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instructions as to where the ramp should be built), have taken these potential network 
allies and deposited them in the middle of the grass where the football-network' has 
resumed action. Thus, the grass as a node in the chain of the football-network' has 
again had its role as a football pitch interrupted. 
There are now several unhappy children shouting that Aaron, Liam and James cannot 
build their ramp in the middle of the grass because they are playing football. James is 
now explaining to these other children that his father has told them to build their ramp 
there. Terry, who has been playing football walks over to the pile of bricks and pieces of 
wood that are piling up and starts throwing these bricks and pieces of wood onto the 
perimeter pavement. The other footballing children join in with the brick and wood 
throwing. James who now seems to have abandoned his intention to return to playing 
football in favour of ramp building is again trying to explain that they have to build their 
ramp there because his father has said so. Terry is telling James that they (the footballers) 
do not care what James's father has said because they are playing football and they were 
there first. 
The situations is now this: Aaron, Liam and James are throwing the bricks and pieces of 
wood back onto the grass and as fast as they are throwing these the footballing children 
are throwing them back upon the perimeter pavement. This has turned into a somewhat 
dangerous situation with two groups of children throwing bricks and pieces of wood to 
and fro. As expected, it does not take long before one of the children is accidentally 
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struck by a brick and unfortunately, Liam has been hit on the knee by a brick. The sound 
of Liam's screams which rapidly follow alerts Liam's mother who immediately enters the 
scene to attend to Liam. In her presence the brick and wood throwing stops. She 
demands to know which one of these children has struck Liam with a brick. 
Aaron is now telling Liam's mother that himself, Liam and James were building a ramp 
and that James's father had said they were to build it on the grass but the others had 
started throwing the bricks and pieces of wood off the grass and were not letting them 
play there. The footballing children are now issuing protests to this version of events 
stating that they were there first and that Aaron, Liam and James are ruining their game. 
Terry is trying to emphasis that Aaron, Liam and James were also throwing bricks and 
pieces of wood. Now Aaron, Liam and James (although mostly Aaron) are claiming that 
they were not throwing the bricks and pieces of wood but rather that they were putting 
them back where they had been. So these various issues are being hotly argued. 
Aaron switches from disputing the facts of the brick and wood throwing to asking Liam's 
mother to tell the footballing children that it is not only their grass and they can play there 
too. Terry begins protesting telling Liam's mother that they need the whole of the grass 
for football and they can build their ramp on the pavement. Aaron is now informing 
Liam's mother that James's father has said they have to build it on the grass. James is 
confirming these facts and explaining his father's reasons for this (getting hurt, crashing 
into fences, danger from cars and so on). So Liam's mother proposes this: she suggests 
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to all the children that they share the grass and indicates to the children what area the 
ramp can built on and what area football can be played in. This seems to dissolve the 
arguments and the two groups of children engage in discussing these boundaries and 
agree not to intrude into each other's designated space. 
What emerges next is a battle for the ownership of the grass as an entity in a network. 
One group (the footballers) is declaring ownership in terms of their prior enrolment of 
the grass in their network and the other the ramp builders) is claiming ownership in 
terms of the conditions of use set down by the possible obligatory passage point a. k. a. 
James's father. Now this is a hazardous situation for both the construction of the new 
network and the stability and possible destruction of the other. Both of course are now 
keen to protect their network interests and this requires either the enrolment or 
retainment of this particular entity respectively. Thus, the throwing to and fro of the 
bricks and pieces of wood. In this respect the roles of many network entities have now 
changed. For example, the various human actants in the football-network' are now 
heavily engaged in retaining one actant - the grass - which is now an obligatory passage 
point through, which all must now pass. James has now removed himself from the 
football-network' altogether and transferred his membership to the 'ramp-network'. 
For a while the bricks and pieces of wood have become enrolled by each network 
(unstable as they are) as missiles and not future ramp elements. Now there is little doubt 
as to the effectiveness of bricks and pieces of wood as missiles as soon there is an injured 
child. The sounds of screaming children who are in close proximity to their homes is 
usually enough to alert mothers and prompt their arrival at scenes of possible carnage. 
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Here, the arrival of Liam's mother to attend to her injured child inserts a precarious new 
entity into the soup pot of heterogeneity that now characterises the scene. 
As entities parents are sometimes unpredictable to these children who often find their 
behaviours bizarre, confusing, contradictory and sometimes downright unfair. However, 
these children can all tell you how Liam's mother's involvement in their disputes and her 
resolution of these disputes often favours her own child which, in many respects is not 
all that surprising. However, these children know that their own parents are good 
potential allies whose adult status coupled with their legitimate authority makes them 
particularly valuable when they are successfully enrolled into children's actor-networks. 
However, parents have a tendency to define their own roles in networks and this parent 
seems to position herself somewhere in the middle of both networks, assimilating herself 
with both and yet neither (for Liam's mother this is a somewhat contrary response). 
Instead she has become a negotiating entity between both networks. An entity which 
redefines the role of the grass and gives it a new dual identity. In doing so, it becomes an 
actant with membership in both networks. Yet again however, the difference between a 
simple intermediary and an obligatory passage point is somewhat confused. The grass 
has become somewhat indispensable to both networks for without the grass neither ramp 
building or football playing can occur. Putting this aside the spatial division of the grass 
presents a solution to this problem which is accepted by both groups, both being aware of 
the consequences that the violations of parents' decisions can bring. For now the 
183 
children consider this fair and agree to share the grass. 
So far so good - football playing resumes and ramp building commences, each group 
keeping within their designated area. Now to the ramp building: Aaron is now overseeing 
the construction of the ramp and issuing out instructions to Liam and James on exactly 
how to build the ramp, whilst sitting upon his new bike. However, balls are balls - they 
roll and bounce and they are kicked. Moreover, footballs do not always stay where they 
are intended or ought to. This particular football seems to be straying were it ought not 
slightly too often. For ramp building this is problematic because stray footballs have a 
tendency to knock over ramps. The situation is now this: each time the ramp seems 
almost finished and the pieces of wood are put in place ready for ramp riding the football 
manages to knock over the pieces of wood. Of course the football is not exhibiting a will 
of its own but is being kicked towards the ramp. Now the two groups of children are 
arguing about footballs and ramps. The footballing children are claiming that the 
knocking over of the pieces of wood is accidental but the ramp building children are not 
convinced by these statements. So Aaron is now telling the footballing children that if 
their ball hits the ramp again he will throw the football in Alfie's garden - Alfie being a 
dog who likes to eat children's footballs. Convinced that Aaron will indeed feed the 
football to Alfie, the footballing children stop aiming footballs at the ramp in progess. 
Now sharing an entity - one group goes back to the process of network building and the 
other has reconstituted itself. Aaron is now orchestrating the enrolment of the new 
entities by directing Liam and James in their new ramp building role. However, the 
184 
sharing of an actant with another network is proving problematic for ramp-network that 
Aaron is still engineering as it appears that an actant -a football -from the footballing 
network is being continuously recast as a missile that keeps repeatedly hitting the bricks 
and pieces of wood that Aaron and his ramp builders are attempting to manipulate into 
the role of a ramp. From the point of view of footballers it seems that this recasting of 
the actant into the missile role is an attempt to halt the construction of the ramp building 
network in order to re-enrol the shared entity (grass) into its previous non-dualistic role 
as a football pitch. The loss of the 'whole entity' is now being considered problematic 
for the football network who are not happy with its new multiple membership status. 
Aaron and his ramp builders are not devoid of the ability to see this attempted re- 
enrolment for what is and so Aaron has a strategy to preserve the construction of his 
network and further threaten the stability of the other. He informs the football network of 
his intention to enrol a potentially destructive entity into his network in order to deal with 
the destructive actant of the football-come-missile. Now the entity in question - Alfie the 
dog - is known by all the children to be particularly fond of savaging entities that are 
also known as footballs to me and you. Moreover, the children are all perfectly aware 
that Alfie the dog is positively encouraged by his owner (who happens to strongly object 
to the presence of footballs in her garden) to partake in the act of football savaging and 
no football has ever survived or been retrieved from this particular garden for these 
reasons. Now the sound of Alfie's presence in this garden has been rumbling away in the 
background for most of this particular day and all children are well aware that if carried 
out the enrolment of Afe will be most effective. So this it seems may be a successful 
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strategy as footballs-come-missiles no longer strike the bricks and pieces of wood. Alfie 
is not used but still remains a silent actant in the 'ramp-network'. 
This threat seems to continue to work because ramp building is now going on 
unhindered, football playing has resumed and no stray footballs are toppling the ramp. 
So the ramp is now finished and the ramp builders are admiring their work and Aaron is 
directing Liam and James in minor adjustments. With the minor adjustments completed 
Aaron prepares to test the ramp. Now ramp testing appears to be a serious matter. Aaron 
is testing the strength of the pieces of wood by jumping up and down on them, walking 
over them and jumping off them. However, the ramp seems satisfactory and Aaron 
mounts his bike for the final test. Test riding a ramp must indeed be a daring thing to do 
as a sense of endangered excitement mixed with anticipation is hanging in the air. Now 
Aaron is sitting on his bike some twenty yards in front of the ramp, and engaging in some 
altering of the starting position. Liam and James are beginning to get impatient as they 
are shouting to Aaron to hurry up. Aaron though tells them of the relative merits of 
lining up the bike properly and the demerits of not. 
Suddenly however, Aaron springs into action. The act of ramp riding though is not 
executed quietly. First Aaron mimics a revving motorbike engine, then he shouts `on 
your marks, get set go', then he approaches the ramp, revving en route. As the bike 
makes contact with the ramp he declares `and he's off. Indeed he is off. As he hits the 
ground at the other side he is whooping triumphantly. The ramp has now been 
successfully tested and declared by Aaron to be `cool'. Aaron has now ridden around and 
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is preparing for another ramp ride. The testing ritual is repeated and the ramp is 
approached in the same fashion as before. 
Liam and James are now both simultaneously engaged in asking Aaron for a shot of his 
bike so they too can ride the ramp, reminding Aaron of his previous promises. Aaron 
does not seem particularly concerned with fulfilling his previous promises and reiterates 
repeatedly that they will both get a shot in a minute - all the while continuing with his 
ramp riding. Liam and James are not entirely happy with this situation and are appearing 
increasingly frustrated as their requests for a shot keep being rebuffed by Aaron who is 
simultaneously feeding their frustrations with his performance of how exciting and 
enjoyable ramp riding is. More than that, he is also telling them it is his bike and his 
ramp and it is up to him if they get a shot. 
Now that the ramp is complete it would be logical to think that network building would be 
complete and the mobilisation of the allies would commence. However, Aaron has other 
ideas and before this can happen he needs to engage in ensuring that the ramp has been 
locked into place. Now this locking into place of the ramp is performative to say the least 
and it seems that once the performance has taken place Aaron is happy that the bricks 
and pieces of wood have indeed been properly enrolled, that is, manipulated into the 
roles that have been envisioned for them and are behaving consistently as a ramp. 
However, James and Liam are now becoming concerned that their vested interests in 
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ramp building / network construction are being overlooked by the heterogeneous 
engineer who after preventing the achievement of their goals (to use his bike and ride the 
ramp) through a stalling tactic is now making it explicitly clear that this ramp belongs to 
him and its use like the use of his bike is under his control. In doing so he has set himself 
up as both an indispensable entity within the network and is now re-establishing himself 
as an obligatory passage point through which James and Aaron who are now 
dispensable intermediaries in the network must pass in order to meet their own interests. 
These declarations of ramp ownership do not go down too well because both Liam and 
James mount their own challenges to this. In the first instance they are both reminding 
Aaron of his previous promises but again these are rebuffed. Now what happens next 
could result in Aaron's loss of the ramp. James is now challenging this claim to 
ownership of the ramp by telling Aaron that it is actually his ramp (by default) because 
the bricks and pieces of wood from which it has been made belong to his father. 
However, Aaron still declares the ramp to be his because it was his idea. So an argument 
is now underway about the ownership status of the ramp. James is now seeking 
clarification and support of true identity as ramp owner from Liam who is now agreeing 
that it is indeed James' ramp. Aaron continues with his insistence that the ramp belongs 
to him until James announces that he is going to get his father. 
Instead of locking his actants into place Aaron's allies are threatening mutiny and James 
is now voicing his threat to betray his network leader if his interests are not met. Now 
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Aaron has previously attempted to lock his allies into place by setting himself up as an 
obligatory passage point through which James and Liam must pass through to access the 
ramp. In declaring himself as the rightful obligatory passage point - as the entity that 
controls the ramp, James (who we could agree has a valid enough point) now seems to 
have the potential to take over as leader of the network. He has also enrolled Liam as an 
ally in his claims as the rightful obligatory passage point. Aaron however is reluctant to 
relinquish his status as both network leader and obligatory passage point until James 
threatens to attempt to enrol another potential ally - his father. 
Aaron responds to these challenges by succumbing to honour his previous promises and 
offers to give James and Liam a shot of his bike and a shot of his ramp. Shot giving is 
not however a simple process but seems to require a degree of complex organisation and 
orchestration. Aaron is now engaging in defining the rules and processes involved in 
getting and having a shot. More or less, he tells is it like this: First off there is going to 
be a start line and Liam is issued with the task of finding a stick to mark this start line 
with. This does not seem to be a task that should present any challenges because there is 
a tree to hand from which sticks can be procured. So Liam breaks a stick from the tree 
and brings it over to Aaron. However, the stick is considered defective - it does not lie 
flat upon the ground. Liam is now sent by Aaron to get a stick which will lie flat. Liam 
breaks off another stick but this stick also refuses to lie flat. Aaron decides that the 
solution to sticks that do not lie flat is the replacement of a stick with a plank of wood. 
As they know that pieces of wood are plentiful in James' father's garden James is sent as 
before to ask his father for a plank of wood. 
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The plank of wood is collected from James' father and because it lies flat it is considered 
by Aaron to be a suitable starting marker and is placed upon the ground by James under 
his direction. So now there is a starting position. Starting positions are fine and well but 
it seems that starting positions are not enough when organising the process of shot giving. 
Aaron has also decided there must also be a finishing position. Aaron is suggesting the 
procurement of another plank of wood but James is telling Aaron that his father has told 
him they are getting no more pieces of wood from his stockpile. No more planks of 
wood therefore mean the identification of an alternative marker and Aaron suggests a 
stick will do for this because unlike the starting marker a finishing marker is not to be 
ridden over as shots are to finish before the marker is reached. Liam then, is now being 
told to put one of the previously discarded sticks in the place indicated by Aaron. 
Aaron is now providing the instructions for shots. He is explaining that Liam and James 
have to start at the starting marker, positioning their bikes behind the plank of wood. 
After Aaron has shouted `on your marks, get set, go' they can then ride the ramp. After 
dismounting the ramp, bikes have to be ridden along a designated route and brought to a 
halt before the bike reaches the finishing marker where the next person will stand and 
queue for their shot. Just for good measure Aaron is now demonstrating to Liam and 
James how this should all be done. 
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In order to retain his status as network leader and obligatory passage point Aaron has 
realised that some concessions need to be made and he needs to allow these 
intermediaries to achieve their interests. To retain this status he promises the 
intermediaries will have their interests met and get a shot of his bike and his ramp. The 
intermediaries (Liam and James) accept his terms without challenge. Consequently, 
Aaron has managed to remain an obligatory passage point. 
Before Aaron allows this shot taking / ramp riding to commence he instigates a complex 
organisation of the shot taking / ramp riding process. However, this is more than the 
development of a method to organise this activity. For Aaron the enrolment of actants 
(the plank of wood and sticks) to assist in the control of the shot taking / ramp riding 
process is an enrolment of allies that further stabilise his position as network leader and 
obligatory passage point. These are actants that he will use to further control Liam and 
James and the activity of shot taking / ramp riding. However, despite the previous 
challenge to Aaron's status, the fact that he has successfully induced both Liam and 
James into the enrolment of these actants suggests that Aaron's status has remained in 
tact regardless. Although, it is also worth remembering that just as Aaron knows these 
children need access to a bike they know this too. Therefore, their deference to Aaron is 
still motivated by this factor. 
The identification of entities with the required attributes to become competent actants in 
the ramp-network is a complex process. The original entity, here a stick, selected as a 
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starting marker refuses to perform its role to the required standard and the second 
selected entity fails to perform for much the same reason. Both of these entities refuse to 
lie flat against the ground and therefore are considered to lack the necessary attributes of 
a starting marker. Mindful of the resources in James' father's garden the process of 
enrolling a plank of wood for its ability to lie flat follows much the same pattern as the 
enrolment procedure implicated in the bricks and pieces of wood scenario recounted 
earlier. The plank of wood is enrolled (via the possible obligatory passage point that is 
James' father) and successfully enters into and performs the role Aaron has identified for 
it. 
For a finishing marker a stick is eventually enrolled for two reasons: James' father has 
indicated his refusal to co-operate in any more enrolment attempts and as Aaron decides 
the marker does not need to lie flat the role it has to perform is easier and therefore 
achievable for the bent stick selected from the previously discarded potential entities. 
Now Aaron inscribes his status as network leader and obligatory passage point further 
by issuing instructions and performing how the process of ramp riding should commence 
for the intermediaries who have now been cast in the shot taker role. 
With the instruction and demonstration process now over Aaron decides that James can 
have the first shot. Taking a shot it seems is instructional because Aaron is guiding James 
through the process and telling him what to do. Once he has decided that James has 
positioned the bike properly he tells him he can go after he has shouted `on your marks, 
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get set, go'. After following Aaron's commands to his satisfaction James eventually gets 
to ride the ramp. As James dismounts the ramp Aaron is shouting at him to stop before 
the finishing marker otherwise he will not get another shot. So James stops before the 
marker and is told to get off the bike by Aaron. However, instead of giving the next shot 
to Liam, Aaron is taking the next shot himself, telling Liam he can go after him. Now the 
rules Aaron has constructed for the others regarding how 'to take a shot seem not to apply 
to him. James and Liam issue protests that he has gone past the finishing marker. 
However, not only has he gone past the finishing marker he is in the process of riding the 
ramp again. Although, according to Aaron, he does not need to follow the rules and stop 
at the finishing marker because it is his bike and it is his ramp. Still he does not give 
Liam a turn but he does promise he will do so in a minute and will tell him when it is his 
turn. 
After completing several ramp runs Aaron stops and tells Liam he can now have a shot. 
In much the same way as before Liam's shot is also instructional and Aaron provides the 
directions for Liam's actions throughout the ramp riding process. Shot giving proceeds 
like this for a short while: Aaron issues instructions to ramp riders throughout their turns 
and decides who has a shot and when. 
Now mobilisation has taken place. Aaron has locked the allies into their roles, convinced 
them that their interests are the same as his and gained their compliance to meet his 
demands. He has become the leader in a network which is now an organisation 
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consisting of a chain of links composed of various heterogeneous elements that act as 
intermediaries. But the continued stability of the network still needs to be controlled by 
the network leader and Aaron achieves this by regulating the network and co-ordinating 
the intermediaries in their actions, whilst continuously asserting his status as network 
leader. 
However, things are about to change. James is getting ready to ride the ramp under the 
instructional gaze of Aaron. He positions the bike in the designated manner and Aaron 
has just issued the starting command. James is now hurtling along the approach to the 
ramp. He mounts the ramp. But as he bikes over the ramp one of the pieces of wood 
splits in the middle causing James to lose control of the bike and be catapulted from it. 
So the situation is now this. The ramp is broken and James is shouting that he has hurt 
his leg. James now worried about his sore leg which he is kicking up quite a bit of a fuss 
about is lying on the ground yelling for his father at the top of his voice. Whilst James is 
yelling, Aaron is shouting that his bike had better be okay. Happy enough that bike has 
managed to survive unscathed, Aaron's attention is now directed towards the ramp and he 
is telling Liam that they need to sort it. 
Now while Aaron and Liam are attempting to reconstruct the ramp out of the broken 
pieces of wood, James' father has appeared to see what James is shouting about. 
However, James' father appears to be lacking in sympathy and tells James to stop his 
shouting and screaming and demands to know what the fuss is all about. James explains 
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to his dad that the ramp has broken has he has hurt his leg and so on. James' father now 
decides that children, bikes, bricks and pieces of wood are a dangerous combination. 
James is now being told to get all the bricks and pieces of wood back into the garden 
before anyone else gets hurt and to go inside. 
The ramp has not only broken it is now gone. James has gone inside. Liam has taken up 
an offer to join in football. Aaron is left alone with no ramp, no ramp builders and no 
ramp riders - he is back to the start - it is just him and his bike. 
An interrelated chain of events have resulted in the destruction of the ramp- network and 
as a consequence Aaron 's status as both leader and obligatory passage point. His 
actants have dissented, betrayed him or been carried way by another actant and / or have 
become enrolled in some other network. Now the dissention of the ramp was perhaps the 
catalyst for this chain of events leading to the destruction of the network. A piece of 
wood gave up its role in the network (or failed to perform) and in doing so highlighted its 
own importance as a nonhuman element in the network. Perhaps the necessity of this 
nonhuman actor was underestimated all along. The upshot is without this network of 
heterogeneous materials Aaron is no longer a leader of a network. His powers were 
derived from and dependent upon the actants within the network performing their roles 
together and remaining locked in place. Consequently, he is no longer powerful. 
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Overview and Conclusion 
The description above is a story about children building a ramp. However, the 
(re)description is a story of translation which illustrates the performance of 
heterogeneous engineering by one child. This (re)description allows for a more thorough 
analytical account of the processes involved without necessarily requiring that the basic 
description is supplemented by the application of explanations from elsewhere. Thus, 
explanation independently emerges from the (re)description albeit in through the 
vocabulary of actor-network theory. 
The processes and strategies used in the production of the `ramp-network' are 
highlighted. The various ways in which Aaron convinced and enrolled other actants into 
the actor-network that produced the ramp is given a more direct voice. In the process, 
Aaron's position of power vis ä vis the other children is revealed to be dependent upon 
his own ability to keep his allies locked in place and their continued compliance with the 
roles he has envisioned for them and their successful performance of these roles. That is, 
to closely paraphrase Michael (1996: 57) discussing Callon's (1986) marine biologists: 
Aaron's power could only endure as long each of the actors in the `ramp-network' played 
their allotted parts' and when eventually his actants dissented his `relation of power' to 
those other actants was destroyed. 
Additionally, treating these human and nonhuman actants as analytically symmetrical 
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draws attention to the importance of nonhumans in Aaron's `ramp-network'. For 
instance, the importance of successfully enrolling the grass into the network and of 
course the absolute necessity of this entity for the construction of the network was 
revealed. Indeed its pivotal role for the network perhaps positioned it (in the same way 
as James' father) as an obligatory passage point through which all the others had to pass. 
Relatedly, the fact that this actant came to participate in two actor-networks 
simultaneously demonstrates that actors or actants (whether human or nonhuman) are all 
members of more than one actor-world at the same time (cf. Star 1991). Of course, this 
also draws attention to how nonhumans are implicated and present in human encounters, 
which working within another frame of reference would most probably be overlooked. In 
the case of the `ramp-network' the role of nonhumans transpires as being so critical that 
the dissention of one piece of wood sets into motion a course of events that leads to the 
eventual demise of the actor-network and as a consequence the powers of its 
heterogeneous engineer - as Akrich (1992) and Latour (1987) have already noted, if one 
of the non-human elements in an actor-network dissents, then the network breaks down in 
much the same way as if the dissenting element had been a human 
Amongst other things, another issue drawn out about the role of nonhumans is the ways 
in which nonhumans can be used to impose physical constraints. For example, the 
nonhumans used for the starting and fmishing positions were used by Aaron to shape the 
behaviours of Liam and James. The ability of nonhumans to control the actions of 
humans is something that Latour (1992) draws attention to in his discussion of the 
function of a door-closer. Here he considers that nonhumans can be used as a more 
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effective way of disciplining humans into desired actions. Therefore, Aaron's use of 
nonhumans as starting and finishing markers could perhaps be considered as his method 
to discipline Liam and James into a particular way of ramp riding he designed. That is, 
he delegated the task of structuring the ramp riding behaviours of Liam and James to 
these nonhumans. 
In sum then, the (re)description offered by actor-network theory through the language of 
translation allows the intricacies of these processes to emerge. What is a relatively 
mundane activity that children engage in emerges as something that depends upon a 
series of complex processes in which the orchestration of various heterogeneous elements 
into a collective is played out. In the spaces in which I observed children at play and 
talked to them about their activities, the construction and of course the destruction of 
actor-networks to create various effects was in constant motion - children were 
continuously engaged in heterogeneous engineering. Their heterogeneous engineering 
was not always related to positioning themselves as powerful as Aaron did or to create 
something like a bicycle ramp. For instance, in the next chapter, this theme of 
heterogeneous engineering / translation continues, however, the focus is upon how one 
child in collaboration with others overcomes the difficulties he encounters when he is 
victimised by other, older children. Here, however, I return to writing conventions and 
bring in the explanations of other sociologists of childhood. 
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Chanter Six 
Heterogeneous Engineering and Children's Interpersonal Relations: Conflict and 
Retaliation 
Introduction 
The previous chapter took, as an illustration of heterogeneous engineering by children, a 
case study that demonstrated how children build actor-networks out of various human 
and nonhuman elements in the accomplishment of their every day play activities (such as 
ramp building). In the fieldwork locations used a great deal of the children's 
heterogeneous engineering was activity centred, that is, it was engaged in the creation of 
various games and so on. However, the children also assembled actor-networks as a 
method for dealing with their interpersonal and interactive entanglements with each 
other. These heterogeneous engineering attempts were particularly visible during 
children's interpersonal, intra-group and inter-group conflicts and disputes where 
children would (although not always), for example, draw on the resources of 
heterogeneous others in their attempts to resolve disputes or win arguments. Aspects of 
this were apparent in the example given in the previous chapter when the authority of the 
parent was utilised to settle a spatial dispute. 
As its exemplar, this chapter takes one such episode where a child engineered a 
heterogeneous network in order to retaliate against a group of other, older children who 
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had harassed him. Being extraordinarily small for his age, this child experienced daily 
ridicule, social exclusion and stigma from other children (cf. James 2000: 29). Having a 
`different body' made him a vulnerable target for peer harassment in its various forms. 
His body was read by many of the other children as weak or lacking in strength and this 
manifested in the language they used to talk about, and to him, and also in the reasons 
they gave for excluding him from sporting activities that were seen to require these 
supposedly masculine body traits. However, this reading of his body as weak and passive 
was confused by some of the children as an indication of an essential or inner weak and 
passive disposition. Although discussing illness, Christensen (2000: 52-53) observes that 
adults read the exterior body of the child in order to assess the ill-health or otherwise of 
the interior body. Thus the invisible internal body is associated with the visible exterior 
body. In much the same way, many of these children associated this child's exterior 
body with his interior body therefore viewing one as weak and passive meant viewing 
both as weak and passive. Whilst this child often viewed himself self-deprecatingly, in 
exactly this way, his actions often betrayed this view that he and others held that he was 
weak and passive. For instance, on many of the occasions that he was subjected to peer 
harassment he was most definitely not weak and /or passive - quite the opposite in fact. 
He often actively refused to fully accept the role of victim that his perpetrators carved out 
for him by developing and deploying methods to, for example, seek revenge against those 
who had transgressed him. 
That he did so was not always immediately obvious. His methods were subversive and 
rarely did he respond to his aggressors by reciprocating their aggression either physically 
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or verbally. Rather, he engaged others in carrying out such acts of revenge on his behalf. 
In this he was particularly skilled and could manoeuvre and incorporate other children 
and / or adults into, if necessary, a collective entity - an alliance or gang that would 
generate the effect he wished to achieve. 
The discussion below is concerned with exactly how this child incorporated others into a 
collectivity for this sort of purpose. Akin to the previous example the discussion moves 
through description and (re)description. However, here the (re)description does not stand 
alone but is supplemented in the traditional style by the explanations of others. Before 
beginning the account of the event used to illustrate how this child creates an actor- 
network the discussion begins by contextualising these events by considering this child's 
everyday life in his `different body'. 
Living in and as a `Different Body' 
I am sitting with Lewis watching a game of football underway in Greenspace. I have 
frequently noticed that he does not join in football with the other children very often. I 
am aware from observing the children's activities and interactions that he is regularly 
excluded from such sports based activities. I am also aware from listening to children's 
verbal exchanges what the likely reasons for this exclusion are. However, I am very 
eager to find out what Lewis' considers the reasons to be: 
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Sharon: How come you aren't playing football? 
Lewis: They don't let me play cos I'm rubbish only if I'm in goal if 
there's no goalie and I don't like being goalie. 
Sharon: I'm sure you aren't rubbish. 
Lewis: I am rubbish. 
Sharon: Why do think that? 
Lewis: Cos the ball hurts me. 
Sharon: What do you mean the ball hurts you? 
Lewis: They don't let me play cos I'm a greeter. They call me greeter 
cos they kick the ball hard to hit me and everything. 
Sharon: Why do they do that? 
Lewis: To hit me with it like on the head and everything so I'm wee and 
can't get the ball cos they kick it hard at my head and everything so 
they don't let me play cos I can't get it and I can't tackle like I get, like 
I can't win tackles cos everyone's bigger so cos I can't get the ball then 
and everything. They never let me play. 
Sharon: You play sometimes though in goal right? 
Lewis: Yeah but I can't do it cos they wellie it (the ball) and I don't get 
the ball then they go mental and everything cos we lost then don't let 
me play anything cos I'm too wee and they get beat so no one picks me 
only if you can't get eekies. 
Sharon: What do you mean eekies? 
Lewis: Eekies like three on their side and three on their side if there's 
no eekies I get to be the goalie for the crap team cos the best team is 
already there cos like say like if Aaron is like the captain and he goes 
first he has all the best players so I go with the crappy team cos I'm wee 
in the goal. They are all big and the goalie is big like look there (shows 
height with hand gesture). 
This is an extract of one of many conversations with Lewis in which he expressed his 
own and others negative perceptions of his small body as a deficient body. He clearly 
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articulates his own understanding of the reasons for other children's treatment of him as 
being directly related to his body. Additionally, he communicates his own assention to 
their interpretations of his body. Moreover, he engages in empirically confirming his 
body to be small by drawing comparisons with other bigger bodies. 
James (2000) suggests that children develop their sense of their bodies and themselves as 
their bodies through their everyday relations with other children, wherein they engage in 
constantly comparing theirs and others' bodies. In so doing, she argues that children 
learn to differentiate between different and normal bodies and develop a self-awareness 
of the place of their own body amongst others (James 1995 cited in James 2000). Thus 
she states: 
`... children whose bodies are smaller than those of their contemporaries 
may gradually become self-conscious of their difference through a 
dawning recognition of their own body's failure to conform' (1995: 70). 
Small bodies, as James (2000) draws out, have the potential to be stigmatising and to 
result in other social consequences such as exclusion. 
Lewis' sense of being-in-the-world was intimately bound up with his sense of smallness- 
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in-the-world. He experienced himself as his body (cf. Lyon and Barbalet 1994 cited in 
James 2000). His participation in (or more frequently his exclusion from) mundane 
activities (such as football) with other children routinely reinforced his own sense of 
smallness-in-the-world and the social consequences that having a small body brought. 
Here, there are some links with how Lewis experiences himself with Mead's (1934: 154) 
concept of the `generalised other' in so far as Lewis' sense of himself is derived from the 
attitudes that others hold and exhibit towards him: 
`The individual experiences himself as such, [an object unto itself] not 
directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoint of other 
individual members of the same social group, or from the generalised 
standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs' (Mead 
1934: 138). 
Building upon this; Prus (1996: 152) in his discussion of `identity work' argues that the 
treatment people receive from others forms part of the self's ongoing assessment to work 
out self definitions. The treatment that Lewis received was pivotal to how he 
experienced himself from the `viewpoint of others' (Prus, 1996: 56). The viewpoint of 
others is expressed below by James: 
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Sharon: Who do you play football with? 
James: Everyone roond here plays footie. 
Sharon: Can you tell me who everyone is? 
James: Well, Marc, Liam, Terry, Jordan, Thomas, sometimes Stephen, 
sometimes Stuart and Aaron and everyone. 
Sharon: Why do you play with them? 
James: Cos I dunno know... em... like they're gid at footie and stuff. 
Sharon: What about Lewis do you play footie with him? 
James: Sometimes but he's crap. 
Sharon: What do you mean he's crap? 
James: I dunno know like well like he cannae play he's a midget. 
Sharon: Tell me about that then. 
James: Well its like he's a midget ken cos he so he cannae play right 
cos right he's crap at footie so we dinnae want him to play cos then the 
game is crap cos he cries if the ba hits him and his kicks are crap so all 
he does is moan about no gettin the ba cos everyone, like no one passes 
the ba cos he cannae get it and no one wants him on their side an aw 
thing cos he's a wee crap midget and he runs off an tells we're no 
letting him play. 
Sharon: What do you mean he tells you aren't letting him play? 
James: He goes and tells his mum we're picking on him an calling him 
crap and no letting him play. 
Sharon: Why don't you let him play? 
James: Cos he's crap he's a wee crap midget and we get into trouble 
from his mum cos he goes in greetin when he gets hit wi the ba cos 
everytime the ba hits him he goes in greetin cos like we cannae cos its 
no fair its no our fault he cannae handle it when the ba hits him he's a 
wee skinny sap he's a stick he cannae take it. 
205 
In this account I was most deliberately seeking the perspective of another child on Lewis' 
treatment where football was concerned. However, what this extract draws out is the 
exceptionally close similarities between this and Lewis' own narrative. This perhaps 
reveals how potent Lewis' internalisation of the viewpoint of others. Alternatively (or 
perhaps additionally), and given that other children echoed this narrative, this is perhaps 
indicative that Lewis and other children held a shared social schemata36 (Erasmus et al. 
2002) about Lewis. 
However, subtly interwoven within these two accounts is a shared recognition that there 
is also an issue about the protection of the dynamics of the game that goes beyond simply 
deriding Lewis' body and its perceived capacities (or lack thereof) in respect to football; 
put simply Lewis is seen as detrimental to the game because he is considered to lack the 
required skills. Moreover, Lewis recognises this himself. Exclusion on the basis of skill 
deficiency was common across all of the children's activities, which suggests that 
children's exclusion by others from activities is not always a simple matter of `nastiness' 
for nastiness sake. Although, (and this was also a common phenomena across other 
activities) Lewis was sometimes given access to the activity if the dynamics of the game 
were seen to be at risk because of the considered unfairness of one team having more or 
less players than the other. However, his positioning as goalkeeper in football emerged 
because within the hierarchy of valued player positions, the role of goalkeeper occupied 
36 Social Schemata are cognitive structures that are categorised into four groups: Self Schemata that contain 
information about one's personality, appearance and behaviour; Person Schemata that focus on traits and 
behaviours common to certain types of people; Role Schemata /Person in Situation Schemata that include 
information about people and their typical behaviour in specific social situations; Event Schemata that 
include knowledge about the expected sequence of events in a given situation (Erasmus et al. 2002: 3). 
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the lowest status position. No child wanted to occupy this position - all children wanted 
to be strikers. 
Adding to the complexity of the reasons for Lewis' exclusion (although again this is 
related to his body) Lewis' presence in football games was also considered to bring wider 
consequences. For instance, James discussed how Lewis' would get them into trouble 
because he cried when the ball struck him. Interestingly, James does not express that 
there was any deliberate intentions to hit Lewis with the ball. Rather conversely, Lewis 
understands this to be quite deliberate. My own observations suggested that these strikes 
were sometimes deliberate. 
Football is just one example of how Lewis' `different body' affected his experiences 
within this community of children. For Lewis his `different body' led to a plethora of 
negative social consequences. His assumed physical defencelessness and passivity 
positioned him as a perceived easy target for other children's ridicule. He was often 
pushed around and physically assaulted by other children. In discussing children with 
`different bodies' James (2000: 29) discusses how children with small bodies sometimes 
adopt strategies to influence how `their body is read by others to be able to gain salvation 
from the potential social stigma or exclusion which having a small body threatens to 
bring'. Lewis, however, did not engage in manipulating how others viewed his body or 
him as a consequence. He accepted the view that his body was weak and passive. 
However, he did not always accept the treatment from others that this brought. 
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The above discussion has been intended to situate the example which follows by 
providing the reader with a contextual background of Lewis' daily life as a `different 
body', against which the following example is set. Below the discussion moves to 
present an illustration of a particular episode in which Lewis reacts to the ill-treatment he 
receives from others. 
Getting Your Own Back: Engineering Retaliation 
Lewis is outside looking for something to do and someone to play with. At the moment 
there is no one else is around. He picks up a stick which was lying on the ground and 
begins to poke around with it in the dirt. He does this for a while, singing and humming 
to himself as he prods the ground. After a while some older, 'bigger boys' come along. 
Using a string of profanities, they tell Lewis to leave the spot he is occupying. At first 
Lewis refuses to leave and so they tell him again. Whilst doing so, one of them grabs his 
stick and throws it into the distance instructing him to play where it has landed. 
Lewis runs over to where the stick has landed, retrieves it and runs back to where he had 
been playing with it. He looks at the bigger boys defiantly. One of them grabs the stick 
from Lewis' hands and snaps it into two separate pieces. As they throw it away they tell 
him to get lost (although this is putting it politely). Lewis' starts crying and declares he 
is 'telling'. The bigger boys seem unperturbed by this and laugh it off. One of them 
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shouts, 'go on then you clyping midget, I'm totally shaking'. This verbal taunt has upset 
Lewis and he declares again that he is telling on them but this time he is going to tell that 
they are also calling him midget. This is an abusive nickname that many of the children 
call Lewis. He is quite used to being called this, usually puts up with it, but finds it 
upsetting. 
Lewis moves away from the bigger boys and sits on the ground sniffling. It seems that 
Lewis has accepted the taunts, the stick throwing, the stick breaking and all the rest. He 
has noticed that I am watching him and I have noticed that he is throwing me a few 
glances in between sniffles. He sits moping for a short time alternating between casting 
furtive looks at the `bigger boys' and myself. 
Eventually, Lewis gets up and approaches me. I try to say hello but before I manage to 
speak Lewis is recounting his exchange with the bigger boys. I recognise this as an 
enrolment attempt and I recognise myself as Lewis' target entity. He has not said so but I 
know Lewis wants me to do or say something to these bigger boys. I have come to 
recognise that children do not always fully verbalise or express a request for assistance. 
Rather they state the facts with an added tone of expectancy. I respond by telling Lewis 
that he can get another stick, play somewhere else and that he should ignore their name- 
calling. He responds with: 'but they won't let me play'. I tell Lewis he could play over 
there, pointing to another area as I do so. Lewis tells me they swore at him. I say I 
heard them. Lewis looks at me as if I am a traitor and walks of I feel like a traitor. 
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In sum, the `bigger boys' have effectively ejected Lewis from the space in which he was 
playing. There is no apparent reason why they have done this. It could be because they 
wanted to occupy the spot themselves or it could just be because they could. However, 
Lewis did not instantly comply with their demands. He began by refusing to leave and 
after retrieving his stick he returned and attempted to retain possession of the space he 
was using for play. Even when he began to cry he still attempted to do something about 
the situation by threatening to tell. Already intimidated by the breaking of the stick, the 
verbal and profane chastisement coupled with the mockery the bigger boys issue in 
response to his threat to tell result in his retreat from the space. 
After moping for a bit Lewis approached me and recounted the proceeding events. I 
realised without him having to say so that he is implicitly attempting to enrol me. He 
attempts several times to enrol by highlighting various aspects of the episodes (that the 
bigger boys have broken his stick and swore at him). I recognise that firstly he wants me 
to tell these other children to let him continue playing where he was and verbally sanction 
them for breaking his stick and swearing at him. Although I recognise this, I do not do 
anything. Latterly, my response perturbed me. It perturbed me because I could see in 
Lewis' facial expression that he thought I should have done something. Moreover, as I 
reflected on my response afterwards I became concerned and slightly confused about the 
ethical and methodological implications of this. 
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Ethically, I considered whether or not I had acted inappropriately. As a researcher should 
I have intervened? As a parent (and in keeping with unwritten but never-the-less open to 
interpretation rule of the neighbourhood), under normal circumstances, I would have 
most probably responded the same way; but then again, perhaps not - perhaps I would 
have intervened earlier. Yet, `in the field' I was neither parent nor researcher but a 
hybrid of the two and this hybridity complicated things further. It did so because on the 
one hand, as a researcher, I had ethical responsibilities towards my participants. 
However, on the other hand, and because I was a parental figure in their life worlds, I 
had, through my personal associations with these children and their parents, an assumed 
duty of care. 
From the PAR perspective, Adler and Adler (2001) draw attention to the fact that 
conflicts arise between the parental identity and the researcher identity and the 
obligations and responsibilities each of these separately carry. As a parent my normal 
response to such a situation is variable and I am unable to state with certainty what it 
would have been -I may or may not have intervened. As a researcher, I remain confused 
about how far one should intervene and at what point a lack of intervention becomes 
ethically problematic. Adler and Adler (2001: 35) suggest that a good rule of thumb is the 
`guideline of endangerment'. Here they state that if researchers are party to behaviour 
that presents dangers to the safety of children or which could be harmful then they should 
disengage from their neutral researcher stance. However, as they also note, this is matter 
of personal judgment on the part of the researcher. Moreover, they consider that these 
matters cannot be regulated through bureaucratic rules because `children's behaviours are 
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understood and given meaning within the context of their situations' (2001: 35). 
However, the Adlers' advice regarding the disengagement of researchers from their 
neutral stance is equally problematic. When children draw you into their disputes `in the 
field', it is very difficult to remain neutral in this dual role. Here how much detachment 
and value neutrality one can realistically achieve is a moot point. I had began my 
fieldwork by attempting to assume a field role that lay somewhere between that of the 
`detached observer' (Mayall 2000) and `least adult role' (Mandell 1991; Thorne 1993). 
However, I had increasingly found that the PAR dimension complicated the achievement 
of either, never mind anything in between. When I tried to be detached, my role as a 
parent would frequently encroach into this stance. Equally so, when I tried to be less than 
adult in some way I found that the parental identity loaded as it is with associations of 
authority was difficult to dilute. Complicating this, I was occasionally concerned that I 
was shirking my parentally derived moral obligations to these children because of my 
vested interest in data gathering (I was never quite sure whether I was or not). Here, I 
wondered if my response to Lewis was influenced by a subconscious desire to see what 
else would occur. 
Added to this is the issue that both Lewis and these other children are all participants in 
my research. I did not want to alienate any of these children by issuing sanctions or 
being seen to `side' with one over another (although, in not issuing a sanction I may have 
been alienating Lewis). Mayall (2000: 121) describes one of the requirements of the 
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`least adult role' to be `not siding with adults', however, there is little mention in the 
methodological material about `siding' or `not siding' with children. Whilst, there are the 
complications of the PAR role in this instance it suggests that at times the adoption of 
field roles such as the `detached observer' or `least adult' can be unsustainable or at least 
more difficult than methodological texts suggest. 
Most crucially, however, Lewis had approached me as an adult and a parental figure in 
his life world. He did not approach me as researcher. His expectations of me as an adult 
and a parent are that I should act in his interests. He did not view me as a `detached 
observer' or a `least adult' or even as a PAR; he most definitely considered me as an 
adult-parent. He had approached me because he expected me to do something to help 
(this becomes more obvious later on). I did feel like I had let him down. However, 
analytically speaking, I had refused to become enrolled by Lewis. At this point in time I 
had not been convinced that his interests were mine. 
Despite my resistance to enrolment Lewis does not give up. He goes to the foot of the 
block of flats in which he lives and shouts for his mother. A window opens and Lewis' 
mother appears asking what he wants. He repeats the events of the stick throwing, stick 
breaking, swearing, and name-calling and so on to his mother. His mother tells him to 
play somewhere else. 
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The response Lewis gets to his attempted enrolment of her is pretty much the same 
response he got from me. She tells him to play elsewhere and refuses to become enrolled 
by Lewis. That she did respond in this way made me feel a little less like a traitor and a 
little more comfortable about my own response. However, I am not sure whether this 
necessarily gives me any sort of absolution. More to the point; Lewis' problem remains 
(as yet) unresolved. 
With two failed enrolment attempts behind him it now appears that Lewis has given up 
attempting to enrol someone to deal with the bigger boys. He sits at the entrance to the 
block of flats watching the bigger boys lark around. He looks a little dejected and 
defeated. He begins to tinker with his mobile phone that he has produced from his trouser 
pocket. Nothing about this mobile phone tinkering surprises me. I have noticed that 
children spend quite a bit of time fiddling with their mobile phones so I do not see 
anything unusual about this. I am sure Lewis has given up on getting something done 
about the way these bigger boys have treated him and is now content to play with some 
gaming facility on this phone. 
After a while Lewis puts the mobile phone down on the step and begins jumping on and 
off the step. This continues until Lewis misses the step and in doing so manages to fall 
down, hurting one of his knees in the process. At first Lewis gets up without making 
much noise and inspects his knee. He then suddenly starts screaming for his mother at 
the top of his voice. However, the screaming appears to be a reaction to the blood that 
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has begun to seep out of his knee rather than the knock to the knee itself. Lewis' mother 
appears to inspect the damage to the knee and after realising that there is not really 
much blood to speak of other than a little leakage seeping from the graze, she tells Lewis 
to calm down as there is just a little bit and offers him a sweet. 
I had noticed during the fieldwork that younger children often react like this to injuries. 
That is, screaming and crying often occurs after the injury has been inspected and blood 
has been detected. Often, if there is no blood found children dismiss their injuries and 
continue with whatever activity they had been involved in. Christensen (2000: 50-51; 
1993) has previously commented on children's inspection of injuries, the investigation of 
the presence and amount of blood and both children and adults reactions to such injuries. 
Christensen (2000) highlights the different reactions that children and adults give to 
injuries and to blood, observing that adults react immediately, particularly where there is 
blood, to establish the seriousness of the injury, children are more interested in 
investigating the wound and establishing the amount of blood involved for often quite 
different reasons. Whilst sometimes children react to blood without displaying any of the 
alarm of adults, they can also react dramatically in a similar vein to how Lewis reacted 
above by exaggerating what is often a miniscule amount of blood. Christensen (2000) 
suggests that what injured children want is to engage others in `looking' at rather than 
attending to their injuries. 
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Christensen (2000: 51) also suggests that adults act to `minimise' the importance of 
injuries in for example, suggestions that there is `little or no blood'. She also highlights 
that adults tend to disapprove of children's dramatic reactions to bodily injuries. In this 
instance, the response of Lewis' mother directly corresponds with Christensen's 
observations as she tells Lewis that there is `just a little bit' and suggests that he calms 
down. Backett-Milburn (2000: 83) suggests that from the adult point of view, childhood 
injuries of this kind are regarded, more or less, as so routine and commonplace that they 
are not worthy of any serious consideration. The attention adults give to such injuries is 
minimal, often superficial, and children, because their bodies are viewed as `quickly 
healing' and `resilient', are expected to `put up with bodily discomfort' (Backett- 
Millburn 2000: 83). 
Reassured that he is unlikely to bleed to death and armed with the promised chocolate, 
Lewis resumes his step jumping game. He has also resumed glaring intermittently at the 
'bigger boys'. About ten minutes later I see and hear Lewis making a phone call on his 
mobile phone. He becomes dramatic and what I hear is Lewis relaying the previous 
events to the person he has called. However, as he does so, he is giving the story 'arms 
and legs' and is claiming to have been hit and pushed. Moreover, he cites his grazed 
knee as evidence of a physical attack. 
Lewis it seems has not, as has been assumed, fully dispensed with seeking some sort of 
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recompense for the previous fracas with the bigger boys. Here, he has begun to initiate 
another attempt at enrolment. Before discussing this however, I would like to digress to 
speculate about the role of mobile phone. 
Bell (2001) in a thought provoking article which discussed the role of communication 
technologies in (amongst other things) providing or maintaining contact between children 
and non-resident fathers after marital separation and / or divorce, suggests that the 
telephone becomes a crucial node in the dispersed heterogeneous network of 
contemporary familial forms. Bell (2001) argues that lines of communication involve - 
indeed are dependent upon - such forms of communication technologies that maintain 
contact and facilitate proximity between a child(ren) and their non-resident father despite 
distance. However, Bell (2001) also suggests that the familial network can be cut (cf. 
Strathern 1996) when, for example, mothers halt the use of the telephone as a node in the 
network Additionally, Bell (2001) suggests that the telephone may come to represent 
the non-resident father, and that for the non-resident father, the ability to become father 
is, at times, dependent upon the assemblage between the non-resident father and the 
telephone. 
In respect to the current illustration; it could therefore be suggested that Lewis has 
enrolled the mobile phone as a node in his network -a node which brings into proximity 
another entity which he wishes to enrol. Equally, it could be suggested that without the 
mobile phone perhaps this entity may not have been contactable. In Bell's (2001) article 
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she gives an example of two children using the telephone in exactly the same way as 
Lewis and describes a scenario wherein the two children telephone the non-resident 
father and attempt to enrol him to use his authority as parent to sanction their step-father 
who has upset them. Their attempt was unsuccessful however, whether or not Lewis' is 
remains to be seen. 
In the meantime, it can be suggested that in enrolling the mobile phone, Lewis is able to 
carry out another enrolment attempt. This time his target entity is distant to him. 
However, the account of events that Lewis gives to the target entity is partly false. 
Therefore, in this enrolment attempt he has altered the representation of his problem. It is 
possible that he embellished this account of his problem because his previously truthful 
representations were not sufficient enough to convince his two previous enrolment 
targets. Indeed, as it transpired in a later conversation with Lewis, he expressed his 
fabrications as necessary because the actual account of events did not result in the adults 
he approached (myself included) taking his problem seriously: 
`Well I told you and I told my mum and you didn't bother did you and 
you saw it - you didn't listen" (emphasis added) 
My interpretation of this is that Lewis was trying to communicate that he embellished the 
events to be heard not just to be listened to and also to get something done. As Roberts 
(2000: 238) points out, `listening to children, hearing children, and acting on what they 
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say are three very different activities'. Retrospectively, Lewis taught me a lesson, not 
only about research practice but also about the `powerful social and cultural tendencies' 
(Llyod-Smith and Tarr 2000: 62) that lead to adults to neglect and dismiss what children 
say and also what they feel. 
It transpires that Lewis had called Aaron who bringing with him couple of friends has 
now arrived and is listening, this time in person, to Lewis' version of events. He tells 
Lewis not to worry that he will 'sort it'. Aaron looks over at the group of bigger boys 
and instructs Marc to go round to Dudes' house and see if he is in and if so, to tell him 
what is going on. Marc asks Aaron why he has to go to Dudes' house and so on, to 
which Aaron has replied that he is not going to be fighting with them. The tone of 
Aaron's voice implies that he considers Marc's questions to be rather stupid. 
Another child then has responded to Lewis' problem and it appears that this child (Aaron) 
has been successfully enrolled by Lewis. However, Aaron is Lewis' older brother and 
therefore Lewis has not randomly targeted him for enrolment. As an older sibling Aaron 
has a vested interest in his brother's welfare - as Aaron puts it - `you have to stick up for 
your wee brother don't you'. Aaron often responds to Lewis' requests for assistance and 
this is something Lewis is fully aware of. Of course, the relationship between Aaron and 
his younger brother is not always this convivial. Like most siblings within Greenspace, 
Aaron is often Lewis' adversary. They frequently fought and squabbled and they 
frequently plotted against each other. 
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However, Aaron does not consider himself as able to `sort out' the bigger boys on his 
own; he may be bigger than Lewis but the bigger boys are bigger than he. Moreover, 
despite the fact that he brought with him two friends who he thought might have been of 
some assistance, he felt that the bigger boys outnumbered his group and were too strong 
and too big for them: 
`Frankenstein and that are dead tough and that. They're like huge and 
they could batter you like anything'. 
Aaron knew exactly what Frankenstein and his friends were capable of and he also 
considered that attempting to enter into a potentially aggressive altercation with them was 
nothing short of folly. Thus, Aaron takes responsibility for identifying and enrolling 
others into Lewis' actor-network and immediately enrols Marc to seek out and enrol 
Dudes. 
Soon, Marc returns with Dudes. Now it is easy to see why Dudes has been selected as a 
potential entity for enrolment in this particular situation. Not only is Dudes bigger, in 
the physical sense of the word, he is also older at sixteen years of age than any of the 
other children now at the scene. Dudes spends a little bit of time listening to Aaron 
telling the story of events or rather the embellished version of the story as told by Lewis 
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to Aaron and there is much ado made about the inspection of the injured knee. Lewis is 
quite delighted about the inspection of his knee which is now being presented to Dudes as 
excruciatingly painful. Moreover, I have noticed that Lewis is giving the injury the odd 
squeeze as if to try to encourage further bleeding. It seems as if the injury to the knee, 
prefabricated by Lewis to have been caused by the bigger boys, has become the major 
vehicle for enrolment to Lewis' cause. After listening to the tale and looking intently at 
the injured knee he tells Aaron he will be back soon and tells Lewis, who he 
affectionately calls 'wee man', not to worry he will 'sort it out' when he gets back. 
Aaron seems quite perturbed by Dudes' announcement that he going off somewhere and 
has suggested to Dudes he just 'squares up' to them now. However, Dudes has told 
Aaron he will be back and he will sort things out then but he has to go and get someone 
to help him first. 
Aaron has also been strategic in his enrolment choice and he has used the same logic 
applied in all other attempts - he gets someone bigger and someone he knows has a track 
record of helping out. When Dudes arrives, Lewis' injured knee becomes the primary 
device through which Dude's becomes convinced that he should `sort things out'. When 
the group gathered around the knee they became highly involved in the act of `looking' 
that Christensen (1993; 2000) discusses. Additionally, Lewis became highly involved in 
performing the knee injury by attempting to get it to emit more blood and in acting as if it 
was more painful that perhaps it was. However, it appeared, somewhat confusingly given 
his age and size, that Dudes also considered (like Aaron did) that he required assistance 
in dealing with the bigger boys. 
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There is now an air of excitement between the children as they look at the 'bigger boys' 
who are still larking about and speculate about what Dudes has gone to do, when he will 
get back and what is likely to happen upon his return. Lewis now appears thrilled to bits 
that he has managed to attract so much attention and he is doing little to hide his delight. 
Notably, the pain to the injured knee seems to have been forgotten about amidst all the 
excitement. 
Feeling a little braver, Aaron is now shouting to the bigger boys that they are 'in for it'. 
The bigger boys appear unperturbed by this responding with all kinds of profane insults 
and mocking laughter. Quite a bit of verbal abuse begins to be thrown backwards and 
forwards between the two groups. However, the bigger boys maintain an air of 
indifference and ridicule, sneering at the futuristic threat of Dudes that the others are 
now voicing. 
Events take an unexpected turn when Dudes returns to the scene. As promised, Dudes has 
brought a friend with him - Bones. However, Bones is not another child, neither is 
Bones an adult. In fact Bones is not human at all - Bones is a dog -a white Alsatian to 
be exact and a particularly ferocious looking white Alsatian at that. 
This was curious because I had expected Dudes to return with perhaps a couple of friends 
222 
but not with his dog. Up until this point it had not occurred to me that a view that 
considered the social world as heterogeneous could be extend to encompass the animal 
nor did it occur to me that animals could in the same way as any other human or non- 
human thing become enrolled into actor-networks. Yet dogs, according to Dudes are very 
useful very effective allies, particularly in circumstances such as these: 
`I dinnae get any bother if I hae Bones wi me naebody gies you hassle 
wi a dug like bones cos he is a vicious looking thing isn't he and he's 
no really he widnae hurt anyone but he'll bark if ye tell him tae bark 
and all. ' 
This of course is one of the strengths of an actor-network analysis - it opens the door to 
allow for a consideration of the role of all sorts of other things previously obscured from 
view. Of course, Callon (1986a) discussed the role of scallops in the actor-network of 
marine biologists of St. Brieuc Bay, so there seems no reason why a dog cannot be 
extended the same analytical treatment. In debating, from an actor-network perspective, 
Michael (1996: 144) discusses what he refers to as an `animal-human dyad' when he 
considers the forms of associations that take place between humans and animals. He 
suggests that in entering into associations with animal companions humans can achieve 
an expansion of their identity. Certainly, Dudes expresses that he considers his 
assemblage or his `being with' the dog strengthens his ability to deter possible trouble. 
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The dog-Dudes dyad marches over to the bigger boys. This march (and it is a march) is 
more than a little performative. Whilst marching Dudes also acts as if he is having to 
calm Bones down. He is instructing the dog to take it easy and to remain steady and so 
on. The dog is, however, a little frisky, as it is being encouraged by Lewis, Aaron and his 
friends to perform tough; they are shouting to the dog, 'get them' bones'. The bigger 
children are now looking rather uncomfortable (although it appears that this because of 
the performance that Bones is giving rather than the sight of Dudes). As he is 
approaching, Dudes is asking them why they have, as he puts it, 'hurt the wee man's 
knee'. The bigger boys seem ill at ease as they protest their innocence to the knee 
incident (which of course they are innocent )j). I have been expecting Dudes to be 
verbally aggressive but this does not occur. Ignoring their protests and claims of 
innocence he just tells them that perhaps they had better leave. The bigger boys mumble 
a few 'see you lacers' and Dudes coolly replies 'nae bother lads'. They do not argue they 
just turn around and start walking away. 
I was amazed at the calmness of these proceedings. I had expected Dudes to threaten to 
set the dog on them. Dudes believed that without the dog there would have been trouble. 
He said he thought `they would have had a go'. However, he also said that he did not 
want to be seen to be picking on them in any way: 
`Look I don't like folk picking on little kids. So they're no exactly 
really little but they're wee'r than me ken an it doesnae dae. Yi just 
need tae look a bit scarey and hae a wee word ken cos they're a right 
crew they're always picking on the bairns roon here but yi cannae go 
ganging up on them an rubbin them up the wrong way or they'll gie yi 
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hassle somewhere doon the line. ' 
It seems that a dog-human dyad can be a very effective assemblage indeed. 
Conclusion 
Lewis eventually achieved the effect he wished to generate, although not without 
difficulty and not without persistence. In attempting to enrol others to sanction the bigger 
boys he failed to convince two adults who were well placed to have given him immediate 
and speedy assistance. However, this did not result in his giving up and accepting that he 
should enter the victim role the bigger boys had placed him in. He actively resisted this 
role by persisting in his (successful) attempts to identify and enrol others to sanction the 
children that had harassed him. In this respect Lewis obviously did not believe that these 
children should have been allowed to `get away' with their victimisation of him. Thus in 
as far as this was an act of retaliation it appeared that it was guided by Lewis' sense that 
he had been unfairly treated. 
However, his enrolment of other children involved him fabricating aspects of the events 
in his presentation of his problem. This, as Lewis tried to explain, was because the adults 
he attempted to enrol did not listen and did not do anything. Therefore, his false 
presentation of his problem was a strategic attempt to get others not only to listen but also 
to hear and to act. The actor-network he engineered consisted not only of humans but 
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also technological and natural / animal nonhumans - although the dog was not directly 
enrolled by Lewis himself. However, that these forms of nonhumans (technological and 
animal) appeared in his actor-network highlights the variety of nonhumans that can be 
drawn into and considered in an actor-network analysis. Both of these nonhumans played 
crucial roles in the actor-network that generated the effect - the presence of the dog, for 
instance, appeared pivotal in the outcome that followed. Additionally, the somewhat 
separate point of the assemblage between Dudes and the dog highlighted the ways in 
which the self can be extended or expanded through an animal companion. 
Returning full circle to the issue of Lewis and his `different body': it can be seen from 
this exemplar that having an external self which can be read by others as weak and 
passive because of its small physical size is not necessarily indicative of an essential 
inner weakness and passivity that results in an inability to counteract the treatment 
received from others because one is considered physically defenceless. Lewis actively 
put together an actor-network in order to seek some form of recompense for the treatment 
he received from the other children who had harassed him and successfully dealt, through 
his enrolment of others, with his perpetrators - after all, `the capacities of the body can be 
modified in various ways by importing the resources of other humans or nonhumans, 
technological or natural' (Michael 1996: 56). 
This theme of extending the capacities of the body continues, in part, in the next chapter. 
However, the focus of the discussion changes direction to consider more fully the role of 
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the nonhuman (primarily objects) in children's social relations. In doing so, the thesis 
now turns to considering the children's interactions with the school playground at 
Hillend. 
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Chanter Seven 
Extending the Self and Weaving the Collective 
First Impressions of Hillend Playground 
The playground is quite unremarkable as playgrounds go. It is quite small and entirely 
covered in concrete. There is no grass. There are no permanent play structures. Iron 
railings surround it and a few trees. The school buildings are quite imposing when 
viewed from the playground and are as equally bland and gloomy as the playground 
itself. On the whole the playground can be described as busy, despite the blandness of its 
landscape. When the children come out to play it comes alive - it becomes colourful and 
vibrant. A lot of activity goes on it the playground and it is very noisy. Maybe more 
boisterous than noisy - plenty of hustle and bustle. It looked like a bit of rabble at f rst 
with children running this way and that and the noisiness of it all. It is a lot more 
organised than it first appears. The activities are organised. They are even routine. The 
same children engage in more or less the same activities everyday and interact with the 
same clique (I have noticed that on the whole, the children engage in the same activities 
in school as they do out of school, and usually with the same children). There even 
appears to be an informal partitioning of the space of the playground - each activity and 
each group inhabiting the same space each day with little changes being made. 
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The boys mostly play football. They bring quite a lot of football gear in with them. Apart 
from balls and things they also bring in their football tops and wear them on top of their 
uniforms at break time. Some boys hold tournaments with wrestling figures at playtimes. 
Others are engrossed in comparing and swapping football stickers. Beyblade battles 
seem to be as popular here as on the streets and there are a group of boys who gather 
round a beyblade stadium each break time. This game is based on a children's animated 
television programme which airs on a satellite channel. The girls mostly seem to chat 
either in the shelter shed or at the entrances to the school buildings. Sometimes they are 
allowed coloured chalks to draw pictures on the concrete and spend break times drawing 
colourful murals on the f oor of the shelter shed and occasionally on the walls. They work 
quite collaboratively at this. 
Older girls tend to hang around the boys activities and although they do not normally 
join in they are involved in some of the banter that surrounds these activities. There is 
one girl who spends her break times playing football with the boys. As yet I have not seen 
her play or chat with any of the other girls. She does not seem to engage much with the 
girls at other times either (for example, when queuing up at bell time). 
Skateboarding and inline roller skating is common. Mostly it is boys who use skateboards 
in the playground and girls who use inline skates. Skateboarding is apparently banned in 
the playground because of accidents but it goes on nonetheless. Skateboards themselves 
are not banned as there is an authority wide project aimed at getting kids to choose 
`active' travel options to school and skateboarding or roller skating to school is 
229 
encouraged. The children are therefore allowed to bring these items to school. 
Some boys bring their hand held computer games consoles with them and play them at 
break time. They spend time watching each other play and swapping games and consoles. 
I have noticed Richard usually brings in his various computer games things. Sometimes 
he brings in a Robot. It seems to be mostly boys who bring various things to school to 
play with at breaktimes. Some children remain almost entirely absent from the 
playground at lunch times. A few boys, but no girls, go to chess club on a daily basis. 
Some girls go to the sewing club on a daily basis. One boy also goes to this. He has told 
me he is making a frog. He has also told me he thinks the sewing club is great. He is 
making a boat next. He comes to school everyday with his own sewing kit. 
This extract is taken from a descriptive summary of my initial impressions of playground 
activity at Hillend. At the time it was written merely as a way of recording my thoughts 
-a sort of memo to myself. Thus, it was never intended to be used for analytical 
purposes and was never formally transferred from its `raw state' (at least initially). 
However, this description is rich in material heterogeneity. It contains within it a whole 
host of materials. For the most part these materials are recognizable objects and artefacts 
of contemporary childhood culture but there is also reference to buildings and 
architecture - materials that Anni Dugdale (1999: 118) reminds us we are prone to treating 
as background, as `mere things' (Mol and Messman 1996: 428) and as a consequence of 
little importance in the analytical task. 
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Conformity to the `analytical repertoire' (Pels 1996:. 278) of actor-network theory brings 
these materials out of the background and into analytical focus. The picture that emerges 
from this recasting of the analytical gaze is considerably different to that which is usually 
portrayed in school based studies of peer relations. What emerges, I suggest, is a picture 
in which these material objects emerge as pivotal in the social organisation of playground 
life. In this chapter, I would like to explore, more fully, the role that some of these objects 
play in holding social relations together. Here then, the focus of my analysis changes 
direction slightly. However, a salient consideration of agency is retained, although here, 
the discussion is focused on how this is achieved in the playground. It is with this this 
the discussion below begins. 
Extending Agency in the Playground 
For the most part, sociological analyses of children's football games have been 
characterised by their central focus on gender. Considered alongside other competitive 
sports and games as part of the wider repertoire of `boys' culture' (Adler and Adler 
2001: 208) the study of football is marked in general by the study of masculinity. In this 
respect, a considerable amount of research in this area has been aimed at elucidating upon 
how boys perform and construct masculinity through sports and games such as football 
(cf. Connell 1996; Gilbert and Gilbert 1998; Kessler et al., 1985; Skelton 1997,2000). 
In discussing boys and football, Epstein et al. (2001: 159) echo the sentiments of many 
others when they suggest that success in football is a primary `signifier of masculinity' 
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wherein physical prowess, skill and social and technical knowledge about the game, 
becomes a marker of status, admiration and success. However, relative failure (being a 
bad player) or disinterest leads to stigmatisation, ridicule, marginalisation and may be 
seen as indicative of effeminacy. 
However, these studies contain within them an analysis founded upon an uncritical 
acceptance of notions of embodied agency. Those that are able to construct successful 
masculinities through sports such as football, are often considered as `bodies that act' 
(Swain 2002: 105) full of embodied power and agency (Crossley 1996 cited in Swain 
2002). Here, the implication is that access to the resources of the body, that is, physical 
attributes such as strength, skill, speed and co-ordination, as well as a particular kind of 
savoire-faire (Adler and Adler 2001: 42) not only empowers (some) to perform as `good 
footballers' but also empowers them as agents in the sense that the scope of their agency 
is increased. In contrast, those who are not successful, whose bodies are deficient of the 
stellar abilities required, are presumably considered to be disempowered and thus lacking 
in (embodied) power and agency. 
These stellar abilities can be acquired, by some, through certain material practices. 
Bodies can be trained to become footballers and bodies can be subjected to exercise 
regimes that can alter the corporeal resources of the body (Prout 2000). At the point of 
data collection many of the boys at Hillend were engaged (some of them heavily 
engaged) in material practices of this sort and in the quest to shed notions of weakness 
and vulnerability associated with the embodiment of femininity so too were a small 
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number of girls (cf. De Welde 2003). My point however, is not to criticise this approach 
per se (indeed I have drawn on notions of embodiment elsewhere here) but to press the 
argument in a somewhat different, perhaps extended, direction. 
Whilst there is little doubt that being good at football has something to do with the 
capacities of the corporeal body, the body itself is not operationally sealed. To some 
extent it is permeable (Bruun and Langlais 2003) and to some extent it relies upon what 
Clark (1997) refers to as `external scaffolding'. For example, he argues that in 
performing complex actions such as difficult arithmetic operations human agents depend 
upon sets of external instruments such as calculators, papers and pens. External 
instruments such as these are considered by Clark (1997) to be constitutive in the task or 
action. 
Whilst primarily centred upon neurological processes, Clark's vision is similar in 
emphasis to Deleuze and Guattari's (1988 cited in Lee 2001) thinking on `assemblages'. 
Most directly, his argument is that external resources are intrinsic to, and part of, human 
agency (Bruun and Langlais 2003). The problem with external scaffolding is that for the 
most part it remains hidden from view. In actor-network terms Law (1992) makes the 
argument thus: 
`All phenomena are the effect or the product of heterogeneous 
networks. But in practice we do not cope with endless network 
ramification. Indeed, much of the time we are not even in a position to 
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detect network complexities. So what is happening? The answer is that 
if a network acts a single block, then it disappears, to be replaced by the 
action itself and the seemingly simple author of that action. At the 
same time, the way in which the effect is generated is also effaced: for 
the time being it is neither visible, nor relevant. So it is that something 
much simpler -a working television, a well-managed bank or a healthy 
body - comes, for a time, to mask the networks that produced it. ' 
What Law is discussing is what ANT theorists refer to as `punctualisation', the process 
whereby the network which produces a particular action is rendered invisible or deleted 
from view (Law 1992). Thus in children's football games what we see is children 
playing football, children kicking footballs, children scoring goals, children taking free 
kicks and so forth. However, what we focus on - what we see - is children as authors of 
these actions. It may be that we consider that is all there is. Consequently, the networks 
which generate these actions remain out of focus and their composite entities marginal 
(Star 1991) or silent. They also remain more or less out of focus to the authors of these 
actions who themselves (at times) believe that their agency is an attribute of the self: 
Mitchell: I'm brilliant at football. Everyone says I'm a great footballer 
and I'll play for saints... [... ]... Did you see me score that goal yesterday 
Sharon? Did you see me score that goal from halfway? 
Sharon: I think so. Just before bell time? 
Mitchell: Aye. Greg says it was an awesome shot just like Gary Neville 
cos I can really score loads of goals you know, I can really kick the 
ball. ' 
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Here, Mitchell considers himself the author of his own actions. His understanding of his 
own agency is a version which, as Rachel (1994: 809) puts it, `is concerned with lithe 
active human bodies, demonstrating their agency in movement and talk. ' He scored the 
goal; he scored it from the halfway line; he can score loads of goals; and he can really 
kick the ball. What he depends upon for his actions (scoring and kicking) receives no 
recognition here. Mitchell's condition is reminiscent of Bateson's (1972: 318) lumberjack 
in his following parable: 
`Consider a man felling a tree with an axe. Each stroke of the axe is 
modified or corrected, according to the shape of the cut face of the tree 
left by the previous stroke. This self-corrective (i. e., mental) process is 
brought about by a total system, trees-eyes-brain-muscles-axe-stroke- 
tree; and it is this total system that has the characteristics of immanent 
mind. . . But this is not how the average Occidental sees the event 
sequence of tree felling. He says, "I cut down the tree" and he even 
believes that there is a delimited agent, the 'self', which performed a 
delimited `purposive' action upon a delimited object. ' 
Mitchell considers himself as much a delimited agent as Bateson's (1972) lumberjack. 
Yet, he is as much of a `total system' (or here, network) as the man yielding the axe. He 
has told me as much himself. On many occasions his own words have betrayed his 
narrative representations of himself as a `delimited agent'. He, as have many other 
children, has depicted in considerable detail those entities which he relies on to generate 
235 
his actions on the football pitch. The importance of footwear, for example, has arisen 
often: 
Mtichell: Predators (a brand of football boots) are the best. 
Sharon: Why? What difference does it make what boots you wear? 
Mitchell: Well you see the laces? 
Sharon: Yep. 
Mtichell: Well they lace up like this way (demonstrates diagonal layout 
of laces) you see. 
Sharon: Why is that important? 
Mtichell: Cos its not the same as other laces. 
Sharon: What do you mean? 
Mitchell: They go like this (demonstrates vertical layout of laces). 
Sharon: I don't get it. 
Mitchell: It's like well it means that there is more space on the boots 
for kicking the ball so and the laces don't get in the way of the ball 
when you kick it so you can kick it better see? 
Sharon: Ok I see. Does it work? 
Mitchell: Aye and you can swerve the ball better and stuff. 
Sharon: What else? 
Mitchell: It's cos of what its made of. 
Sharon: What? 
Mitchell: The boots. 
Sharon: What are they made of? 
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Mitchell: Rubber and stuff and they are made so that you can control 
the ball better and move your feet better and stuff. 
Sharon: So are they better than other boots then? 
Mitchell: Aye and they stop your feet getting injured like other boots. 
Sharon: What boots are worse then? 
Mitchell: All sorts of boots are worse. 
Sharon: Why are they worse? 
Mitchell: Cos they don't do what preds do. They slow you down and 
stuff and hurt your feet lots sometimes and you can't kick the ball right 
you know. 
Apart from informing me of the technical merits of predator football boots (I remain 
forever astonished at the depth of knowledge children have about such things), Mitchell 
is also telling me about the way in which football boots can `act' upon the capacities of 
body, or more properly feet. Akrich and Latour (1992) refer to this issue of how `things' 
can act in such ways as prescription, that is: 
`What a device allows or forbids from actors - human and nonhuman' 
(Akrich and Latour 1992: 262 cited in Michael 1996). 
Mitchell makes this clear in relation to boots - some can help you play better football, 
others can prohibit performance and impose physical constraints. However, the problem 
with school is that football boots cannot act on concrete (at least not very successfully). 
Concrete can offer up its own resistances which serve to constrain action in many 
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different, albeit contingent, ways. Although, this is only part of the story of concrete or 
any other environmental (either natural, built or technological) entity for that matter and I 
shall digress a little to mention this here and draw upon Michael's (1996) thought on 
natural nonhumans and local nature where he asserts there is a danger in missing from 
such storylines `a vision of the expanded or collective physical individual', an expansion 
which can incorporate both humans and nonhumans (1996: 98). 
For children, the `affordances' (cf. Gibson 1979 cited in Michael 1996) offered by the 
concreted landscape of the school playground can multiply in the company of other 
humans such as friends but decrease in the company of teachers. In a similar manner, 
affordances can be expanded with the assistance of various nonhumans (for example, 
footballs are a case in point) and reduced by the presence of others (for example, iron 
railings, locked gates, walls, technologies and so on). All of this is, of course, highly 
variable. In school the presence of other children is not always experienced positively. 
Likewise teachers can enable as well constrain. Footballs may expand affordances but 
only for some. For instance, at Hillend the presence of these particular nonhumans was 
good news for some children but perhaps not for those others excluded from either the 
activity of football itself or subjected to the restraints of its spatial dominance within the 
playground (discussed later). The iron railings and locked gates (not to mention the 
telecom entry system and CCTV which constantly monitored the school grounds) could 
have been viewed as containing, restraining and / or disciplining children. However, this 
containment was as much about protecting the children from the hazards of that which 
was perceived to lie beyond the school yard (traffic, stranger danger and so on). Thus, the 
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presence of others within the playground, whether human or nonhuman can function as 
either restrictions or possibilities for social interaction. 
Back to boots: concrete then, can offer up resistances of its own. Here, the issue of 
footwear for footballing children at Hillend oscillated around which forms enhanced the 
capacities of the body without yielding to the resistances of concrete. Unsurprisingly 
perhaps, training shoes were favoured over school shoes or boots by the children. Whilst 
many other children at Hillend wore trainers, the children who played football wore 
trainers specifically because they could play football better in trainers (some trainers, like 
football boots, were considered better for play than others) than in shoes or boots, which 
were considered too heavy and clumsy. However, whilst there was no issue with the 
wearing of trainers at Hillend (at least while Mr. Murphy occupied the headship), many 
of these children were prohibited from wearing trainers to school by their parents. 
Sneaking trainers into school was the order of the day for most of these children. A few 
of the footballing children were regularly seen producing training shoes from their school 
bags and changing into them shortly after arriving at school or during the mid morning 
break. For these children, getting their trainers into school was considerably important to 
them. Indeed, it was important enough to run the risk of being found out and incurring 
the anger of a parent: 
Dale: My mum goes mental when she finds out I've been wearing my 
trainees. 
Sharon: Why? 
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Dale: Ach cos she moans on about how my trainees make me look like 
a mink and how everyone will think she can't afford to put shoes on me 
and stuff and that they cost her loads so I've to wear them. But I can't 
play footie right without my trainees and she says that I'm not here to 
play footie I'm here to learn to do reading and stuff and that I can play 
footie in my school shoes then when I get hee haw for scrapping them 
and getting them ruined and she starts on about like having to buy new 
ones but I'm no caring about it cos I need my trainees for footie. 
Sharon: So you bring them in your bag right? 
Dale: Yeah cos I need to have them. 
Sharon: Are you not worried about getting into trouble then? 
Dale: Sometimes. Not really. She goes mental and makes me empty 
my bag on the way. 
When Dale had been recently caught for -wearing trainers it became obvious as he would 
play football wearing his school shoes. The shoes would then be held accountable for 
any bad passes or shots. Understanding his dilemma, his fellow team mates would, more 
often than not, empathise with his predicament rather than berate his performance. 
Sneaking trainers into school could perhaps be considered as a sign of children's 
resistance to adult authority. Indeed Swain (2002: 95) advances exactly this point in 
relation to the `sneaking in' of trainers to school. However, here what I would like to 
suggest is that in their discussions of such issues (whether it be football boots, trainers or 
any other thing) children have an implicit recognition of their agency as collective in 
some sense. At times they recognise that they can extend their agency through 
assemblages with some actants but that likewise some assemblages - some actants - may 
act to impair their agentic powers. Therefore, they recognise that their agency is 
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dispersed amongst those actants they enter into associations with. 
Weaving the Collective: Quasi-Objects 
Leaving the nonhuman aside for a moment; at the most fundamental level there are no 
delimited agents in a game of football. Each individual operates as part of a team - as 
part of a collective. One player alone is not very effective. He / she is nothing without 
those others who together form the team. For example, the act of scoring depends upon 
the act of passing - on the `setting up' of the ball by others and this itself is dependent 
upon the effects collectively generated to `keep the ball in play' (Day 1997). 
This is where things get interesting. The ball is seen by the players as an object within the 
game. It is given the ontological status of a `mere thing'. It is seen by the children and 
by those who look on but it is not noticed. It is something which can be manipulated in 
play - kicked, thrown, passed - it is a piece of equipment or an instrument of play. As 
such the ball's main characteristic is that it can be used for something. What the ball 
does `in play' has little to do with the ball. The ball is not seen to act, it is acted upon. 
Under the modern constitution we are told that if objects, such as balls, hold any meaning 
beyond `thing-like-ness' it is because humans endow them with such meaning. In short, 
this is the view that considers the properties and values of objects as resulting from social 
interests and needs (Day 1997). 
A somewhat different, almost contrary argument can be advanced regarding the role of 
the ball if Serres' (1982,1987 cited in Middleton and Brown 2001) notion of the quasi- 
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object is drawn into analysis here. Serres argues that in complex series of actions objects 
serve as a sort of `third party' in the exchanges that take place between persons. Objects, 
artefacts or any other nonhuman thing for that matter occupy a space between actors -a 
space in which and through which interaction and / or communication is made possible. 
In order to exemplify this, I shall turn to Serres' (1982,1987) best known example of 
`thirdness' here (and for reasons of relevance) expressed in relation to the role of the ball 
in a game of rugby: 
`A ball is not an ordinary object, for it is what it is only if a subject 
holds it. Over there, on the ground, it is nothing; it is stupid; it has no 
meaning, no function and no value. Ball isn't played alone. Let us 
consider the one who holds it. If he makes it move around him, he is 
awkward, a bad player. The ball isn't there for the body; the exact 
contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball; the subject moves 
around this sun. Skill with the ball is recognised in the player who 
follows the ball and serves it instead of making it follow him and using 
it. It is the subject of the body, subject of bodies, and like a subject of 
subjects. Playing is nothing else but making oneself the attribute of the 
ball as substance' (Serres 1982: 225-26 cited in Middleton and Brown 
2001). 
According to Middleton and Brown (2001), Serres' point is this: The object (here the 
ball) weaves the relations between the players - it `weaves the collective' It does so 
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because through its circulation from one player to another it binds humans to each other. 
The participants in the game gain their relation to one and other in terms of their relation 
to the ball. To become a member of this collective a player has to make themselves an 
attribute of the ball and whether one is defined as a good or bad player is dependent not 
upon the ability to `master the ball' but upon how, as Brown and Lightfoot (1999) put it, 
one takes `up a position in relation to the field of play which the ball defines' and: 
`... at the same time, the players are modes of activity which the ball 
can open up. One is before or after, passing away from or toward the 
ball. The body of the player is a material link between two phases of 
the ball's passage, much a preposition in a sentence. Neither subject 
nor object, but the means of passage. A mediator. 
Thus, the ball becomes the subject of circulation and the players merely stations in its 
passages. As means of passage, the player is neither a subject nor object but a mediator - 
a `participal act' (Fisher 1978: 140 cited in Brown and Lightfoot 1999) occasioned by an 
object (Brown and Lightfoot 1999; Middleton and Brown 2001). 
It is therefore argued that in sets of interactions between persons it is the nonhumans that 
pull humans together. However, when they enter into circulation in such ways objects 
leave their objective features behind - they become quasi-objects (Brown 2000). After 
all, the ball in circulation is much more than just a ball. It is not as Serres (above) puts it 
`an ordinary object' because it is what makes the realisation of a collective possible and it 
provides the means through which the adoption of subjectivity can emerge: 
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`This quasi-object [here the ball] is not an object, but it is one 
nevertheless, since it is not a subject, since it is in the world; since it 
is in the world it is also a quasi-subject, since it marks and designates 
a subject who, without it, would not be a subject' (Serres 1982: 225). 
What I take these arguments to mean, is that objects are capable of weaving together and 
structuring social relations. These arguments can be equally applied to and seen in 
relation to the football in the playground. It wove together a collective and structured the 
social relations played out on the makeshift concrete pitch - itself defined by pullovers, 
bags and other `to-hand' objects that defined the parameters of play and the movement of 
bodies. Indeed, in so far as these others are concerned perhaps it would be unwise only to 
give them passing reference here. Day (1997) quite rightly points out that, materially 
speaking, it is objects such as these that `collect the players and allow the game to be 
played. ' So things are perhaps not quite so simple or reducible only to the powers of 
quasi-objects. Then again perhaps these are also quasi-objects. Although, perhaps not, 
because if Day's (1997) arguments are followed through they would be considered to 
provide context rather than structure or even a means through which a quasi-object such 
as ball is given it's `ballness'. 
The playground at Hillend was infested with quasi-objects and the collectivities they 
weaved. They were embedded into the fabric of everyday playground activities. It is of 
course this embeddedness that lends quasi-objects their power: 
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`They are powerful, certainly, but they gain this power through their 
ability to lodge themselves in everyday interaction' (Middleton and 
Brown 2001). 
Objects, Middleton and Brown (2001) consider, are vitally important for everyday social 
interaction. Yet, and as Dant (1999) has argued, sociology as a discipline has tended to 
overlook the importance of objects for social relations, primarily because of its focus 
upon relations between people. The ways in which objects interact with people and the 
manner in which material things help constitute relations in everyday social settings has 
been largely ignored (Dant 1999). However, once invoked, a non modern symmetrical 
analysis brings into focus a different view of social relations. 
In the micro setting of Hillend playground it becomes more than apparent that the 
majority of social relations are held together in the interactions between humans and 
nonhumans. A cursory glance sees that the landscape of the playground is characterised 
by small groups of children, each group bound together by an object or objects of sorts. 
The types of objects are diverse indeed - footballs, beyblades, beyblade stadiums, 
skateboards, inline skates, wrestling figures and wrestling rings, Barbie dolls, gameboys 
and so on - but the functions they serve are almost always the same. 
In each of these many groups children, through their relationship to the quasi-object, and 
of course (and as a consequence) each other, carve out subjectivities - sometimes 
moment to moment - sometimes over time. Interactions oscillate around these quasi- 
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objects as does much of the talk that occurs. Even for those children not in a direct 
relationship with the quasi-object their effects can be seen. The gathering of children 
around these groups as observers or `wannabes' (those wishing to gain membership) was 
a regular feature within the playground. Epstein et al. (2001) call this framing and I 
would agree with their analysis, however, I would also suggest that this speaks of the 
powers of quasi-objects to influence subject positions beyond their immediate 
interactional scene. 
Conclusion 
The above discussion has highlighted inter alia how children in the school playground 
attempt to extend the capacities of their bodies through entering into assemblages with 
nonhumans, and also how nonhumans weave together the collective. Whilst the 
discussions were primarily contained within the examples of football boots and footballs 
respectively, the use of and function of the nonhuman in these ways was an insidious 
phenomenon within Hillend playground. Quasi-objects were present in the multiple. At 
the beginning of this chapter in the analytical memo I presented I drew attention to the 
fact that the playground was highly organised and that the children appeared to conduct 
their activities in little groups. More latterly, I returned to this theme to briefly highlight 
that these groups were held together by the presence of quasi-objects. In this respect, 
quasi-objects played an important part in the organisation of social relations in the 
playground. 
Crucially, the importance of the nonhuman in holding children's relations in place within 
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Hillend playground did not emerge until these artefacts became all but absent in its 
totality. The next chapter addresses the consequences that occur when a new head 
teacher embarked on a project that removed the vast majority of these artefactual 
participants that were present within the playground at Hillend. Banished and excluded, 
their absence speaks of the pivotal role that nonhumans occupy in holding together 
children's social relations. 
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Chapter 8 
"There is (No)thing to Play With" 
When The 'Missing Masses' Go Missing 
Introduction 
In Chapter Seven, I drew out the role that nonhuman artefacts played in `weaving 
together the collective'. Additionally, I discussed the ways that children in entering into 
assemblages with material objects were able to extend their agentic capacities within the 
playground and within their respective peer groups. However, the vital function that the 
nonhuman plays in the extension of children's agentic capacities and the binding together 
of their relations with each other only became apparent in the absence of the nonhuman. 
Here, I argued that within the school playground children's relations were held in place 
by the nonhumans that participated in the interactional scene. 
The appointment of a new head teacher had resulted in a residualisation of `the field of 
heterogeneous possibilities' at Hillend. This was characterised by an incremental and 
ultimately, almost complete removal of material artefacts from the playground. This 
removal seriously impaired children's abilities to act, interact and hold their social 
relations in place. This chapter describes the changes that took place at Hillend and the 
resulting effect that these changes had upon the children. In discussing how the children 
acclimatised to this situation I draw attention to the ways in which children sought re- 
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inscription into the material through both resistance to the rules that banished the material 
and through the introduction of new forms of materiality. 
The School as a Restricted Field of Heterogeneous Possibilities 
The informal spaces of the local community constituted for the children a 
`(semi)autonomous' (Matthews et al. 2000: 76) realm where they experienced a 
potentially limitless field of heterogeneous possibilities wherein an unending array of the 
human and the non-human could be put into (and out of) circulation and drawn into 
networks of mediation. Here, children could, subject to certain contingencies, 
availabilities and environmental opportunities, draw upon the field of heterogeneous 
possibilities to become more agentic and also, sometimes, to make others less so. 
As I have illustrated previously, what this has exposed is that children's agentic 
capacities are not located within the self or some other sovereign centre. Rather, agency 
`emerges from associations with a heterogeneity of other actors' (Michael 1996: 156). To 
put it another way - the analysis of these associations has revealed that children's agency 
and its construction, is dependent upon various `extensions and supplements that are 
available to them' (Lee 2001: 131) and the abilities of children to translate or enter into 
assemblage with these extensions and supplements. 
That children are dependent upon extensions and supplements of various kinds to become 
successful actors becomes all the more transparent when children enter a circumscribed 
field of heterogeneous possibilities. That is, when access to a potentially endless array of 
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heterogeneous materials is removed. The school is one such field. Here, what is 
heterogeneously possible is linked to what assemblages are considered appropriate for the 
child / pupil subject (and the success of the child / pupil subject) and what assemblages 
are not. The extensions and supplements available to children within the school are 
carefully prescribed. The child / pupil is expected to enter into assemblage with the 
materials and material practices of learning and to do so successfully. The teacher has his 
or her own set of extensions and supplementations to ensure that the child / pupil enters 
into appropriate 'learning assemblages'. Compliance to preferred assemblages is exacted 
through reward and non-compliance through punishment. Surveillance technologies 
(standardised tests and so on) further assist teachers in monitoring the outputs of 'learning 
assemblages' and identifying problematic or failed assemblages. 
School based fieldwork brought to light that adults can control, regulate, change and 
restrict heterogeneity, in particular (although not exclusively) material heterogeneity, in 
the process profoundly limiting the capacities of children to become agentic. Here, 
analysis is focused upon the playground and how strategies of `heterogeneous control' by 
adults acted to configure (and reconfigure) the space of the playground and the social 
relations therein. 
Extensions, Supplements and Deconstructive Fairies 
By default rather than by design the question I am asking (and hopefully answering) here 
is: what happens when the supplements and extensions children rely upon for their 
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agency do not exist or are taken away? John Law (1997) in The Manager and His 
Powers, has, in part, already asked and answered this question. He has deconstructed his 
manager - his `deconstructive fairy' having worked her magic - removed his extensions 
and supplements and exposed him to have been a network of social and technical 
relations. He asked what his manager is without this network - `what he is by himself'. 
What he is, Law (1997) tells us, is a `naked ape - with all the powers of a naked ape': 
`Yes! He can beat his chest. He can shout. He can hit us too, if he's big 
and strong. The powers of the body. To extract compliance. Important 
of course. Sometimes personal violence works well enough. But it isn't, 
shall we say, very reliable. Or very long range. Even thugs like to carry 
weapons, and leave their calling-cards. For the powers of the body - or 
of the mind - are the least part of it. The least part of the power of the 
powerful. ' 
The moral of Law's story is that without supplements and extensions we are nothing. We 
are one of Strum and Latour's baboons (see Chapter Two). By his own admission Law's 
story is quasi-fictional - it is partly drawn from real events but it is also an imaginary 
experiment. However, for children, Law's imaginary experiment is more of an empirical 
reality than he himself may have assumed. In the social worlds of children, 
`deconstructive fairies' (Law 1997) exist. Fairies that work tirelessly to remove their 
extensions and supplements, or at least to prohibit access to them, and in the process also 
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their potential for agency. Sometimes this removal work is successful, sometimes it is 
not. Sometimes children outsmart deconstructive fairies, sometimes they do not. 
The changes to the field of heterogeneous possibilities at Hillend were a result of the 
project of one particular deconstructive fairy. Below I would like to introduce this 
deconstructive fairy to the reader. However, the aim is not to cast this fairy in the role of 
villain - as the 'taker away of children's agency, although my narrative, at times, may 
appear to be doing just that. Rather, the aim is to highlight how this fairy's disciplinary 
project resulted in the removal of the nonhuman from Hillend playground and the 
consequences that this had upon children and their relations with each other. 
Introducing the Deconstructive Fairy 
I would like to introduce this deconstructive fairy in the same way as she was introduced 
to me. My reason for doing so is that in my own introduction to her the first `seeds' of 
her `deconstructive project' were given voice. Here, I am drawing upon the only audio- 
recorded conversation she permitted me to conduct, although even here, in this first 
formal encounter, I was asked rather quickly to cease recording the conversation. 
Interwoven within this conversation are some important issues that relate more generally 
to relations within the field. In particular, it became obvious to me that Ms. Witherspoon 
was not at ease with my presence within the school. As much as this was intended as a 
formal introductory meeting, in so far, as this is how it was presented to me, it also 
appeared as an opportunity for Ms. Witherspoon to subject me to a status reduction 
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exercise in which I was firmly positioned as a non-expert on all things educational. Of 
course, I cannot speak for Ms. Witherspoon and I am aware that this is my own 
interpretation of the purposes of this meeting, as Moje (2000: 29) suggests, `it is a 
complicated endeavour to reflect on one's role in a relationship without othering, through 
re-representation of someone else's voice and experience'. Therefore, I am reflecting on 
my interaction with Ms. Witherspoon only in terms of what this interaction meant to me. 
However, I am unable here to replicate the authoritative tone and superiority of her voice 
and the intimidating impact this had. Nor am I able to adequately convey the 
psychological effect of my spatial positioning on a small, child-size chair at the opposite 
side of the desk from her. Given my small stature I was barely able to see over the desk 
between us let alone meet her gaze. I felt reduced to the status of a pupil and 
immediately subordinate to her before we even began our conversation. 
Here I am then, on my small chair: 
W: I had heard that I was inheriting a student doing research. So you'll 
be it then? 
S: Yes, for my sins yes. 
W: Hmm, uh huh, right then. So you have the relevant permissions and 
so on I see. You know I'm not that sure that I would have agreed to 
this but well then there it is you're here now anyway. How long are 
you intending staying? Are you an education student? 
S: No I'm not an education student. Sociology. I was planning 
another couple of months. 
W: So you're not a trained teacher then are you? 
S: No I'm not my degree is in sociology and social policy. I'm 
studying for a PhD. 
W: A PhD in what? 
S: Sociology. 
W: You said. Not education then? 
253 
S: No not education, sociology. 
W: Oh well then you won't know anything about schools or education 
then will you? You're not one of those liberal left winger progressive 
types then are you? I could do without one of those hanging around the 
place. No you don't look like likely to be like that now do you. So 
you're not a teacher, I mean you haven't studied education then? You 
won't have informed views then. 
S: No I'm not a teacher. I'm not sure I follow. 
W: You're a sociology student. 
S: Yes. 
W: So neither are you a qualified researcher then this is a college 
project? 
S: I've had training in research methods but I... you could say I'm still 
training. 
W: So you're not qualified or anything. 
S: Not exactly. You could say this is sort of part of my training... this 
project. 
W: I thought you said you were doing sociology? 
S: I am yes... I mean I'm doing a research degree in sociology. It could 
be viewed as training. 
W: Uh huh. Training, you said. 
I would like to pause and take a momentary digression to consider this conversation thus 
far. Shkedi (1998) discusses the difficulties and challenges that face qualitative 
researchers when the attitudes that teachers hold towards research and researchers is less 
than favourable. Based on empirical research Shkedi (1998), whilst suggesting other 
reasons why teachers hold negative views about research, reports that some teachers see 
little value in research that seems to hold no relevance for them in the field. Shkedi 
further reports on the comments of some teachers that suggest that their reactions to 
research would be more favourable if the study was perceived to provide a solution to 
problems they faced or were experiencing. Others, report that they simply feel 
professionally threatened. 
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I have thought that some of these reasons might have explained Ms. Witherspoon's 
negative attitude towards my presence. I have also thought that perhaps this was also a 
failing on my part to communicate or demonstrate adequately any direct relevance to 
practice in my work. However, being married to a high school teacher and having mixed 
with many educational professionals on a social basis, I had been told prior to access 
negotiations about how teachers, feeling that they were being increasingly scrutinised, 
were becoming more negative about research (practitioner research aside). Additionally, 
I was informed that many teachers within the local authority were apathetic towards both 
research and researchers because of the saturation of researchers `they had to put up with' 
due to their relatively close proximity to a university that provided teacher education and 
engaged in educational research. Perhaps, what I was dealing with was simply a lack of 
interest. Retrospectively, however, I have wondered if Ms. Witherspoon had viewed me 
as a challenge to her authority and whether this status reduction exercise had been an 
intentional strategy to offset any challenge that I may have presented. 
Simpson (2000: 61) has discussed the ways in which teachers use status reduction 
techniques to offset the possibility that pupils may challenge their authority. Drawing on 
Neill and Caswell (1993) she discusses amongst other things, the use of facial expression 
and tone of voice by teachers as well as other techniques which target pupils' bodies as a 
site of discipline and control. Simpson highlights that strategies of this sort are 
considered to facilitate the maintenance of authority. I very much felt that these were the 
sorts of strategies Ms. Witherspoon, either intentionally or unintentionally, used upon 
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myself. Whilst this continued the conversation orientated itself towards a discussion of 
the children's behaviour and Ms. Witherspoon's opinions of their behaviour: 
W: So you have been watching how the pupils behave in the 
playground then? 
S: I wouldn't say I have been watching their behaviour exactly, more 
observing their interpersonal relationships with each other. 
W: Their behaviour then. And what have you found out? 
S: I haven't really subjected my material to any sort of thorough 
analysis as yet. 
W: So what do you think of their behaviour then? 
S: I'm not really studying their behaviour as such. Do you mean 
conduct? 
W: Yes conduct then. What do you think of it? 
S: It's not really conduct I'm looking at. I'm more interested in their 
interactions with each other. 
W: What do you mean exactly by that... interactions? 
S: Um their relations with each other. 
W: Their relations? Why would you want to look at that? 
S: Well I'm interested in how children interact with each other. 
W: Mmm. Well there is a lack of civility that is one thing that is 
certain. 
S: Sorry? 
W: I don't suppose you have been in many schools have you. 
S: No not really. 
W: Well believe you me there is a lack of civility. They behave like 
wildcats in that playground wouldn't you say. Well you will have seen 
that for yourself. Apparently there has been no supervision out there. 
You can not let over a hundred pupils run around a playground without 
proper supervision doing whatever it is they wish. Have you ever seen 
any supervision out there? 
S: Well no. 
W: There it is. No supervision. So tell me what happens. 
S: Emm I'm not sure.. emm... to be honest I... I don't think it's that bad 
really. 
W: Huh well you have nothing to compare it to do you if you haven't 
been in any other schools for any length of time and you won't have 
had any experience with children. 
S: I do have some experience. 
W: You won't necessarily understand that schools need a certain level 
of civility in order to run efficiently. 
S: No I understand that. I can see that. 
256 
W: Well then you will appreciate what it is I am trying to say then 
won't you. What experience? 
S: I worked for the education department as a youth worker for several 
years. 
W: Did you oh. Well schools are different. I thought you said you 
weren't qualified in education. 
S: No I'm not. 
W: Well how could you have worked for the education department 
then wouldn't you have needed to be qualified. 
S: No... yes but not in education I did vocational qualifications in youth 
work on the job. 
W: Yes but that is youths isn't it its not children is it? 
S: No I worked with children too. I worked with children and young 
people from toddlers to young adults up to around age 26. 
W: Doing what exactly. 
S: Well it was quite wide ranging. Like for example, sometimes I 
would be helping to run creches so women could attend adult literacy 
classes, sometimes it was youth clubs other times I was involved in 
drugs education in schools and stuff like that, sometimes it was young 
adults groups where we would help them with things like finding jobs, 
filling in application forms and so on. All sorts of things really. 
W: Thought you said you hadn't been in schools. 
S: I haven't really only really on that sort of basis and it was usually 
out of school hours. 
W: Mmm well you might have some understanding then of the need 
for rules then. 
S: We let the children and young people draw up the rules. 
W: What. 
S: Well in consultation with us. 
W: I thought you said you weren't one of those lefties. 
S: I didn't say that. It was policy at the time. I'm not sure what the 
policy is now but at the time it was thought, particularly with older 
children that if they were active in making the rules then it was more 
likely they would stick by them or others would with them being 
consensual within the group and we tried to treat them on as equal a 
footing as possible. 
W: Well its different in schools when you are dealing with large 
numbers of children you can not just let them decide what is best and 
let them do what they like or else they run wild. Given the chance they 
will do exactly what they like and before long they are out of control 
and we are not dealing with older children here we are dealing with 
children that come off that estate. Half the parents are living off the 
state where there are parents to speak of and they are probably let loose 
to roam the streets day and night doing exactly what they like. That is 
why they are all running amock. These children are not all used to 
abiding by rules and doing what they are told you see. If you let them 
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do what they like then the school can not function properly and they do 
not learn wouldn't you say so. Do you know how many pupils are at 
this school that have behavioural problems? Who are on conduct 
sheets? Is it absolutely necessary to record this? 
S: No Ican turn it off. 
Whilst this is quite a lengthy extract, it reveals Ms. Witherspoon's belief that children in 
general needed adult constraint and control, and that Hillend's children in particular were 
lacking in this. Her perception seemed to be that these children were out of control and 
needed to be civilised. The imputation being that the school playground, or more 
correctly those who inhabited its space, were unruly and in need of transformation into 
something more civilised or more `tamed' (Simpson 2000: 65). 1 did not necessarily 
agree with Ms. Witherspoon's opinion. When I ventured the contrary opinion that I did 
not think that the situation was quite as bad as Ms. Witherspoon thought I was reminded 
of my non-expert status and my lack of knowledge on the running of schools. 
There also seemed to be an aspect of resocialisation in Ms. Witherspoon's comments. 
This is something that Davis et al. (2000: 208-209) discuss in their account of research 
with disabled children: 
`One of our aims, on entering the school, was to discuss issues of 
informed consent, confidentiality and so forth with the staff and 
children (Alderson 1995: Morrow and Richards 1996). John explained 
these issues to the staff. However, they appeared to reject the premise 
that the children would know what was going on. The adults whom 
258 
John met seemed concerned that he understood that the children's 
impairments made them `not like us'. The staff appeared to challenge 
John's idea that he should explain the research to the children, we as a 
team were reminded of Wax's (1971) comments that people will often 
try to resocialise the researcher. It was clear that the staff were 
attempting to influence John's views and have him believe that these 
children were incapable of thinking for themselves. ' 
Although the issues involved are different, it appears that Ms. Witherspoon attempted if 
not to resocialise me then to re-educate me about appropriate standards of pupil 
behaviour in school and the reasons why `civility' was necessary. Perhaps, Ms. 
Witherspoon was quite right to do so. After all I did not have either the experience or 
legitimacy of a teacher, nor could I claim to have any professional insight into the 
administrative task of `running a school'. I was merely a student and former youth 
worker, neither of which gave me any expert status on schools or any insight into the 
`realities of the field' from an educational point of view. Perhaps, if I had been 
experienced and expert my views might have been different. From here on in I decided 
that the offering of opinions `onsite' were best avoided unless absolutely necessary, in 
which case I would attempt to be vague and non-committal. In part, this decision was 
influenced by my perception that Ms. Witherspoon was not fully supportive of my 
presence in the school and my related anxiety that should I offend her then I might be 
asked to leave. In any case, her attitude towards me continued to appear less than 
259 
favourable and the conversations we did have remained uneasy although we were polite 
on the surface. 
It would be far too easy to portray a wholly negative picture of Ms. Witherspoon. It 
would also be very misleading. Whilst, she did embark in crusade like fashion on her 
project to impose adult constraints and `civilise' the children, many of the changes she 
made were informed by concerns she had about the well-being and safety of the children 
or principles she held about fairness and equality. However, it would be equally true to 
say that many of the changes she initiated appeared to have been driven by her personal 
preferences and beliefs. 
Reconfiguring the Field of Heterogeneous Possibilities 
Changes that are made within the formal culture in schools usually produce, as a 
consequence, changes within the informal pupil culture (Swain 2002; Pollard 1985; 
Woods 1990). Whilst Ms. Witherspoon made a series of rapid and considerable changes 
to the formal school rules governing pupil behaviour and the sanctions for the 
transgression of these rules, I wish only to reiterate those that directly related to 
playground activities and were therefore directly related to my research site within the 
school. 
The new rules that were developed in relation to playground activities can be classified in 
two categories that aid the discussion in terms of my analysis. First, there were a series of 
rules directed towards changing the social (human) composition of the interactional 
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spaces of the playground. Second, there was the series of rules that changed and eroded 
the circulation and participation of nonhuman artefacts in the playground. The 
combination of both types of rules eventually resulted in an almost total and unforeseen 
destruction of the existing social order of the playground. Before moving to consider the 
cumulative effects of these rules for the children, I will outline below those that had the 
most impact and the changes that they produced. 
Changes to Social Heterogeneity 
The former of these were primarily aimed at addressing the use of space by children. In 
particular, they were aimed at controlling boy's domination of the physical space of the 
playground and the marginalisation of younger pupils within this space. The solution to 
the problem of younger children's marginalisation was considered to be the creation of a 
separate playground. This consisted of a physical division of the space of the playground 
(symbolised by the erection of a fence) into two separate asymmetrical spaces. The 
smaller of these was designated for the exclusive use of the children in classes one, two 
and three (ages 5-8) and the larger for the children in classes four and upwards (ages 8- 
12). 
This strategy of spatial division was also applied to address the issue of male domination 
of the playground. As the male children's spatial domination of the playground was seen 
to be directly connected to their monopolising use of the playground space for football 
games, a small football pitch was marked out in white paint in a corner of the playground. 
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In both cases the motivations that informed these changes were interwoven with notions 
of fairness in relation to both the gendered and `aged' distribution of space and also 
concerns over the safety of younger children amongst the rough and tumble of older 
boys' physical contact sports. In particular, the frequency with which younger children 
incurred relatively minor injuries as a result of, for example, collisions with footballs or 
footballers was considered problematic. 
In an article on gendered relations in school playgrounds, Epstein et a!. (2001: 165) 
discuss under the sub heading `caging the beast' a school playground that already had a 
separate football playing area referred to by the children in their study as `the cage'. As it 
became apparent that Ms. Witherspoon disapproved of competitive sports (in particular 
football which she considered distasteful for its associations with what she considered to 
be the `sport of hooligans'; the aggressiveness that she perceived it gave rise to; and the 
culture of profanity it promoted) I have wondered if Ms. Witherspoon herself had been 
attempting to `cage the beast', so to speak. In any case it is worth noting that changes 
made to these sorts of sporting activities within the school did appear to be subject to Ms. 
Witherspoon's preferences. 
In discussing similar sorts of preferences by teachers in a school where all competitive 
sports and games that involved physical contact were banned, Swain (2002) considers 
that, since there are positive values to be learned through sport, the school should have 
spent more time considering and promoting these rather than negatively focusing upon its 
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less desirable virtues. As discussed later, the negative focus on these sorts of activities, 
particularly football, continued at Hillend. 
Both of these spatial divisions had, however, despite positive outcomes for many 
children, separate but also interrelated and hitherto unanticipated consequences for the 
social order of the playground. The rules governing the uses of these spaces were, as 
would be expected, that each of the two playgrounds were for the exclusive use of the 
designated class groups (the smaller playground for classes one through to three and the 
larger for classes four and upwards) and that football was banned from all areas other 
than the newly introduced `pitch area'. 
Unsurprisingly, many children considered the new regime unfair. The footballing 
children were particularly vocal about the new spatial arrangements. However, their 
opinions were based on the unsuitable size of the pitch for the game rather than the fact 
that the game was only to played within this area: 
Mitchell: Its totsie we cannae play right you can hardly play. 
Dale: See the goals are too wee so you can't score cos you can't get 
past the goalie. 
Therefore, the dissatisfaction with the pitch was not the creation of the pitch itself but 
with the consequences that its small size had for the game. Had the pitch been bigger and 
less constricting of the game then the footballing children would have been quite happy 
with this arrangement: 
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Scott: It's good to have a pitch for the rules cos it's marked out like a 
real pitch but even fives dinnae get played on a titchy pitch. Even fives 
have a proper pitch. 
The new pitch was therefore received unfavourably by the children. However, the 
division of the space into two playgrounds had other consequences for not only football 
but other playground activities. 
The act of dividing the space and therefore dividing the children into two large cohorts 
overlooked the fact that not all of the `activity groups' in the playground were stringently 
formed according to either age or class strata. It was common within the playground for 
there to be a mix of ages within these activity groups and also, although less frequently, 
gender. This observation does not coincide with the findings of others on the composition 
of children's friendship groups. A large number of studies have made observations about 
the tendency of children's friendship groups to comprise children who share similar 
attributes or characteristics, for example, age and gender (cf. Hartup 1970; Schofield 
1989; Thorne 1986). Amplifying this view, Adler and Adler (2001: 116) state that the 
close friendships they observed within school, `tended to be age and gender 
homogenous'. The cause of this they attribute to both structural and cultural conditions. 
They argue that because schools organise children and their activities through age- 
grading and children experience school in age-segregated groups, they are not given 
much opportunity to interact with children of other ages (cf. James et al. 1998). In 
addition to this, they argue that children prefer to interact with others of the same age 
(and gender). 
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Whilst this may correspond more directly to a general picture of age related interactions, 
despite age stratification at the structural level within the school, within Hillend 
playground inter-class relations were much more fluid. The `bey-blading' group, for 
example, consisted of children from all class groups. What mattered was not the age of 
the participant but their skill at bey-blading. Additionally, more experienced, and usually 
older bey-bladers seemed to derive a sense of satisfaction from the passing on of skills to 
younger children and the act of encouraging younger players as they participated. What 
held this and other activity groups like them together was a shared interest rather than a 
shared attribute such as age or gender. Therefore, gender segregation during autonomous 
play outside of the classroom setting was not as rare as authors such as Thorne (1993) 
have previously suggested, although, cross-gender interaction was much less prevalent 
than mixed age interaction. 
The division of the playground into two segregated playgrounds therefore disrupted the 
structure of many activity groups. Many of the younger children who had been involved 
in activity groups with older children attempted to `reform' through continuing their 
activities in their new playground. However, for those younger children involved in the 
footballing group, the fact that they were excluded from the area in which the `pitch' was 
located resulted in their being unable to reform under the new regime. 
Attempts to `sneak' into the playground containing the pitch were commonplace and 
sometimes actively encouraged by the remaining footballers who frequently suggested 
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that these younger children scaled the dividing fence. Attempts at sneaking into the 
football area were, however, usually quickly thwarted by whichever teacher was on 
supervisory duty. Being caught usually led to much pleading from the children to be 
allowed to take part in the football and just as much subsequent complaining about the 
fact that they were not given permission to do so. Supervisors often couched their 
reasons for refusing access by recourse to either rules or by telling the children `it was for 
their own good' and that `they would get hurt playing with the bigger boys'. 
Some of these younger children, however, had to deal with more personally experienced 
repercussions because of the division of the playground into two parts. For some, the 
division of the playground eroded their social support networks within the school. In 
particular younger children found themselves parted from siblings who had previously 
played an on-going `care-giving' or `protective' role in their school lives. One such child 
was Lewis whom I introduced to the reader in Chapter Six. Lewis, who was frequently 
chastised for his small physical size in relation to others of his own age group, had been 
moderately dependent upon his older brother Aaron to intervene in chastising episodes 
within the playground. However, succeeding the physical division of the younger and 
older children in playground Lewis was unable to rely upon Aaron's support. As a 
consequence, Lewis began and continued to experience a rising level of chastisement 
which was occasionally called to a halt by the playground supervisor. 
As Downey and Condron (2004) point out, the vast majority of research on sibling 
relationships assess and report on the negative aspects and consequences of these 
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relationships. In relation to what is here, consensually considered to be a form of 
bullying, it is overwhelmingly the case that sibling involvement in bullying is considered 
in the context of the sibling-perpetrator role (cf. Wolke and Samara 2004). Therefore, the 
positive benefits that siblings can gain from each other have had a tendency to be 
overlooked. Corsaro (1997) for example, draws attention to the varied and positive roles 
that siblings occupy in relation to each other. Amongst these Corsaro (1997) highlights 
that siblings often act as caretakers and protectors for each other. Additionally, he 
highlights that siblings can play an important role in integrating their often younger 
siblings into the peer culture. These positive roles were evident in the relationship 
between Aaron and Lewis. For instance, in addition to the protection that Aaron gave 
Lewis he also included Lewis in his activities with his own friends which had the effect 
of minimising the opportunity for other children to call him names. 
Another example of the negative effects of losing access to a sibling within the school 
was Alannah, a wheelchair using pupil. Alannah's older sister Helen had usually assisted 
her with lavatory visits during recreational breaks, although, not because Alannah could 
not negotiate the use of the lavatory but because of the time it took her to perform the 
task. These `care-giving' roles by siblings have been commonly recognised and 
researched (cf. Burke and Montgomery 2000) however, because it was officially 
considered unnecessary for Alannah's sister to assist her in this activity, Alannah's own 
complaint about not being near her sister anymore was dismissed. Alannah herself was 
angry about this because it meant that if she needed to use the lavatory during break times 
267 
then she would inevitably spend more or less the whole of the break time engaged in this 
task. 
In order to subvert the loss of recreational time with friends, Alannah had begun to 
schedule in lavatory visits during class time instead. However, because her parents 
eventually complained about the situation Alannah's sister was given permission to enter 
the smaller playground in order to assist Alannah in any necessary lavatory visits. For 
both girls this meant a complicated chain of communication arose through the use of 
`third party' children who acted as messengers between Alannah and her sister. This 
infuriated Alannah's sister who had been enjoying the freedom of being able to engage 
with her own friends without having to assist her younger sister: 
Helen: well it's really annoying because I'm doing things and then 
someone tells me your sister wants you and I have to go. If I don't go 
then she tells my mum and dad at home time and I get into a lot of 
trouble and they tell me that I'm being selfish and have to help her and I 
wouldn't like to spend all my playtime in the toilet and everything but 
then if I have to go then I do a lot of playtime in the toilet. Sometimes 
she takes ages and doesn't even do it. 
Therefore, Helen had been enjoying the new freedom she had been experiencing because 
of the new playgrounds, which draws attention to the fact that for some children there 
were positive benefits to be gained in the arrangements. 
As I mentioned previously, the negative focus on football continued. Ms. Witherspoon 
constructed a new rule about the use of the football pitch. This rule was created because 
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of complaints received from pupils about exclusion from the pitch. In order to overcome 
these issues of inequality in access a rota system was devised to stagger access to the 
pitch. Briefly stated each class group could only use the pitch if it was their designated 
day. Thus, class four could use the pitch on a Monday, class five on a Tuesday, class six 
on a Wednesday and class seven on a Thursday. On a Friday no one was to use the pitch. 
Although seemingly enacted for the best of reasons, this caused considerable anger 
amongst the core footballing group. However, the reason for this anger was not primarily 
to do with the new rota but with how this disrupted the composition of the `teams' and 
the effects it had upon their `league' system. The fact that footballing children did not 
play in age dependent teams and that they did not necessarily (indeed they rarely did) 
play intra-class matches had been completely overlooked: 
Pigeon (Craig): Its totally crap by the way like because the teams right. 
We have teams and we have a league and now we can't play the league 
and our team was at the top and guess what right `ticket booth' (Scott) 
was our best player right and now he's off the team cos he's in P6. 
There isnae even enough in our class for a game. 
Apart from the disruption to the footballer's teams, their league and their opportunities to 
play football there were playground wide ramifications caused almost entirely because 
there was now a playground full of displaced footballers unable to regularly or 
constructively engage in playing football. Pitch invasions where the footballers tried to 
resurrect their normal teams and league system were stopped by the supervisor on duty. 
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As football was banned from other areas of the playground attempts to start up games 
elsewhere within the playground were also stopped relatively quickly. 
The class based rota system that was in place failed dismally. The primary reason for this 
was that each class on its own did not have enough footballers within it for `good games' 
to get underway. In mimicking professional football, the footballers considered that 
games should be played properly with eleven members on each team, each playing their 
own position. No alternative team system was considered as good. The football playing 
that did occur were `kick abouts' rather than games. 
It seemed however, that where there was a will there was a way. It transpired that in 
order to subvert the football rules the footballers had been congregating in the school 
playground to play their matches and continue their league in the early morning period 
before school and before teachers arrived for the day. The official match meeting time 
was eight-fifteen a. m. The janitor apparently being sympathetic had colluded with these 
children, opening the gates before the usual eight-thirty a. m. to let the children into the 
school grounds. However, the situation did eventually come to the attention of the 
teachers and Ms. Witherspoon who took the rather contrary decision to ignore the 
situation on account of it being out of official school hours. 
During the school day however, a relatively large number of boys without recourse to 
football became problematic for the rest of the activity groups. The displaced footballers' 
began to engage in the systematic disruption of the activities of other groups. With the 
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exception of a few of the now previous footballing children, this sort of behaviour was 
uncharacteristic. A favourite new game that a cohort of the previous footballers began to 
indulge in was `wrestler raiding'. This involved launching a rapid charge upon the group 
of children who played wrestling matches with action figures, running past them, and 
stopping momentarily to steal the action figures before running on and throwing them 
onto the shelter shed roof. This led to frequent outbreaks of squabbling and fights much 
to the frustration of whatever teacher was on supervision duty. 
However, it was not only the footballing children who were displaced because of the 
changes made to the playing of football at Hillend. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, 
many non-footballing children, particularly girls, had spent their break times on the side 
lines of the games of football that had taken place. These children were highly involved 
in the game as `spectators' and much of their talk oscillated around the game and the 
players. This positioning of the spectators around the fringes of football games was, I 
felt, misconstrued as marginalisation. That is not to say that there was not a problem of 
spatial marginalisation for some children but rather that it is was not as much of a 
problem as Ms. Witherspoon had perhaps thought. That this was indeed a `framing' 
behaviour became all the more apparent when the new pitch area was first introduced. 
When football moved to the new pitch, the `framers' moved also. These `framers' moved 
from framing football to hanging about the fringes of the displaced cohort and soliciting 
the new destructive activities such as `wrestler raiding'. 
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The movement of footballers and their spectators had created a larger playing space for 
other children and other activity groups there was little movement into the open space 
that was left from the removal of football from the main area of the playground. There 
was a small and discernable encroachment of activity groups and children but for the 
most part they continued to conduct their activities in clusters around the margins of the 
space. Again, here there seemed to be a misperception about spatial marginalisation. 
However, there had been an ordered and stable use of the spaces of the playground by 
children which, was perhaps, given the lack of movement into the new `free' space, was 
much more engrained into the social order than it appeared. 
In an article on the invisible play-lines of a primary school playground, Factor (2004: 143) 
has argued that children develop: 
`... a map of the school grounds which designates functions and 
attributes values to every major feature: open space, treed space, 
benches, shelter-shed, toilets, grass, asphalt, tree roots, scheduled 
corners, verandahs, rubbish bins.... ' 
Factor's argument is that children in their relationship with the material aspects of their 
playground environment develop meanings about the various uses of its particular 
features, for example, where particular games are played. She argues that this sort of 
map develops over time, sometimes over generations but remains invisible to `outsiders'. 
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Factor (2004: 142) compares children's playground maps to the supposed terra nullius 
(empty land) of traditional Australian Aboriginal Societies: 
`... tribal territory is inscribed in the memory of its community through 
song and story-lines: invisible tracks that trace the history, meaning and 
use of every significant feature of the environment. Each place has its 
own story, its own melody and often is own special importance for a 
particular family. To an outsider, it is just a landscape of trees, rocks, 
water... without close, patient and attentive listening and learning from 
the traditional owners of this land, the song and story-lines that mark 
every inch of their earth are unknown and unknowable to the non- 
initiated. Outsiders cannot read the invisible tracks that hold the land 
and its people in such close embrace. ' 
Thus, Factor (2004: 143) argues that there are similarities between the Aboriginal terra 
nullius and children's playgrounds, in so far, as neither are empty lands but lands infused 
with meaning, each space or feature with its own particular importance. 
Factor's arguments, I believe hold some relevance for Hillend playground. In particular, 
they draw attention to what could be considered the `invisible playlines of Hillend'. The 
children at Hillend had a well developed `map' of the meanings of particular spaces and 
features of the playground and the uses of these spaces and features. What could appear 
to the outsider as a random and disorganised use of the playground space was in fact not 
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random at all. Rather, the converse was true. It appeared that it was more the case that 
the children had a very fixed and stable set of (unspoken) story lines about the spaces and 
features of the playground and their uses for particular activities. This was revealed in 
their repeated uses of the same spaces and features for their particular activities and the 
relative non-movement of these activities from these spaces and features following the 
spatial changes made at Hillend in the interests of `freeing up' space for marginalised 
children. In making these spatial changes to the playground, it was quite obvious that 
there was little understanding of children's uses of the spaces of the playground and the 
meanings children invested in these sites. 
Whilst I have given considerable space to discussing the various changes to social 
heterogeneity within the playground and the events that followed these changes, I have 
been doing so in order to (re)emphasise that heterogeneous networks also consist of 
human actants that children enrol into their networks. The disruption of human elements 
within the `field of heterogeneous possibilities' at Hillend was as important at the 
disruption of material heterogeneity. Although not always negative, for many children 
the consequences of removing or restricting the possible roles that their regular human 
allies could play had quite disastrous effects. Below, I move to consider the changes to 
material heterogeneity that occurred. 
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Changes to Material Heterogeneity 
In part, changes to the materially heterogeneous were already occurring as a by-product 
of the changes made to the social heterogeneity of the playground. The footballers, who 
have figured largely here because of the knock-on effects of their displacements for the 
majority of children, were, for example, without the binding function and ordering effects 
of the football as quasi-object. Without this object and lacking an immediate other, they 
had already began resorting to the `powers of the body' (Law 1997). The framers who 
also had an indirect relationship to this quasi-object and now lacking their once-removed 
relationship to it, had in following the displaced and unbound footballers, nothing else to 
do than develop an indirect relationship with these unmediated bodies. However, the 
more explicit changes to the material field of heterogeneous possibilities began in relation 
to the subversive early morning pre-school football matches that had been taking place. 
As previously discussed, the staff and Ms. Witherspoon had chosen to tolerate these early 
morning indiscretions. Believing that they had been successfully accomplishing a small 
triumph over their head teacher the children were quite vocal about what they considered 
to be a very clever move on their part and one which was aided by their adult accomplice 
and now hero, the Janitor37: 
Jordan: We dinnae even use the pitch and they haven't even noticed 
and Bill the jannie lets us in and he doesnae even tell them. 
Stephen: Ken right they haven't even noticed the dosses. 
" In relation to the arguments advanced above about the relationship that children forged with their 
playground environment and the meanings that they attach to particular features and spaces, I believe that it 
is very `telling' that these footballing children were using their `traditional' football space in these early 
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Of course the head teacher did know. However, the children's triumph was short lived. 
Several weeks into the early morning fixture routine the second of two broken windows, 
firmly established as the result of unruly footballs used in these games, led to the total 
ban of these early morning games, games of football altogether and the presence of 
footballs in the playground. Any one who was caught with a football would forfeit their 
privilege to `golden time'38. 
This naturally went down like a lead balloon, so to speak. It also outraged some parents 
who were sympathetic to their children's complaints that they were no longer allowed to 
play football at school. One parent remarked how they thought it was `ridiculous' and 
how, for the children who, like his child, was less academically gifted but excelled 
athletically this and the news that sports day would no longer consist of competitive 
games was giving the message to sporty children that their abilities were of no value. 
Moreover, this parent remarxed that for some of the children, particularly boys, football 
was one of the few aspects of school that they looked forward to each day. 
The entire ban on footballs, however, signified the beginning of the process of removing 
the material from Hillend playground and the concurrent and incremental erosion of the 
social order of the playground that resulted as a consequence of this. It is apparent 
morning games. This suggests the strong sense of attachment that these children had with this space for 
their activity and their reluctance to let this space go. 
38 This formed part of the school's policy on discipline. Golden time referred to a set time on a Friday 
afternoon when the children were allowed to engage in `free play' as a reward for good behaviour. This 
often involved trips out of school to the local park or some other venue. As such the time was highly 
valued by children and exclusion from it was a source of much anguish as transgressions resulted in this 
time being withheld. 
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however, that there was a peculiar gender bias in this removal in so far as this removal 
seemed to primarily concentrate on the objects that boys brought into the playground. 
Whilst never couched in these terms it seemed that Ms. Witherspoon held objections to 
anything that symbolised aggressive forms of masculinity. 
Soon after the removal of footballs the children were complaining that they were no 
longer allowed to bring in their action figures. This included (amongst other forms) the 
wrestling figures of the large wrestling activity group. The reasons advanced for this by 
the teaching staff were related to the arguments and fights that were continuously 
following the `wrestling raids' of the displaced footballers. The wrestling activity was 
considered to be the source of the problem, although, the problem was transferred to the 
presence of the action figures themselves. The connection between displaced, bored 
footballers and wrestling raids went unrecognised. 
Other material objects were withdrawn because of issues of intra-activity group disputes. 
Ms. Witherspoon considered that the bringing of personal possessions into school was 
one of the primary reasons, for conflict in the playground. Other teachers within the 
school appeared to support this view because, amongst other things, they considered that 
resolving issues between children about breakages to their possessions, non-return of 
borrowed or exchanged objects between children, accusations of theft of objects between 
children and the whole general business of the quarrels that took place over toys, took up 
not only class time but also their own coffee breaks. 
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The gradual removal of the material ultimately reached its climax when a letter was sent 
out to parents of children informing them that personal possessions were no longer 
permitted to be brought into school by children and that children found with personal 
possessions would have them confiscated for the duration of the school day. This new 
policy had the singular effect of bringing about an en masse removal of material artefacts 
from the playground. In doing so, it brought about profound changes in the material field 
of heterogeneous possibilities that had a direct and almost immediate impact on 
children's capacities to act and the social relations within the playground. 
Unmediated Bodies, The Moment of Purification and Confusion in the Field 
Following this en masse removal only bodies remained in Hillend playground. I have 
come to refer to this period in the biography of Hillend as `the moment of purification'. I 
have done so because the absence of objects implied that within this interactional setting, 
stripped as it was of objects, the possibility of an impure quasi-subject (Latour 1993) 
became remote (although, and as I discuss latterly, this purified moment was a temporary 
state). In doing so, however, I speak only to the fact that the mundane artefacts and 
objects of childhood were no longer visible nor present in the immediate interactional 
scene. To imply that the absence of these nonhuman participants rendered Hillend a 
`pure society' would necessarily imply that Hillend playground and its human inhabitants 
were in some way free from other networks of association. Indeed this is not the case. 
ANT speaks quite clearly of its view that the task of purifying anything is somewhat 
impossible, as Prout (2000: 15) states: 
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`In this view social life cannot, therefore, be reduced to the `purely' 
human (adult or child) or to the `purely' anything'. 
Invoking the notion of purification here, as an analytical strategy, was conceptually 
useful when applied to the immediate interactional setting wherein a separation of 
humans from things had occurred. However, the humans that remained were, for the 
most part, characterised by their passive and inactive bodies - bodies that did not appear 
to be able to act or interact. 
Connecting this inactive state with the removal of the material and, therefore, changes 
within the field of heterogeneous possibilities was not immediate. As I discussed in 
Chapter One, my own interaction with actor-network theory was sporadic and somewhat 
tense and I had not been wholly convinced that it had any inherent value. Thus, my 
interest in the nonhuman had progressed somewhat tentatively. However, and as I also 
discussed in Chapter One, it was at this point in the field that I became converted to 
actor-network theory. Therefore, there has been an element of `tracing back' in my 
analysis. However, before considering the `moment of purification' more thoroughly, I 
would like first to present to the reader a short narrative that communicates the state of 
my thinking at the time of inaction. In doing so, I am in part asking the reader to try to 
see these events through my eyes. 
Picture if you can a school playground full of children, nothing but children - nothing but 
bodies. Can you picture such a playground? Maybe you can because this is what you usually 
see. Perhaps you do not look further than the swirling mass of bodies contained there. You do 
not look because bodies, what they do and what they say is, we have been told, our raison 
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d'etre. I- like you, believe(ed) in this. Yet, I have just read an article by Annemarie Mol and 
Jessica Mesman (1996). It has nothing to do with school playgrounds but everything to do with 
what it is we see or more properly look at or listen to. They have reminded me (albeit in a 
round-of -about sort of way) that my watching of and listening to bodies (and only this) does 
not take into account what lies beyond the somatic - beyond and between those bodies that I see 
and hear in / on the school playground. They have reminded me that in rendering holy the ethnograpahic injunction to follow the actor' I have deleted from view those other actors that 
inhabit the social - Latour's (1992) 'missing masses' and his call to follow the things 
themselves'. 
Now it is not so much that I am deleting them as ignoring them. I have been happy to reduce 
the 'missing masses' to the category of 'other- the category of the non-social. To do otherwise 
seems to be a perversion of my constructionist /constructivist roots in which I have been 
thoroughly immersed throughout my sociological training. Now Annemarie Mol and Jessica 
Mesman are reminding me that if I keep this up: 
'... before long Bruno Latour will point his fnger.. [and ask].. are you aware of your 
discriminatory biases? ' You are discriminating between the human and the inhuman'. 
However, I have chosen to discriminate none-the-less and find it is easily done. I am perfectly 
aware of the existence of these, 'missing masses' (I can see them in their many forms in the 
school playground - balls, skateboards, beyblades, action figures and all the rest) and I am 
happy to discriminate (I am sure the balls et al will not kick up a fuss). I have drawn the 
boundaries of my analysis around that which I consider to be human. Now and again, I have 
reasoned I can allow these 'missing masses' - these mere things -a walk on part, so to speak. I 
can, as others have done before me, confine them to the margins in discussions of material 
culture (cf. Mergen 1992; Sutton-Smith 1986). No one will criticise me in following the 
orthodoxy. If they do I can call on those others who defend the orthodoxy. Harre (2002) for 
example defends it very well, , although 
he too is calling on others. Of course ANT has 
something to say about this calling on others in such ways but I am trying to forget that for 
now. 
So it has gone quite well this plan to ignore the missing masses. I have two favourite 
methodological texts that I am quite sure have told me everything I need to know in order to 
properly attend to the business of ethnographic fieldwork without any attempt to undermine 
humanism. However, my favourite texts betray me. They dissent (.! ) and take their voices with 
them. The school playground is suddenly different. The swirling mass of bodies is suddenly 
different. They behave differently. At first they are apathetic; subdued. There is talk but no 
movement. Words but little sound. I am at odds trying to figure out where all the action has 
gone. My favourite texts have no advice for me. I consult others (texts) but they refuse my offer 
of enrolment (I). I can not even reason that I am somehow missing the action - that it is, as 
they say, happening elsewhere - given the small size of the playground and the fact I can, if I 
strategically position myself so, pretty much see it all. 
Then chaos... 
280 
Many of the bodies have become anarchistic, violent, destructive, angry.. frustrated. Others 
have become more withdrawn. There is no order to speak of At least none that I can see. I 
have no answer to this. I am puzzled by it. Much worse, the school staff (who are equally 
puzzled) have approached me for answers I do not have: 
'You must know you've been watching them. What's going on then? ' 
I have thought about hiding my ignorance by recourse to ethics (argue my data is confidential) 
but admit I do not know. 
7 thought you knew about those things. ' 
Suddenly I am expected to have 'expert status' after spending the whole fieldwork period so far 
being denied any. My ignorance is announced in my apparent absence: 
'that student doesn't know'. 
'doesn't she' 
'no she says she doesn 't' 
'what use is she then' 
Total humiliation then. Marvellous. 
At the time that these unexplained changes occurred they remained just that - unexplained. I 
had searched in the usual places for a comparative case hoping to find answers to this puzzle. 
However, the answer (if I can call it that) was always in front of me in the writings of Callon, 
Akrich, Latour, Law and those others in the 'CALL-collective' (Vandenberghe 2002:. 51), in 
their incitements to consider the 'missing masses' , enrolment to which 
I had resisted. Had I 
broken with tradition at the time and treated these 'missing masses' as actants and not 'mere 
things' then I would have recognised their role in the configuration and reconfiguration of the 
space of the playground and the social relations therein. In addition I would also have 
recognised that these children had embodied their social relations not only in each other but 
also in sets of extra- somatic materials and objects of various kinds, in the process producing 
something stable and ordered and relatively durable. More importantly, I would have 
recognised that the changes that I could only describe but not explain were changes brought 
about by the removal of these materials and objects - by the 'missing masses' going missing. 
Most crucially, the moment of purification was not characterised by social interaction but 
rather by the relative absence of it. It was marked by stillness and quiet and by passive 
not active children who behaved as if struck by an inability to act. A setting, which 
during early fieldwork had been alive with the noise and movement of children at play, 
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had become almost stagnant. However, at first I struggled to understand the situation - 
why it was so still and more importantly why it had become so: 
Fieldnote: 
No one seems to be doing anything. No one is playing. No one is even 
talking much. Kids look bored, lost, fed-up, dejected. Everything is 
quiet. Why are they so quiet? It's eerie - strange, unsettling - not what 
a children's playground should be, not the way it usually is. 
Children's play spaces whether formal or informal, structured or unstructured are usually 
characterised by activity and interaction. Indeed, this is one of the reasons that play 
spaces of various sorts are so alluring for ethnographers. Given the setting therefore, I 
considered the children's behaviour as somewhat aberrant. However, whilst I considered 
the abnormality (at least in my own opinion) of a playground full of children but more or 
less absent of action / interaction, it rapidly began to emerge that the meaning of this state 
of quietness and inactivity amongst the children held an entirely different meaning for the 
school staff. 
Rather than perceiving the situation as perhaps abnormal in the same manner as I had 
done, for the most part, the staff considered the situation as ideal. The children's 
behaviour seemed to have concurred with widely held beliefs amongst the staff about 
orderliness, civility and comportment within the school environment. For example, 
previously, Ms. Witherspoon had considered the noise level of the school playground as 
evidence of disorderly pupil conduct and the hustle and bustle of the activities the 
children engaged in as further proof of the same. Thus, to the staff, hushed children in an 
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almost silent and motionless playground were collectively considered to be `good' 
children and thus good pupils in the sense that their behaviours conformed with 
embodied notions of what constituted ideal pupil conduct: being quiet (not shouting), 
walking properly (not running), standing or sitting still (not moving around) and so on 
(c£ Simpson 2000; Gilborn 1990). 
Many comments were made amongst the staff regarding how peaceful the break times 
had become. In particular, the staff seemed pleased about the reduction in the numbers of 
children who presented themselves at the staffroom door during these times. The staff 
had often complained about their own break times being constantly interrupted by 
children who presented complaints of various sorts. The decline in the frequency and 
volume of this was welcomed largely because the staff had been experiencing the unusual 
phenomena of uninterrupted coffee breaks. One teacher had commented upon how this 
had been the first time in several years service she had been able to look forward to a 
relaxing break during school hours safe in the knowledge that it would not consist of 
having to attend to `crying and whinging pupils'. Moreover, she had added that the staff 
no longer had to contend with `the bloody din' that resonated throughout the school 
during break times. 
It had occurred to me that throughout my time at Hillend that the behaviour of pupils was 
constantly interpreted by staff in terms of whether pupil behaviour did or did not benefit 
their adult concerns. Here, the fact that the staff could enjoy uninterrupted and peaceful 
breaks was considered as evidence that the children's behaviour had improved. Thus, 
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while I had considered the children's behaviour as unnatural, the staff had considered the 
same behaviour as idea139. Furthermore, peaceful break times - as the result of the 
metamorphosis of `unruly bodies' into `docile bodies'- were transformed, amongst other 
things, into evidence of the success of Ms. Witherspoon's wider project to bring order to 
Hillend school. 
Yet, I still struggled to understand where all the action had gone. Retrospectively, that 
this should have been the case is unsettling to say the least. When these events were 
unfolding at Hillend, my focus was very much upon understanding generic social 
processes. Thus, I had been concentrating upon social processes and therefore upon 
human action. However, when faced with a situation where only social processes could 
occur and where human action was the only possible action that could unfold, I found 
that this approach was wholly unsatisfactory in its explanatory power. That it should 
have been so was interminably puzzling at the time. 
Let me pose this another way through drawing on the thought of Latour and Strum. In 
the purified moment, social (or human) actors were the only actors within Hillend 
playground. This having been the case, it stands to reason then, that what I should have 
found was perhaps something akin to the society of pure social interaction (interaction 
unmediated by the material), that Latour and Strum (1986,1987) have proposed exists, 
39 Of course I have never had to deal with the noise level of over one hundred children at play on any sort 
of regular basis. More to the point at this stage I was also interminably worried about the ethnographic 
implications of there being `no action'. Thus, break times that were characterised by quiet and inactive 
children did not, at the time, seem all that ideal to me. 
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not in human societies but in simian ones. This proposition forms part of the answer to a 
question posed by Latour (1996) that has relevance here. 
Effectively, Latour asked what would a society look like if it consisted only of social 
interaction? In so doing, he argued that such a society cannot exist in the human world 
given that, the human world is saturated with nonhumans - technology, artefacts, texts 
and so on - and bodies everywhere are inscribed. However, Strum and Latour (1987) 
have argued that societies consisting only of social elements do exist but in simian not 
human societies. 
Drawing upon research that has demonstrated that it is social skills and social bonds 
rather than aggression based dominance and sexual bonds that hold groups of baboons 
together (Murdoch 1997); Strum and Latour (1987: 789 cited in Murdoch 1997) have 
argued that as it is now recognised that baboons utilise a range of social skills to interact 
with each other, in a variety of complex ways, baboons are now considered to be `social 
players actively negotiating and renegotiating what their society is and what it will be'. 
Latour (1996: 229) has taken this point, rather mischievously in Murdoch's (1997) view, 
to argue that: 
`Since the effects of the composition of the social depend on work by 
individual actors which is continually being started over, one could 
draw the conclusion that the social life of monkeys is apparently an 
ethnomethodological paradise. Social constructionism literally depends 
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solely on the work of the actors themselves to hold things together, and 
depends crucially on their categories alone' (cited in Murdoch 1997). 
Whilst it may offend some to liken children to baboons, it is both analytically useful and 
illustrative here to invoke a comparison between baboon society ä la Latour and Strum 
and the children of Hillend. 
In the moment of purification the children of Hillend, like Latour's baboons, essentially 
comprised a society that consisted only of social elements and in which only social 
interactions could occur. Bearing this and the rest of Latour's postulations in mind, I have 
considered that perhaps what I should have observed at Hillend was a society of pure 
interaction. That is, one which was solely composed of and solely dependent upon human 
participants and their interactions - thus the phrase `the moment of purification'. 
So it seemed that in this micro-setting at least I could have relied, quite legitimately (and 
without any accusations of anthropocentrism) upon making one category of entities - 
humans - do all the explaining. Although, as Prout (2000: 15) reminds us: 
`Sociological approaches that try to make one kind of entity do all the 
explanatory work result in some form of reductionism'. 
At this point in time actor-network theory had failed thus far to seduce me. Therefore, I 
had been actively attempting to make one sort of entity (humans) do all the explaining. 
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However, in these ideal typical circumstances this failed to provide satisfactory 
explanations beyond the connection between Ms. Witherspoon's reforms and this new 
situation within the playground. The consequent changes to the existing social order of 
the playground seemed the most probable explanation for the sea of docile bodies that 
had come to occupy the spaces of Hillend playground. 
Yet, this explanatory schema did not provide any obvious reason or reasons as to exactly 
why, regardless of the extent or effects of these reforms, these children lost the capacity 
to act in any but the most rudimentary of ways. More pressingly and perhaps naively, I 
had been becoming concerned about what this meant for my data collection or more 
accurately what it meant for my thesis if there were no data. My perception was that I 
was heavily dependent upon these children `doing something'. Therefore, I reasoned that 
as it appeared to be the case that they were `not doing anything', I believed I was in 
trouble. As I highlighted in Chapter One, my eventual understanding of this situation was 
coupled with the words spoken to me by a child and the subsequent bringing of actor- 
network theory to the field that these words prompted. For reasons of relevancy and for 
the sake of the argument I wish to reiterate these remarks here. 
As I pointed out much earlier on in the thesis, puzzled by the situation I had asked a 
child, Stephen, who was looking bored and miserable what the matter was. He replied: 
`There is nothing to play with' 
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The reply was common enough and was a phrase I associated with children and had 
heard often but usually dismissed due to its mundaneity. However, in this particular 
instance it quite literally `stopped me in my tracks'. As I thought about the meaning in 
these words and in particular the connotations associated with the word nothing a 
different perspective began to form in my head: 
no-thing; not anything; not any thing - absence; absence of things 
And: 
It is the masses; the missing masses; the things themselves; the things have gone missing; 
there are no things. 
This was a, if not the, critical moment in my fieldwork - the elusive moment when it all 
apparently comes together. As I looked around the playground I realised what this child 
implied in these words and the poignancy of these words as they related to the then 
current conditions of these children's interactional setting. There was indeed (no)thing 
to play with - no footballs, no beyblades, no stickers to swap, no action figures to wrestle 
with, no children huddled around gameboys, no micro-machines, no micro-babies, no 
bratz.... and so the list could have gone on. 
Banished and excluded by our deconstructive fairy those nonhuman participants that 
were once woven into the fabric of the micro setting of Hillend playground were gone. 
Quasi-objects that had previously woven together the collective and brought order where 
288 
it seemed none had existed were now absent. Those distributed selves once the 
accomplishments of complex socio-technical ensembles had vanished, leaving in their 
stead confused bodies that sought pathways to reconstitution without the assistance of 
their familiar material allies, and in some cases, their social partners. 
As I gave an extensive discussion in the previous chapter of the various roles and 
functions that objects served within the playground and the various ways in which they 
extended (or restricted) children's agentic capacities and held together social relations, I 
will not repeat these arguments here. However, I wish to infer that what these events at 
Hillend illustrated was children's dependence upon these objects for their abilities to act 
and hold together their relations. This gives a rather different perspective on agency and 
social relations because it exposes these things as being dependent upon extensions of 
various kinds. Lee (2001: 130) has made this point in relation to an actor-network 
approach to agency and here Pasteur: 
`ANT gives an account of agency that does not rely on the 
independence and self-possession of the standard adult. Instead it 
emphasises incompleteness and dependency. Without his network of 
extensions and supplements, for example, Pasteur would not have been 
the agent for change we see him as today. But we have grown used to 
thinking of agency as independence because it is so easy to forget 
dependencies, extensions and supplements. Simply stated the story of 
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Pasteur as independent genius is easier to tell than the story of all his 
dependencies'. 
The story of Hillend then, can perhaps be viewed as a story of dependencies and the 
exposure of these dependencies. It is also a story about the fragility of these 
dependencies, and in particular about how children's capacity for agency is interwoven 
with what can be accomplished and with what is available within the various fields of 
heterogeneous possibilities that they move in and out of. What transpired at Hillend was 
that the networks of extensions that are available to children are forever limited by and 
subject to the influences of adults, Extensions and supplements can be taken away and in 
the process children's agentic capacities and their abilities to hold together something 
enduring and stable can be irretrievably altered. However, the story does not stop here 
with some final words about how the removal of children's supplements and extensions 
at Hillend. Many researchers have commented on how children are able to use whatever 
material and spaces are available to them for play in school playgrounds (cf. Armitage 
2001). At Hillend the children slowly began to utilise other sorts of materials that 
inhabited the playground and in doing so began to create new forms of associations. 
However, this did not occur until after they had spent a short period of time as `naked 
apes'. 
When Naked Apes Roamed 
The moment of purification was characterised not only by this period of inactivity but 
also by a second period in which the powers of the body ruled. Many of the children 
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changed from being quiet and subdued to being excessively loud, more chaotic and in 
many cases aggressive than they had ever been during my time at Hillend. In contrast to 
this, others began to withdraw into themselves. 
Playground activity began to transform into body-centred activities. For example, 
stripped of their wrestlers, the members of the action figure wrestling group replaced 
their action figure wrestling with contact wrestling. Here, mimicking televised American 
wrestling programmes they adopted various personas derived from this form of 
entertainment wrestling and began spending their break times re-enacting wrestling 
moves and scenes they watched on television. Previously they had re-enacted these 
through the use of their figurines. 
This activity drew crowds and new members from other, by now dissolved, activity 
groups. In common with televised wrestling, a certain amount of this wrestling was 
acted or choreographed, however, frequently these wrestling episodes either turned into 
serious fights or ended with tearful, injured children. 
The shelter shed became the venue for `belly-bashing', which seemed to be a version of 
sumo wrestling. Here two opponents would stand on benches at the opposite ends of the 
shelter shed and to the spectators resounding chorus of `on your marks, get set, go', 
would proceed to leap from the benches and run full thrust towards each other. The aim 
of the game was for each child to bash the other child with their stomach, which they 
puffed out, and attempt to knocx their opponent to the ground. Whoever was successful 
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at this won and reclaimed their position on their bench to face a new opponent. If no-one 
fell to the ground then both children would return to their benches and repeat the action 
until one of them was defeated. 
In discussing how boys construct and perform their masculinity in the school playground 
in the absence of competitive games and / or sport Swain (2002: 91-93) has highlighted 
how boys are inclined to engage in other forms of activities that emphasise `embodied 
physicality and athleticism'. Here, it is possible that these games were providing some of 
the boys at Hillend with alternative methods to construct and perform their masculinities. 
Games with more sexual elements also began to be played within the playground. Large 
numbers of boys and girls became highly involved in the game `kiss, cuddle and torture'. 
Briefly stated, this game involved one set of children giving chase to another set of 
children from the opposite sex. If a child caught a member of the opposite sex they had 
to choose whether to be kissed, cuddled or tortured. It was common for boys to opt for 
torture and girls to ask to be kissed or cuddled, although, it was frequently the case that 
boys ignored requests for kissing or cuddling, seemly preferring to torture girls instead. 
This, in common with wrestling, and also `belly-bashing', frequently resulted in the over- 
tortured children's tears and a corresponding increase in the frequency of injured children 
(usually girls). 
The main participants in these games of `kiss, cuddle and torture' were boys who had 
previously been involved in playing football and the girls who had `framed' the football 
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games. As a lot of girls had spent their time at the side lines of the football games 
discussing the players and their romantic interests in them, in part, it seemed that this 
game may have provided an outlet for girls to continue expressing the romantic interests 
they had in these boys. However, boys in their tendencies to opt out of romantic gestures 
seemed more reluctant than the girls were to openly express any interest in the opposite 
sex. For girls the kissing and cuddling aspects of these games appeared to be the most 
exciting. Whereas boys tended to gesticulate disgust at the thought of kissing or 
cuddling, preferring instead to demonstrate their strength to the girls through excessive 
physical torture, although on occasion they would acquiesce to a kiss or cuddle. 
However, in doing so, it was common for boys to lie on top of girls or straddle them 
whilst administering torture. 'Therefore, perhaps they were just as invested in these more 
sexualised aspects of this game (cf. Merten 1996b; Rubin 1980). 
At a general level then, various forms of aggressive and often dangerous play activities 
were increasing. That this was the case was becoming a cause for both concern and 
frustration amongst the staff. Despite attempts to halt these activities in the playground, 
the children tended to either ignore the repeated instructions to cease playing these 
games, disengaged from them temporarily or they attempted to avoid detection by the 
playground supervisor by posting `lookouts'. 
A playscape full of bodies, running violently towards each other, pinning each other 
down and engaging in bodily conflicts (amongst other things) appeared as an anarchistic 
playscape. Certainly, in comparison to the previous serene landscape and even the one 
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previous to that which was full of hustle and bustle, this one was, by contrast, more 
chaotic. Moreover, given the prior serenity of the playground the staff were somewhat 
bewildered about why the children had become `bad'. 
It had, as I have illustrated, became obvious to me that the moment of purification could 
be explained through the removal of materiality within the playground. However, to 
begin with I struggled to find an explanation within actor-network theory that accounted 
for this `embodied moment'. In the moment of purification, I had become anxious about 
the issue of non-action. This embodied moment seemed to invalidate my earlier analysis 
that children's activities were dependent upon the material and therefore on something 
other than the somatic. Here, I momentarily lost faith in the explanations I had been 
developing. 
In my account of the `deconstructive fairy', I drew quite explicitly on John Law's (1997) 
quasi-fictional deconstructive fairy. In discussing what his manager became after the 
fairy had worked her magic, Law (1997) describes him as a `naked ape with all the 
powers of a naked ape'. Law (1997), suggests that all that this naked ape could rely upon 
for his powers was his body. However, even this is not enough because the powers of the 
body are unreliable and because as he states, `even thugs like to carry weapons'. 
This is a particularly astute" observation by Law, in the context of what followed the 
embodied moment at Hillend `when naked apes roamed'. It is so, because at Hillend, the 
naked apes gradually began to seek out material allies through the creative use of 
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whatever materials were available in the environment of the playground. The materials 
they began to associate with were, however, of a different sort to those objects of mass 
production that had previously participated in the interactional scene. 
Sticks, Stones, Empty Cans and Plastic Bottles.... Reinstating the Material 
The introduction of new forms of material objects began to occur as I was concluding (as 
a matter of need) my time at Hillend. Therefore, I did not witness exactly how far this 
reinstatement went. From those children who were also part of my community based 
fieldwork I did learn that there was a subsequent introduction of what was called `soft 
play' within the playground and this had involved the school supplying the children with 
various sorts of play objects "such as sponge-balls, bean bags and hula-hoops - the sort of 
traditional school play equipment that I recall having used myself in primary school. It 
seemed therefore that the children at Hillend continued to experience adjustments to the 
field of heterogeneous possibilities. However, I would like to discuss a few of the new 
forms of materiality that I saw the children introduce and offer some analytical thoughts 
on this. 
Sticks were the first these new forms of material extensions to the body that I noted at 
Hillend. They appeared, or so it seemed, as quite literally a way of extending the 
physical limitations of the powers of the body in one of the more aggressive activities 
that had developed within the playground - sword games. As is probably obvious, the 
children who began this form of what Dunn and Hughes (2001: 500) refer to as `violent 
pretend play' (play which contains themes of inflicting pain upon or killing another) 
295 
utilised the branches of the trees that grew in the peripheral verges of the playground to 
make swords and other sword-like weapons. These sword games were interwoven with 
fantasy and the playing of roles from contemporary fantasy horror films and science 
fiction films, for example, star wars. Interestingly, these were games that the children 
also played in their local, community and therefore this activity was already an 
established routine within their out-of-school play which suggests an active transference 
of story-lines between sites or a drawing upon reliable allies from elsewhere. 
In common with the out of school features of this activity, close attention was paid to the 
selection of swords and a great deal of comparison and discussion about the qualities of 
particular swords went on. These discussions about swords contained many similarities 
to the discussions on football boots presented in Chapter Seven, in so far as, swords were 
often assessed in terms of how they made them better `fighters' or how various attributes 
such as length, thickness and weight made them better or worse swords. Again, these 
children were making explicit statements about how materials extended the powers of 
their bodies and also how these materials failed to extend their somatic resources. For 
example, bad losers would often blame their `deaths' on their swords, either by declaring 
their own sword to be `rubbish' or their opponents sword to be `better'. 
What is interesting in swords is the way in which these children were associating with the 
natural materials of their environment in order to find nonhumans to extend their agentic 
capacities. This had been a hitherto relatively infrequent occurrence at Hillend as the 
children had been previously free to bring and use manufactured toys to school. This 
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reinforces the point made by Factor (2004) about how children creatively use whatever 
materials are at hand in their play. 
Another good example of these associations with the natural materials of the playground 
was the use of stones that the children were combining with empty juice bottles and cans 
in a form of skittles that they began playing. Juice bottles and cans bought from the 
school tuck-shop were specifically being collected and stored in the narrow gap between 
the shelter shed and the wall it backed onto. Stones were used to knock down the skittle 
arrangements that children built with the empty cans and plastic juice bottles. 
What I think these and other similar forms of associations that were being produced 
suggests is that these children had a need to extend themselves through the nonhuman 
and preserve their relations in various forms of material objects. Perhaps, I am 
overstating the case and I recognise the speculation in this statement. However, Latour 
(1994: 793) suggests (although discussing society and social relations more generally) a 
need for such inscription into artefacts. His argument is that the social cannot hold itself 
together by human interaction alone. Rather, it is held together in the sets of interactions 
between the human and the nonhuman (Latour, 1986). Perhaps, children understand and 
recognise this or perhaps the need to inscribe, to associate and to extend the self is more 
intrinsic and more insidious than we ourselves may recognise. 
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Conclusion 
The events at Hillend draw out an important point about the powerful and perhaps 
unintended effect that adults can have upon children's agentic capactities. Fielding 
(2003) makes a similar point when he argues that the extent to which children can realise 
their agency within school is dependent upon the practices of adults and the structures 
they put in place. At Hillend, the project of one adult, although seemingly well 
intentioned, had many consequences for the children's interactions and social relations. 
Atlhough, it should be noted, that these consequences were not always negatively 
experienced by the children. 
Most crucially however, the story of Hillend emphasises how children's agentic 
capacities are dependent upon extensions and supplements. The dependence of Hillend's 
children upon various extensions and supplements for their agency became evident when 
the field of heterogeneous possibilities from which they drew underwent a process of 
residualisation. Moreover, the removal of those artefacts which had held their relations in 
place diminished their existing social order to the point that relations within the 
playground became unstable. Here, the important role that these artefacts had played in 
holding the children's social relations in place became particularly visible. As the 
assemblages the children had regularly entered into during their daily interactions and 
routines were no longer possible, the children had to readjust and create new forms of 
assemblage with different sorts of heterogeneous others. That they actively did so was 
indicative of the children's apparent need to extend themselves in such ways and inscribe 
their relations into material `things'. 
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Conclusion 
Bringing it all Together 
Introduction 
Focusing upon the every day play activities of children, this thesis has explored inter alia 
children's agency, power and social relations. Drawing heuristically upon actor-network 
theory and thought of this kind it has extended the analytical lens to consider the role of 
nonhumans in the mundane interactions of children. In doing so, nonhumans have 
emerged alongside children as crucial participants in social interaction that are implicated 
in the heterogeneous networks of dependencies that children, as heterogeneous engineers, 
actively create to achieve their particular goals and desires. As a corollary to this, an 
analytical incorporation of nonhumans has drawn attention to the wider role that 
nonhumans play in the life worlds of children. Most specifically, the argument advanced 
is that nonhumans, in their diverse forms, are functionally important in holding children's 
social relations in place. 
Crucially, this thesis is intended to contribute towards the development of theoretical and 
empirical debates on children's agency as well as social studies of childhood more 
generally. Here, it engages directly with the (as yet) peripheral move to pose children's 
agency as a question. The theoretical arguments for asking this question and the 
possibilities this may yield have already been advanced quite conclusively by Prout 
(2000,2004 in press) and, Lee (1998,2000). Given that both the theoretical and 
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empirical case for children's agency has been firmly established and has long since 
passed critical mass, both authors have argued that the issue of children's agency should 
now be opened up to empirical analysis. 
Directly connected to this argument is a dissatisfaction with the essentialised treatment of 
children's agency (Prout 2000) upon which the current orthodoxy to treat children as 
social actors (James and Prout 1995; Prout and James 1990) rests. Whilst this has been 
considered strategically necessary in order to develop the sub-discipline of the `sociology 
of childhood' and permit children entry into sociological discourse (Lee 1998), Prout 
(2000: 16) argues that, `the agency in children's agency remains inadequately theorised'. 
Therefore, he suggests that there is a need to `decentre agency' and to ask `how it is that 
children sometimes exercise it' (2000: 16), or to put it another way - what children 
depend upon for their agency (Lee 2000). 
Tracing the networks of dependencies through which children realise their agency is a 
central theme in this work. Given that the social actor paradigm has now become so 
entrenched as to be represented in many research accounts as `implicit and taken-for- 
granted' (Christensen and James 2003: 3) and given that this, in itself, may be seen as 
indicative of a wider problem of theoretical stagnation (see Chapter Two) a project such 
as the one contained here is perhaps timely. However, considering the widespread 
currency of the social actor paradigm a project which seeks to move the (current) 
established standpoint from a `being-based' sociology towards a `becoming-based' 
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sociology may be considered by some sociologists of childhood as a `retrograde step' 
(Lee 2001: 134). Such a view, I believe, would be misplaced. 
In Chapter Two I argued, that the approach taken in this thesis does not disconnect with 
the social actor paradigm nor with the theoretical arguments or empirical observations 
that have supported the case for children's agency. A study which intends to ask what 
children rely upon for their agency necessarily implies an acceptance of the argument that 
children are capable of exercising agency. Therefore, recognising that children can be 
agentic has been crucial to the central task of this thesis. However, the need to 
essentialise children's agency has not. 
In concluding this work, the discussions below aim to bring together the various strands 
within this thesis and tease out more comprehensibly the arguments that have been drawn 
from the analysis of the empirical materials generated and presented in the preceding 
narrative. For the sake of expediency, these discussions are presented thematically and 
reflect the substantive arguments contained within the thesis. However, before moving 
on to do so, I wish first to briefly revisit the field. 
Revisiting the Field 
Ethically and practically, the parent-as-researcher approach presented many difficulties 
`in the field'. In particular, the strain caused by attempting to find and sustain an 
acceptable stance in the field that lessened the asymmetrical power relations invested in 
both the parental role and the researcher role was salient throughout the fieldwork period. 
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Whilst it is recognised that power imbalances are pronounced when researchers enter the 
lives of children (Corsaro 1981) and most childhood researchers have to find methods to 
circumvent these sorts of difficulties, they appear intensified in this approach. Ethical 
practice in this approach has to be an adaptive and active process that is characterised by 
continued reflection and if necessary, adjustment and refinement of fieldwork practice. 
Although not an unprecedented approach, it is one, that I suggest, is best left to practised 
researchers of childhood who are perhaps more experienced in the act of ethical `tight- 
rope balancing' (Alder and Adler 2001: 37). 
The adoption of the parent-as-researcher approach was a contingent outcome of in situ 
developments within the research process. That is, it emerged through the combination 
of a perceived need to conduct an exploratory phase to focus down the research and 
through a local identification of a play space and sample considered suitable for these 
purposes. Therefore, this 'approach which resulted in the development of this 
ethnographic study was not an a priori decision. 
No less a priori has been the development of the analytical framework used in this study. 
Therefore, whilst the analysis of the empirical materials has been informed by actor- 
network theory and associated thought of this kind, this thesis did not set out to present 
an actor-network analysis. That it has developed into an actor-network analysis has been 
a direct result of `a process of interaction between the conceptual and empirical world' 
(Bechhofer 1974: 73). A direct consequence of this has been a broadening of the 
analytical lens to include the nonhuman. Therefore, in attending to the nonhuman, the 
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`more direct voice' (Prout and James 1992: 8) that ethnography is considered to permit 
children has been somewhat diluted in this account. 
However, this analysis has been mindful of children's understandings, particularly as 
they relate to children's `vocabularies of motive' (see Chapter Three). For an actor- 
network analysis this has been crucial to understand, as far as it is possible, children's 
own rationales for the actor-networks they constructed and most particularly those 
humans and nonhumans they enrolled and their strategies for doing so. Additionally, and 
as the reader will no doubt have picked up, the interpretation of children's meanings was 
pivotal in the analytical development of this thesis (see Chapters One and Eight). 
The communication of the complex and interwoven processes that have resulted in the 
development of this thesis has been inherently difficult and it is my hope that I have 
yielded this comprehensible to the reader throughout and that I have adequately 
accounted for the `means of production' (Stanley 1990), in spite of the formal 
restrictions bureaucracy places upon the doctoral thesis. As I move to conclude the 
substantive findings of this work, it is hoped that the reader can draw their own 
conclusions whilst being as fully informed as possible about the conditions under which 
this thesis became. 
The Roles Nonhumans Play 
Recognising that the life worlds of children are populated by a diversity of nonhumans in 
obvious forms such as toys or in less obvious forms such as animals, is perhaps an 
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unsurprising observation. The accounts of many childhood researchers are, after all, 
littered with descriptions that bring these nonhumans into the ethnographic dramas they 
recreate in their texts. However, for the most part, these nonhumans, whilst present, are 
excluded from the sociologist's analytical endeavours. An analysis which invoked an a 
priori symmetrical treatment brought these nonhumans out of the background and 
revealed them to be as implicated in the social interactions that took place as their human 
counterparts. Consequently, toys and other miscellaneous materials and artefacts 
emerged as more than simply the instruments of children's play. Likewise, the roles of 
other diverse nonhumans such as environmental elements, items of clothing and 
footwear, bricks, bottles, planks of wood and so forth became increasing visible when 
they were recast in the shape of entities or actants and absorbed into analysis. 
Just as diverse as the nonhumans themselves are the multiple ways in which these 
nonhumans contributed to social interaction. As extenders of children's capacities and 
co-participants in the creation of effects, nonhumans enabled children to achieve desired 
goals and aims or to perform certain functions. For example, something as mundane as a 
pair of football boots was seen to extend the capacities of the body and act to enhance the 
abilities of children who played football. In so doing, football boots - as actants - 
empowered children to become a better players through facilitating better interactions 
with other players and also other nonhumans (a football for example, or the grass pitch 
upon which some of the game were played). Therefore, this revealed that a non- 
symmetrical analysis distorts the roles that these mundane nonhumans play and conceals 
them behind a notion of a single point actor (Law 1992) which may only permit a limited 
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view of the footballer as the author of a particular action -a somatically bound entity 
who aims, shoots and scores. 
In their descriptions of themselves as good footballers, or goal scorers children also 
considered themselves as authors of their own actions. However, their narratives also 
offered, sometimes concurrently, a contrary view in which they described and revealed a 
complex understanding of their own `networked-ness'. For instance, in discussing 
football boots, children were particular and detailed in their accounts of the ways that 
football boots extended the capacities of their bodies and enhanced their performances as 
players. In their discussions they also `unblack-boxed' these entities, describing their 
various elements and components and how these act together to produce a good football 
boot. Here, children would depict in meticulous and knowledgeable detail the various 
technical components of football boots; from the devices that kept the laces from entering 
into contact with the ball to the material that allowed better ball control and so on. 
Implicit within these discussions was children's acute awareness of how some 
nonhumans could extend their capacities as actors or, conversely, how other nonhumans 
(or indeed the same nonhuman in a different context) could limit their potential to act. In 
the stream of talk about football and the interactions that characterised and surrounded 
football games, children were forever conscious of how, for example, the concrete 
surface of the school playground resisted football boots and school shoes. The latter of 
these items of footwear were recognised as inhibitors of their capacities as footballers 
that limited, rather than enhanced, their somatic resources. 
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This capacity to think heterogeneously was also implicit in children's discussions of the 
rationales that informed their selection of the actants they enrolled into their networks. 
For instance, in enrolling a natural nonhuman -a dog (see Chapter Six) - one young 
person in describing the effectiveness of his dog as an ally, discussed how the dog's 
physical appearance as `vicious' meant that when he entered into assemblage with his 
dog nobody bothered or harassed him. Therefore, the animal-human dyad (Michael 1996) 
was explained in terms of its ability to expand his own capacities to prevent unprovoked 
trouble from others. Instances such as these communicated that the children thought 
reflexively about those they, enrolled into their networks and how they strengthened or 
did not strengthen their corporeal resources and therefore their capacities as social actors. 
Nonhumans that had not been enrolled by children but by adults in their attempts to 
control the children's activities and interactions, also acted to enable or constrain the 
children. A particularly poignant example of this was the erection of a fence to segregate 
the younger children from the older children in the school playground. The fence served 
as a barrier which excluded some children from a particular spatial area, whilst at the 
same time, containing others within a separate designated space. The fence itself acted to 
physically separate a disabled girl from her older female sibling who assisted her in 
visiting the lavatory during break times. This separation from her older sibling impaired 
her ability to use the lavatory efficiently enough during play time to allow her enough 
free time to spend with friends. However, whilst the fence acted to impair her ability to 
use the lavatory quickly and spend time with friends, her sister experienced the fence as 
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an enabler. The physical barrier it put between her and her disabled sister acted to release 
her (for a short time) from caring responsibilities. This illustrated an important point 
about adult's use of nonhumans to control children and also nonhumans in general. For 
some, they may act to constrain action but for others they may enable it. In this instance 
the older sibling enjoyed an autonomy that she was previously denied - time for herself. 
Many of the nonhumans that circulated in Greenspace and Hillend occupied a dual 
constraining / enabling role - allowing some but forbidding others. This drew out of the 
analysis that the ways in which a particular nonhuman may `act' upon the capacities of 
children was never fixed nor given. However, whether enablers or prohibitors some 
nonhumans appeared more potent than others. Moreover, what was heterogeneously 
available was not the same for everyone. 
Heterogeneous Possibilities and Limitations 
Lee (2000) makes the point that people inhabit different sets of extensions and 
supplements. For these children the pool of heterogeneous others upon which they could 
draw was different for each child. For instance, one child's `cultural capital' gave him 
access to a range of potent nonhumans desired by other children but exclusively his. His 
assemblages with these nonhuman tended to be more effective in achieving his desired 
goals because of the exclusivity, desirability and thus strength of his nonhuman co- 
participants. In assembling with these nonhumans he could, at times, temporarily and 
relatively easily, raise his status within the group more successfully than others whose 
assemblages with less potent nonhumans were often less effective. A child-robot 
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assemblage for example, was more likely to raise the status of any particular child than a 
child-football assemblage. 
This use of potent nonhumans for status elevation was a common feature of the children's 
interactions. However, the success of these potent nonhuman-child assemblages was 
directly related to the attractiveness of the object itself. These objects tended to be the 
`desired objects' of mass production. Therefore, children were attracted to these 
assemblages because of their longing to access such an object. However, access could 
only be acquired through the obligatory passage point in such an assemblage - that is, the 
child who owned the object. It was in becoming an obligatory passage point that a 
particular child would become powerful. In order to access the `desired object' other 
children had to pass through the child-as-obligatory passage point. The child-as- 
obligatory passage point could then control the flow of access to, and use of, the object. 
This was illustrated in the `turn-taking' rituals discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five, where for a short time the child with the `desired object' controlled the interactions 
of some of the other children. 
Here there was a related point about children's assemblages with adults and in particular 
their access to the economic resources of their parents (although never posed in these 
terms in the analysis). For instance, the main parental wage-earner in the family of the 
child in the example given in Chapter Four was economically advantaged in comparison 
with the parents of the other children. This had a direct impact on the potency of those 
nonhumans or toys that this child possessed. 
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Adults could, therefore, expand or limit children's heterogeneous resources. Adults 
could also, however, become obligatory passage points. For example, in the illustration 
of the `ramp-network' in Chapter Five, one adult emerged as an obligatory passage point 
through which one child had to pass in order to enrol the nonhuman entities that were 
considered necessary for the construction of the ramp-network. In allowing the child 
passage the `ramp-network' was able to be constructed. 
Adults could limit children's agentic capacties by resisting enrolment into children's 
actor-networks. The attempted enrolment of adults as a help seeking strategy illustrated 
this. Frequently, adults refused to be enrolled by children in such ways. In the 
discussions in Chapter Six there were two such episodes of adult resistance to children's 
enrolment attempts. In this example, a child poignantly expressed his feelings about 
those adults who did not help him because they did not take his concerns seriously - 
because they did not listen. A much more subtle point drawn out here was that children 
appeared to invest adults with a duty of care towards them that they considered should 
include taking their concerns seriously because they are serious to them. 
Within the school, adults as teachers can severely restrict children's agentic capacities. 
The shift from the playground at Hillend from being a relatively autonomous field of 
heterogeneous possibilities to a very restrictive one, served to emphasise the very 
powerful effect that adult control of social and material heterogeneity can have. In 
particular, the cleansing of artefacts that had routinely participated in children's 
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interactions seriously impaired the children's capacities to act. Fielding (2000: 234) in his 
geographical analysis of the primary school makes a similar point when he argues that: 
`In UK primary schools, the extent to which this [children's] agency is 
realised is largely dependent upon the structuring of the teaching, 
learning and management within the school, which is in turn 
constructed through the moral beliefs and practices of the governors, 
headteacher, teachers, learning support assistants..... ' 
In the case of Hillend playground, this particular residualisation of the heterogeneous 
field of possibilities was intimately connected to the head teacher's disciplinary 
programme, which in turn appeared to be connected, in part, to her own system of values, 
morals and beliefs. However, and as Factor (2004) has also noted, children are 
resourceful and imaginative in their appropriation of materials for play. The children at 
Hillend began to forge new assemblages with different nonhumans through creatively 
drawing upon materials such as drinks cans, stones, tree branches and other to-hand 
objects. This was indicative of the children's need to inscribe their relations in material 
objects. 
These events at Hillend drew out the pragmmatic value of the application of actor 
network theory to the study of children's interactions with each other. For example, in 
Chapter Eight attention was drawn to how a lack of understanding or insight about the 
roles that nonhumans played' in social interaction in regard to holding social relations in 
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place and so forth led to the mass removal of material heterogeneity within the 
playground. Whilst various and often quite logical rationales informed the removal of 
many necessary nonhumans (e. g. quasi-objects) from the site the consequences for the 
stability of the social order of the playground were far reaching. Additionally, actor 
network theory in its attentiveness to the variety of assemblages that children enter into in 
their daily routines drew out the problems that some children faced when changes were 
made to social heterogeneity. Therefore when the spatial changes were made to the 
playground the consequences to some children were highlighted (e. g. being separated 
from other children who had been integral to their ability to perform competently at a 
certain task such as going to the lavatory). What this approach allowed therefore was an 
attentive examination of how children's social orders operate and how they are held 
together. In doing so, it drew out the importance of recognising the vast number of 
different types of actors (of actants) that are involved and the roles that they play in 
producing a stable and relatively enduring social order. 
Holding Social Relations in Place 
The events that arose as a consequence of the cleansing of material nonhumans from the 
field of heterogeneous possibilities at Hillend were pivotal to the analytical development 
of this thesis. The final substantive theme in this thesis about the crucial role that the 
nonhuman played in holding the children's social relations in place, arose as a result of 
the social disorder that occur-red when the `missing masses went missing'. Without their 
regular nonhuman co-participants to enter into assemblages with and particularly without 
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the `quasi-objects' that had previously infested the playground at Hillend, the children 
struggled to hold their existing relations in place. 
These `quasi-objects' in the form of footballs, beyblades, wrestling figures and so on had 
acted to bind children together in their activity groups. Illustrated in the football example 
in Chapter Seven, these objects in their circulation between and among the children, is 
what made the realisation of their collectivities possible. These nonhumans held together 
and structured the relations that were played out within Hillend playground. 
The presence of these objects in the multiple, had served to create a social order within 
the playground that was stable and relatively enduring. Their removal broke down this 
social order and transformed the children into `naked apes' who, dependent upon the 
powers of the body, struggled to forge anything that could endure beyond the moment or 
become stable. In their struggle to extend themselves and to hold their social relations in 
place, the children of Hillerid sought out new nonhuman with which to associate. In 
doing so, they exposed themselves and their social relations to be dependent upon the 
heterogeneous associations and mediations that take place between humans and `things'. 
Conclusion 
Most crucially, this thesis has posed children's agency as question and it has offered 
some empirical answers to this question. In doing so, it has advanced a view that has 
argued that children's agency, power and social relations take their form and are an 
outcome of the heterogeneous associations that take place between children and 
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nonhumans. I could draw out this conclusion here and attempt, through the use of 
complex vocabulary, to reinforce, one last time the substantive argument contained 
within and throughout this thesis. I have chosen not to do this. Instead I wish to end this 
thesis with the words of a child spoken to me at the very beginning of my exploration: 
`He is powerful because he has the big table and the photocopier' 
Joseph, aged seven, responding to being asked why his head teacher is powerful 
It has taken me four years to piece together this argument and a near eighty thousand 
words to make a point that a seven year old child communicated to me without taking any 
time to think about it and using only twelve words. I failed at the outset to give his words 
any attention. I now stand humbled by these words that communicate in their marvellous 
simplicity the crux of my argument. 
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Appendix One 
Photographs of `Greenspace' 
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